Communications: Peaceful Co-existence and Stalinism

[p052] Peaceful Co-existence in no sense is a product of the post-Stalin era. The original theory of Socialism in One Country depended upon an estimation of capitalism as a stable system with which it would be possible to have harmonious relations over a long period. Atongside this theory went the view of Stalin that capitalism was no longer in an epoch of wars and revolutions but entering a period of stabilisation in which all hope of revolution had to be given up. The old Bolshevik conception of negotiations as a means of ‘buying time while the Soviet Union and the international revolutionary movement were both built up was thus abandoned in favour of negotiations as a means of establishing long-term relations. The Fourteenth Party Congress (1925) declared: ‘In the sphere of international relations we have a reinforcement and lengthening of the “breathing spell’ which is transforming itself into a whole period. (My emphasis) The Left Opposition declared this to be a result of the defeats of the international revolutionary movement and the pessimism growing out of them and a ‘renunciation of the tactics of world revolution’ (Platform of the Left Opposition). Thus, the idea of long-term peaceful co-existence and even lasting peace treaties occurs long before the post-Stalin leadership in the Soviet Union. In 1928 Trotsky wrote: “The new doctrine proclaims that socialism can be built on the basis of a national state if only there is no intervention. From this there can and must follow a collaborationist policy towards the foreign bourgeoisie with the object of averting intervention, as this will guarantee the con- struction of socialism, that is to say, will solve the main historical question’ (Draft Programme of the Com- munist International. Emphasis mine.) In my view this sums up exactly the policy of the Khrushchev bureaucracy today. And in Revolution Betrayed Trotsky points out: ‘The bureaucracy has arrived at the idea of insuring the inviolability of the Soviet Union by including it in the system of the European-Asiatic status quo. What could be finer, when all is said and done, than an eternal pact of non-aggression between socialism and capitalism?’ Finally, Comrade Varga refers to ‘the “parlia- mentary roads to Socialism” developed by Khrush- chev’. (My emphasis) In fact, Khrushchev himself some time ago chided the Chinese for denying the possibility of a parliamentary road to socialism and yet at the same time supporting Stalin. He pointed out that the passage on parliamentary roads in FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AUTUMN-WINTER 1964 The British Road to Socialism had been drafted by Stalin. It might be argued that the difference between the period I have referred to and the Khrushchev era is that in the former the Stalinists were not yet perpetrating deliberate cold-blooded sabotage of revolutions but were rather pursuing wrong policies. This is true, yet it was Stalin who began the policy of deliberate ‘betrayal of the international working class. The withholding of arms from the Spanish working class, the Popular Frontism of the thirties, the Stalin-Hitler pact, the withholding of arms from the Yugoslav partisans, the halting of the Red Army outside Warsaw while the German army put down the Warsaw uprising, the classic ‘peaceful co- existence’ policies of post-war Europe with the mass French and Italian Communist Parties entering bourgeois governments and making possible the recovery of capitalism in Western Europe, the ruthless abandoning of the Greek communists, the support for Chiang Kai-shek. Lack of space prevents a proper documentation of all these events and allows only one. Herbert Feis in his book on the Potsdam Conference Between War and Peace refers to the conversations in 1945 between Stalin and Averell Harriman, American ambassador to Russia, on the Question of China: ‘Harriman then went on to ask a series of pointed questions. What would the Soviet attitude be if China was not unified when Soviet troops entered Manchuria? Would the Marshal consider it possible in that case to make the necessary arrangements with Chiang Kai-shek? Stalin answered without pause: the Soviet govern- ment did not propose to alter the sovereignty of China over Manchuria or any other part of China; and the Soviet Union had no territorial claims on China, either in Sinkiang or elsewhere. In regard to the Generalissimo Stalin said he knew little of any Chinese leader, ‘but he felt that Chiang Kai-shek was the best of the lot and would be the one to undertake the unification of China. He said he saw no other possible leader and that for example he did not believe that the Chinese Communist leaders were as good or would be able to bring about the unification of China. Was Stalin going to ask Chiang Kai-shek to organise the civil administration when Soviet troops entered Manchuria? He would, Stalin replied; in Manchuria, as in any part of China where Soviet troops went, the Chinese civil administration could be set up by Chiang Kai-shek. ‘Chiang could send his representatives to set up the Kwantung regime in any areas where the Red anmy was’. (Between War and Peace, pp. 112ff) 139

[p053] 140 Feis, quite correctly, calls this an “open and amiable assent to American aims and American tsardom in China’—and that is not Khrushchev, but Stalin. I am aware that Comrade Varga’s article as it appeared in FOURTH INTERNATIONAL is an abridged version of a much longer work, but I cannot see how he has really made out a case for declaring that the present leadership of the Soviet Union is carrying out a new foreign policy based on a theoretical development worked out by them. Stalinism produced a different foreign policy from Bolshevism, based on different theories, because Stalinism was qualitatively and completely diffezent from Bolshevism—it was a degenerated bureaucratic caste which had to destroy the Bolshevik party in order to get power. In my view Khrushchev is the head of a bureaucratic caste in the Soviet Union, as was Stalin, and his fundamental aims are the same— the defence of the privileged position of that bureau- cracy, the holding down of the Russian working class, the prevention of the spread of revolution, and the defence of the Soviet Union but by methods which could only bring about its downfall. If there was a fundamental, qualitative difference in the foreign policies of Khrushchev and Stalin, a Marxist would look for such a difference in their social role inside the Soviet Union. In my view there is no basic difference in those roles. 2. The question of the role of the Soviet bureau- cracy leads on to the second criticism of Comrade Varga’s article. Comrade Varga states: “Acceptance of an armaments control on USSR territory would represent the opening of a breach which would allow imperialism to infiltrate into the planned economy, threatening to dismantle the monopoly of foreign trade . . . this is the projected route for the re-establishment of capitalism in the USSR.’ Let me make it clear, I am not advocating that the Soviet Union ought to allow inspection posts on her territory. Clearly the Soviet Union must arm herself with all the means necessary against the aggressive war plans of imperialism. There can be no disagreement amongst Trotskyists about that. What I am questioning is whether such posts could, in fact, have the devastating effect that Comrade Varga suggests. It seems to me that to go from a military inspection post to the overthrow of the monopoly of foreign trade would be a tremendous jump and not in any way an easy thing to do, The overthrow of the planned economy of the Soviet Union and the restoration of capitalism would be a much more difficult task than Comrade Varga seems to imply here. It could not be done without either armed intervention from without or COMMUNICATIONS armed counter-revolution from within or both. It is true that without the economic defences of the Soviet Union, of which the monopoly of foreign trade is the most important, the workers’ state would be subjected to tremendous pressure from the capitalist market, ‘but even this would require the use of force, in the final analysis, to ‘bring about such a fundamental change in the class structure of the Soviet Union as the restoration of capitalism, making the USSR into a ‘special colony of ‘imperialism’. Comrade Varga seems to me to be on completely false ground when he develops this point further and says that ‘the (Russian leaders . . . are ready to trade the socialist heritage of the October revolu- tion’. This contradicts the Trotskyist analysis of the Russian bureaucracy and at the same time credits the bureaucracy with more strength than it has. The bureaucracy is not ready to trade the socialist heritage of October. At the present stage of development it could not do it even if it wanted to. Trotsky spoke of the dual nature of the Soviet bureaucracy. In international politics it is com- pletely reactionary, whereas in the Soviet Union it has expropriated the working class politically but is compelled to defend the social conquests of October by means of its own. This classic Trotskyist definition retains all its validity today. ‘The Soviet bureaucracy has expropriated the proletariat politically in order by methods of its own to defend the social conquests. (My emphasis) (Revolution Betrayed, Chapter 9 ‘Social Relations in the Soviet Union’) ‘The ‘bureaucracy has not yet created social supports for its domination in the form of special types of property. It is compelled to defend state property as the source of its power and its income. In this aspect of its activity it still remains a weapon of proletarian dictatorship.’ (/bid.) To justify the statement that the Soviet leaders are ready to trade the socialist heritage of October, Comrade Varga would have to show that these leaders had already created the social basis for this within the Soviet Union by creating new forms of property. This he does not do. He would also have to show that the bureaucracy has not only betrayed the revolution politically but defeated the working class completely within Russia. To quote Trotsky again: ‘As a conscious political force the bureaucracy has betrayed the revolution. But a victorious revolution is . . . not only political institutions, but also 4 system of social relations. To betray it is not enough. You have to overthrow it. The October FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AUTUMN-WINTER 1964

[p054] COMMUNICATIONS Revolution has been betrayed by the ruling stratum but not yet overthrown.’ (Ibid. My emphasis) The Soviet bureaucracy could not deliberately and willingly open the doors to the domination of US. imperialism without first having overthrown the system of social relations within the Soviet Union. This they have not done. Nor could they do it without a violent and victorious struggle against the working class. ‘On the road to capitalism the counter-revolution would have to break the resistance of the workers, on the road to socialism the workers would have to overthrow the bureaucracy’ (Revolution Betrayed). All the present indications are that the bureaucracy lives in fear and trembling of the working class, as the recent spate of rehabili- tations shows. 3. The position taken by Comrade Varga in relation to the Communist Party of China should be treated with some caution. In section 5 of his article “The Split inside Stalinism’ he declares that ‘revisionism characterises the Stalinist Parties’, which is true, but then he goes on to say that this revisionism ‘fights the revolutionary position of the Chinese Party’. (My emphasis) ‘ In fact, the Chinese party does not hold a revolutionary position but an opportunist, revision:st one. The Chinese party is still a Stalinist party and this for deeper reasons than Comrade Varga allows when he says: ‘So long as they maintain their un- principled alliance with the murderer Enver Hoxha, and so long as they hail the bourgeois regime of Ben Bella as authentically revolutionary and so on, their criticism of Khrushchev remains within the framework of Stalinist conceptions. It is not Marxism to see the Chinese position as a mixture of good (opposition to Khrushchev and referring back to Lenin) and bad (worship of Stalin, support of Hoxha, etc.). The Chinese Communist party is faced with the direct threat of world imperialism in Asia and this ‘brings it up empirically against the policies of Khrushchev (which are a continuation of the policies of Stalin). But the Chinese leaders, while attacking Khrushchev, defend Stalin. This is not because there is any basic difference between the policies of Khrushchev and Stalin, nor because of a mysterious blind spot on the part of the Chinese, but because the stubborn defence of Stalin by the Chinese reflects the stubborn bureaucratic domina- tion of these leaders over every aspect of Chinese life, including the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese leaders are a ‘bureaucratic caste standing above the Chinese working class and peasantry, just as the Khrushchevites are in Russia, except that the Khrushchevites were compelled to attempt to adjust to mass pressures from below in the FOURTH ENTERNATIONAL AUTUMN-WINTER 1964 141 Soviet Union by denouncing the crimes of Stalin and trying to hide their part in them. Thus, it is not true that the conflict within the world Communist parties is one ‘between ‘the capi- tulationary position of peaceful co-existence and the revolutionary position of the class struggle’. There is not a single Communist party in the entire world putting forward the revolutionary position of the class struggle. Such policies can only be put forward by genuine revolutionary parties—that is, by Trotsky- ist parties. The Chinese leaders have repeatedly declared their own belief in peaceful co-existence and they have not carried out revolutionary policies in Asia. Their attitude to the Asian national ‘bourgeoisie, for instance in regards to Indonesia, is a classical Stalinist one of supporting ‘progressives’ like Sukarno and completely subordinating the real revolutionary forces in Indonesia to him. And Chou En-lai’s tour of the Middle East some months ago in no way differed from the recent visit of Khrushchev, except that the latter had more to offer in the way of loans. The fact that the Chinese Communist Party addresses its criticisms in the main to the official leaderships of the Communist parties instead of attempting to build revolutionary support amongst the international working masses is not due to a ‘serious illusion’ in the possibility of convincing those leaders, as Comrade Varga suggests, but because the bureaucratic position and policies of the Chinese leaders prevent them from making any such revolu- tionary appeal. Finally, Comrade Varga calls upon ‘the Chinese’ to adopt Marxist revolutionary theory and practice and declares: ‘Is it possible for the Chinese Communist Party to manage to adopt such a position? That is a question to which we cannot give a categorical reply.’ It is quite clear from the context that by ‘the Chinese’ Comrade Varga means the Chinese party leaders and that he is referring to the Chinese Communist Party as it is now, with the existing leadership. In that case, we can give a categorical reply to his question. It is not possible for the Chinese Com- munist Party to adopt Marxist revolutionary theory and practice without the overthrow of the present bureaucratic leadership of that party. In other words, without the political revolution in China to remove the present bureaucratic caste and replace it ‘by real workers’ power, there can be no international revolutionary leadership from China. It is not the task of Trotskyists to speculate upon the ‘possibility of a recovery by this (the Chinese)

[p055] 142. party’ (Comrade Varga says, ‘We cannot a priori dismiss this possibility’) but to utilise the deep split within world Stalinism for the construction of a genuine revolutionary ({i.e., Trotskyist) international, Reply by M. VARGA THE CRITICISMS BY Comrade Gale concerning my text on the USSR and the Stalinist bureaucracy certainly prove one thing: they show a willingness to seriously examine and discuss at last this funda- mental problem. If the discussion continues and ends in a better understanding of the USSR today, of the recent policies of the bureaucracy and along with this of our own tasks, then the aim of my own work will have ‘been realised. From this point of view it is significant that the Pabloite revisionists have not up to now made any serious analysis of the social problems of the USSR. Their ‘liquidationist’ attitude, particularly towards the task of constructing revolutionary parties in the USSR, in China and in the peoples’ democracies, is profoundly linked with this theoretical ‘negligence’. I consider the opening of such a discussion in FoURTH INTERNATIONAL as one of the signs of a decisive break with the revisionists: a break with their attitude of adaptation to the bureaucracy, in whatever form, and, as a result, a serious and, of course, practical tackling of the task of building Marxist parties and the International. Gale says frankly that he has not read my whole text and therefore his criticisms concern one chapter, which appeared in translation in the first number of FoURTH INTERNATIONAL. Of course, this fact, at least in part, is bound to distort the discussion. We can do nothing about that ‘but I am obliged to reply through the method which I employed in my original text: it must be understood that we cannot begin at the end, i.e., ‘by the foreign policy of the bureaucracy, but by taking my own point of departure: the social and economic analysis of the USSR. It is right to say that the Stalinist bureaucracy is a contradictory social group which, despite its counter-revolutionary character, is linked to the conquests of October and to their preservation. In fact my whole text is based on the examination of this contradiction. It would ‘be a mistake to consider this contradiction as something fixed and immovable, given for all time. It seems to me that Gale, instead of examining the development of this contradiction in contemporary Soviet society and its repercussions on the international level, tries to refute my analysis by leaning solely upon quotations. I cannot follow him in that. To the extent that COMMUNICATIONS with sections in every land, including Russia and China. Only along this road will Marxist revolutionary theory and practice be developed. Soviet saciety is contradictory the writings of Trotsky—more precisely quotations from them— are themselves apparently contradictory. And since it is a matter of dialectical contradictions, 1.e., perpetual development in which the opposites are changing each in relation to the other, the use of quotations alone will not take us very far. Only the whole analysis of Trotsky provides the key to a correct approach to the understanding of Soviet society. But if Gale thinks that since Trotsky’s assassination, Soviet society has remained the same and, more precisely, that the social content of the contradictory nature of the bureaucracy has not developed, then I am afraid that he will be on his own on that point. He is obviously right when he says that neither the USSR nor the bureaucracy has changed qualitatively. But against whom does Gale advance this particular statement? It certainly cannot be against me since I have shown and repeated expressly a number of times that it is not a question of a qualitative or fundamental change. However, the continued repetition of this truth has the possible danger of concealing from us the fact that there is a difference between qualitative change and other change. Quantitative changes have their importance: through. a number of detailed changes they develop a qualitatively different form. On the basis of an analysis of contemporary Soviet society I am stating then that in the social relations and the policies of the bureaucracy, international as well as foreign, there is an accentuation of the con- tradictory development which tends to the liquidation of the conquests of October. The dual nature of the ‘bureaucracy remains a fact. But within this dual nature forces tending to change it have developed and are influencing it. I stress this phenomenon in my text. During the period 1923-27 the Left Opposition laid stress on the dangers of counter revolution and if one recalls what Trotsky wrote—in 1936—i.e., “The predominance of socialist tendencies over petty~bourgeois tendencies is guaranteed not by automatic economic development . . . but by the political strength of the dictatorship. The character of the economy depends entirely then on that of the state power’—I do not think I was mistaken when I refused to consider the social relations as immovable. Thus, on my side I take account of the dynamics of the contradictory nature of the bureaucracy and of FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AUTUMN-WINTER 1964

[p056] COMMUNICATIONS the Soviet situation. In proceeding in this way I was not alone. And since Cde Gale is well acquainted with Trotsky’s writings I will recall for him this conclusion of The Revolution Betrayed: ‘The scientific task, as well as the political, is not to give a finished definition to an unfinished process, but to follow all its stages, separate its progressive from its reactionary tendencies, expose their mutual relations, foresee possible variants of development, and find in this foresight a basis for action. In my text all I did was to try and make some accounting of the stage. reached today by these ‘unfinished processes’. Now, Cde Gale quotes freely from this work of Trotsky’s but he does not advance any explanation of the contemporary position and policy of the bureaucracy. However, such an attitude can only lead to a complete distortion of The Revolution Betrayed. For example, how can the following statement of Trotsky’s ‘be explained if one remains faithful to the very letter of the text? ‘If the Soviet bureaucracy succeeds, with its treacherous policy of “people’s fronts” in ensuring the victory of reaction in Spain and France .. . the Soviet Union will find itself on the edge of ruin. A bourgeois counter- revolution rather than an insurrection of the workers against the bureaucracy will be on the order of the day.’ In my opinion the military attack against the USSR and consequently the defence of the conquest of October by the masses had the effect historically of postponing the onset of this bourgeois develcp- ment. However, one must not proceed as if no development of this kind took place. Since the war and above all since the 50s_ the development showed its full meaning inside the USSR. I nowhere stated that the bureaucracy—and above all the bureaucracy as such, as a whole social group—deliberately and voluntarily opens the door to imperialism. On the contrary I do write that the logic of this policy leads in that direction; today even more, within the midst of the bureaucracy, powerful forces have appeared who wish to go further, and these forces already influence the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR. It is not my intention here to re-write my whole text. I try therefore to analyse the social problems of the USSR not forgetting this other statement by Trotsky, also from The Revolution Betrayed: ‘The bureau- cracy continues at the head of the state. Even under these conditions social relations will not jell . It must inevitably in future stages seek supports for itself in property relations.’ But let’s finish with quotations now. I should say that revisionists of the Pablo type, although they FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AUTUMN-WINTER 1964 143 have not made any analysis of the problems of Soviet society, try to explain after their own fashion the political development of the USSR. They assert that the Soviet bureaucracy is evolving peacefully towards workers’ democracy. Isaac Deutscher, their unofficial ideologue, also takes this so-called dynamic view of the situation (see The Prophet Outcast), but their ‘dynamism’ goes in a direction fundamentally opposite to mine. Their ‘theory’ results from their political adaptation to the bureaucracy and serves as a ‘scientific’ cloak for the latter. Whereas my aim above all has been and is still ‘. . . to find in this foresight a basis for action’. So I could not remain content with repeating quotations. How can we explain the present rightward trend of the bureaucracy? Is there in fact such a rightwa.d trend? Is it different in any way from the policy carried out up to now? And why? And how? But if there is no change how then can we explain that Trotsky, and along with him the Left Opposi- tion, made a clear distinction between the policies of Stalin before and after 1929 while, however, the ‘bureaucracy’s policy remained fundamentally the same, that is to say counter-revolutionary? How else can we explain if not by this difference (befc re and after 1929), the capitulation of a good number of oppositionists? These differences existing upon the same ‘basis, did they not have their own meaning for activity—that is, for the building of the party? The revisionists acclaim the bureaucracy; they draw their ‘proof’ from the change in the bureau- cracy’s policy. I, on the contrary, fight for the political revolution, wishing to ‘build the weapon of that revolution, the party. And so I must take into consideration this change. If I dare say it we also look at it ‘dynamically’. But where does Comrade Gale find himself? His metaphysical arguments— instead of explaining the present policy of the bureaucracy, he employs quotations—makes me think theoretically he remains in the middle of the road and, politically, in a ‘wait-and-see’ position. I hold fast to the analysis that the present policy of the Soviet bureaucracy is already very largely and to a disturbing extent threatening directly the con- quests of October; that it is changing to a cerain extent (not qualitatively, of course) the social relations themselves, thereby weakening the position of the workers’ state, and that in this way its policy menaces directly and not only historically the fruits of the revolution. How does Comrade Gale explain, for example, the current discussions on planning? Does he really think that such attacks by petty- bourgeois’ forces, encouraged by the very strong fraction in the ‘bureaucracy, against one of the

[p057] 144 fundamental conquests of October, mean nothing new? Is he really of the opinion that the bourgeois counter-revolution or the workers’ political revolu- tion—of which Trotsky spoke—falls from the sky all at one moment, without any preparation and without any quantitative changes which, in their details (as for example the break-up of the machine tractor stations and the sale of their machines to the collective farms), take qualitatively different forms? I repeat that it is impossible for me to reproduce here the analysis of social problems in the USSR presented in my text, but it is on the basis of these changes that I explain the foreign policy of the ‘bureaucracy. Comrade Gale asserts that the policy of ‘peaceful co-existence’ differs in no way from that practised by Stalin. Certainly the ‘bureaucracy has for a long time collaborated with international capitalism against the revolution. It is also true that the theory of peaceful co-existence follows logically from that of ‘socialism in one country’ (is it necessary to make clear again that it flows from this but is not identical with it?). For all these reasons I even began my own text—and I return to the point on several occasions—by saying that essentially the policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie against the revolu- tion is the fundamental policy of the bureaucracy set going ‘by Stalin long before Khrushchev. But it must be said once again that we do not get any further just by repeating this ‘basic truth. In order to show how this problem can in no way ‘be looked at as a static one, I refer to history. It is well known that Trotsky criticises in the same way, for example, the Anglo-Russian Committee and the Popular Front as being essentially the same policy of class-collaboration against the revolution. Nevertheless there is a difference between them which reveals the difference between two stages of the foreign policy of the ‘bureaucracy. The differ- ence comes from the fact that between 1926 and 1936, the bureaucracy ‘passed definitely to the side of the bourgeois order’, Up to 1933, although he criticised the policy of collaboration, Trotsky viewed this question differently from after 1933; because he situated the question in a much wider context, notably, within the real possibility of a revolution outside the USSR and of a reform within. After 1933 these possibilities were wiped out by the bureaucracy itself, and this gave a new scope to its policy of class-collaboration. We can speak about a new scope, for the generalised tactic of the Popular Front, Spain included, was different from the policy in the Anglo-Russian Committee of ‘neutralisation’ of the bourgeoisie. Thus, precisely through the foundation of the COMMUNICATIONS Fourth International, we can see a new appraisal of the policy of the bureaucracy, despite the fact that there was no qualitative change in the social relations. Better still, this new appraisal was formu- lated immediately after the time when Stalin made his turn to the Left, accentuating the ‘socialist’ character of these relations. And because they were transfixed by this turn and did not see the general context, many leaders of the Opposition capitulated. It is obvious that class collaboration characterises the foreign policy of the bureaucracy. But there is a difference between the various stages in this basic policy. Thus we have seen the period of ‘neutrali- sation’ of the bourgeoisie, that of the Popular Front, then that of the ‘cold war’ and, finally, ‘peaceful co-existence’. Naturally I agree with Comrade Gale that all these periods are essentially the same. But I am also certain that they differ from one another. In general the difference reflects the concrete situation in which the bureaucracy finds itself at the time in relation to world imperialism but above all in relation to the working class of the Soviet Union. Comrade ‘Gale sees no difference between the policy of ‘cold war’ and that of ‘peaceful co- existence’. At least, he says, there is no _ basic difference. And yet, even though there is no basic difference, which is true, there is nonetheless a difference which everyone can see and tries to explain, except Comrade Gale. I will not take up space here in describing these attempts at explana- tion. Generally speaking, they have an organic weakness: the foreign policy of the bureaucracy is presented as a thing in itself, explained only in terms of itself. But this metaphysical and idealist approach, all the same, does recognise that there is a difference between the present policy and that which preceded it. What is more, it welcomes this differ- ence. I maintain that this difference is more important than it appears. I place the problem in its general context and I affirm that in this general context there is a change (not qualitative but very important) which, determining the foreign policy of the bureau- cracy, has changed it into ‘peaceful co-existence’. What is this change in the general context? It is that internally as well as externally the situation of the bureaucracy and its power has undergone a modification which is by no means negligible. Externally, the imperialist crisis developed to bring increased pressure from imperialism on the USSR. Parallel with this, the Soviet working class, emerging from the trials of the war, prepared for a settling of accounts with the bureaucracy. The latter tried to reply defiantly: reinforcement of terror and ultra- FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AUTUMN-WINTER 1964

[p058] COMMUNICATIONS left adventurist policy internally, ‘cold war’—or even ‘hot—abroad. The deep and aggravated crisis of the bureaucracy which resulted obliged the ‘bureaucracy not only to abandon the policy pursued up to then, but to change it in an unprecedented manner. Why? Because this time the crisis appeared in the form of an imminent actual revolution inside the USSR. And this fact was 'something new, something without precedent in the history of the bureaucracy. Contrary to the years ‘before the war—and here we have to go as far ‘back as the Civil War—the Soviet working class has since the Second World War gone constantly forward without defeats. This was the menace to which the bureaucacy replied with its course to the right, based on the encouragement of the petty-bourgeoisie against the working class, and through a strengthened alliance with world im- perialism for the prevention of revolution not ‘only’ externally but also inside the USSR. This is what constitutes what is ‘new’. Encouragement of the petty-bourgeoisie took the form of important ccn- cessions to them which weakened the position of the workers’ state in social relations. Begun as a policy, this encouragement turned into a pressure to which the bureaucracy was subjected, whether it liked it or not, a pressure which reinforced, in its turn, the rightist policy ‘both domestic and foreign. ‘Peaceful co-existence’ is then the stage of the counter-revolutionary policy of the bureaucracy at which it establishes its strategic and military colla- boration with the international ‘bourgeoisie in order to stifle the political revolution and where the bour- geois forces within the USSR prepare to make an organic fusion with imperialism. In view of the rise of the Soviet working class and the strengthen- ing of its struggle, for the moment still elementary, the bureaucracy no longer has the old room for manoeuvre. The efficacy of its power, constituting as it does a balance between the forces of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, is reduced. The historical alternative which Trotsky formulated is now placed concretely on the order of the day: political revolution or bourgeois counter-revolution. It is for this reason that ‘peaceful co-existence’ ‘became a general theory. Comrade Gale is wrong in my opinion when he says that Stalin already had such a theory. Certainly Stalin talked about it, but the Soviet bureaucracy and the international Stalinist movement never made of it a finished and general theory, that is, they never used it to characterise the nature of the epoch or as their strategy. There were diverse tactics of collaboration to preserve the build- ing of socialism in a single country. Today, there isa generalised theory which, in its totality and not only in its implications, formally contradicts the Marxist FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AUTUMN-WINTER 1964 145 theory of imperialism. Comrade Gale underlines that the 14th Party Congress, under Stalin’s leader- ship, declared the stabilisation of imperialism ‘for a whole period’, and that the Left Opposition criticised it as ‘a renunciation of the tactic of world revolu- tion’. For Comrade Gale, this is proof that ‘peaceful co-existence’ is not a new theory. Only the bureaucracy today, through the blackmail of the existence of nuclear weapons, says that this has completely changed the world situation, no longer ‘for a whole period’, but permanently, Is there any difference? Certainly. And our explanation, too, must differ from that given ‘by the Opposition. The latter states that Stalinist policy is—I use Comrade Gale’s quotation—‘the result of the defeats of the international revolutionary movement and_ the pessimism flowing from them’. We said, on the contrary, ‘peaceful co-existence’ results from the combined crisis of imperialism and the bureaucracy, arising out of the ascent of the Soviet working class and the pressure of imperialism. I hold therefore that the policy of ‘peaceful co-existence’ is a different theory, a new theory. Clearly there is an organic link between this theory and the theory of ‘socialism in one country’. But strategic and active collaboration only became a theory through ‘peaceful co-existence’. And con- sequently, if Stalin had already raised the possibility of a parliamentary road to socialism—for England— today this localised possibility has become a genera- lised and avowed tactic, more, the theory laid down for the whole international Stalinist movement. The problem of inspection posts on the territory of the USSR cannot be examined in itself either. We must place it afresh in the general context, ie., precisely in this situation where the reinforced and encouraged bourgeois forces in the USSR are seeking to forge their links with imperialism. To use more concrete language: if Comrade Gale approaches this question of inspection together with that of the current attack concentrated against planning, and adds the fact that within the bureaucracy there are elements working more or less consciously for these links with imperialism, he himself will arrive at the conclusion that it is time to sound the alarm. But not a military alarm, as you think, Comrade Gale. It is a political problem, essentially political and not ‘simply’ military. Again, I must emphasise: a peaceful path to ‘bourgeois counter-revolution, as we know, is out of the question. But like every revolution, counter- revolution also has its own preparation, And if Comrade Gale only recognises certain facts when it is too late then for my part I prefer the attitude of the Left Opposition, which never failed to give

[p059] 146 warnings more severe than mine. In his critical remarks, Comrade Gale assures me that the Soviet bureaucracy is not ready to trade the heritage of October. I must point out that I never used the word ‘trade’, but I deliberately used. the word ‘bargain’ (marchander); and although I am not an etymologist, this shade of meaning is worth emphasising. Not to mention the fact that immediately after this statement, I write the follow- ing phrase: ‘For the time being, they (the bureau- cracy) preserve a hesitant attitude, but at the price of an ignoble betrayal of the Chinese revolution.’ The main problem is not a semantic one. Against the rise of the workers in the USSR and under the pressure of imperialism, the bureaucracy is ready enough for such ‘bargaining. The best and most visible. proof is the Moscow test-ban treaty. Personally, I consider the Chinese revolution and its victory as belonging to the heritage of October, and the Moscow treaty as an attack against this revolution. Comrade Gale cannot shake me from this conviction. If one considers the heritage to consist ‘only’ of the direct conquests of October in the USSR itself, I maintain that the bargaining around inspection posts on Soviet territory con- stitutes the proof that at least a fraction of the bureaucracy is in the course of bargaining. Let us come to the question of the Chinese Communist Party. I think that both Comrade Gale and I were wrong in this matter: I take this party to be absolutely different from the Stalinist parties, Comrade Gale considers them as identical. On re-reading my article, I must say frankly that it contains an equivocation, more, a confusion. Cde Gale is right to emphasise that our central task is the con- struction of Marxist parties based on the Transitional Programme, in China also. On this point his criticism is valid: from the affirmation of the possibility that the Chinese CP might make the Transitional Pro- gramme its own, the reader naturally concludes that this party can become the workers’ Marxist party in China. Now we must declare once and for all and without any equivocation, that our task, in China as elsewhere, is to construct Marxist revolutionary parties, and that no bureaucratic party, including the Chinese party, is capable of becoming such a revolutionary Marxist party. And since that was also my task in writing my article then the confusion could only be increased. It arises above all from the fact that the Chinese party showed signs which distinguished it from the other communist parties. At the same time this party, because of the betrayals of the Kremlin, objectively finds itself in different conditions. But instead of analysing this problem, linked with Chinese social phenomena, to the inter- COMMUNICATIONS national problems of the revolution and to our own tasks—impressed by the words of the Chinese regarding the rightward policy of Khrushchev, I arrived too hastily at my equivocal and mistaken conclusion. By criticising me Comrade Gale has raised a problem which I consider to be incorrectly posed in his critique. Now, while I created the impression that the Chinese Communist Party could become a Marxist workers’ party, Comrade Gale himself made a mistake in treating this party as exactly the same as the other Stalinist parties. It is a fact that it is a Stalinist party in its main lines. But one Stalinist party differs from others. In my opinion, it is important for Marxists to seriously analyse the nature and the possibilities of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party. This analysis cannot be presented here. Nevertheless I will put forward certain arguments to support my criticisms of Comrade Gale’s opinion. First of all, this party is not simply a servant of the Kremlin bureaucracy. Several times it has acted against the instructions of that bureaucracy. Further, contrary to the other Stalinist parties, it would be difficult to characterise this party as a deformed and bureaucratic party of the working class. Not only does it rest on the peasantry, its development has been determined and influenced by the peasantry and the peasant army. Nor must it be forgotten that this party led a victorious revolution and that this revolution has been marked, both in its nature and in its development, by the conditions of the country and by the character of the party. Finally, another difference: to my knowledge the Mao faction has not yet liquidated the other factions; even the self-styled rightists of 1957, expelled and humiliated, have been reintegrated into the party. Clearly, a deeper and more detailed analysis cou!d —and must—establish more firmly the ‘specific’ character of the Chinese party. But already, on the ‘basis of certain facts, I think that the reform of this party is not excluded. Such a reform implies, of course, the decisive throwing out of the leadership and the victory of a revolutionary current. Such a reform is not impossible. Yet—and I must make this clear—for the Chinese party, in view of its class character, reform would not have the same meaning as for the Bolshevik Party before 1933. The Chinese party could approach the Transitional Programme but could not identify itself with it, since it cannot ‘become a workers’ party. After its reform, this party could at best become one of the ‘Soviet parties’ spoken about in the Programme. I think then that we must distinguish our own task, which is the construction of a Marxist party FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AUTUMN-WINTER 1964

[p060] COMMUNICATIONS in China, and the present nature and future possi- bilities of the Chinese Communist Party. I cannot agree at all with Comrade Gale who, without making any differentiation, classes this party together with the other Stalinist parties. . In conclusion, I will express again my hope that the discussion will go on and extend to the world Trotskyist movemeni, thus showing the will to break with revisionism and construct revolutionary parties in the USSR, China, and the peoples’ democracies. This is an indispensable part of the steps forward to build parties in Britain, France and the western countries. In order to improve such a discussion we must all strive to use the method of dialectical materialism, which tolerates neither confusion, nor the substitution of quotations and abstract truths for a concrete analysis of the whole. MICHEL VARGA. Postscript. I had already finished my reply when the news arrived of Khrushchev’s dismissal. Although it is impossible as yet to evaluate the full significance, the exact content of this event, it is certainly right at the centre of our discussion. It seems that the bureaucracy reacted precisely because of its dangerous steps along the road of capitulation. I wrote in effect that the bureaucracy had been obliged to change from the policy practised under Stalin. This new policy, analysed in my previous article, strengthened petty-bourgeois layers inside Russia and the bureaucracy’s collaboration with imperialism abroad. In consequence, the petty- bourgeoisie began its direct and open attack on the conquests of October domestically, and international Stalinism began the process of decomposition. The removal of Khrushchev indicates the crude reaction of the bureaucracy to this development. In this, its behaviour confirms indirectly the reality indicated FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AUTUMN-WINTER 1964 147 by my analysis. That this is more likely a frightened leap back by the bureaucracy in face of the concrete threat brought up by the recent evolution, the possi- bility of which I indicated in my article, rather than a more accentuated preparation of the bourgeois forces—that is probable. In any case the political crisis of the bureaucracy is now out in the light of day. If this event is, in fact, shown to be a sign of fright before the bourgeois development, it must be stated that this fright will not be capable of translation into a whole change in line, a long-term turn to the ‘left’, like Stalin’s turn in 1929. The con- ditions have changed: the alignment of classes within the USSR between working class and bourgeois forces is no longer the same. If, on the other hand, the removal of Khrushchev (this is very unlikely) reflects a further thrust forward ‘by the petty-bourgeois forces in the USSR—even including trying to make it up with the Chinese—the bourgeois tendency will try to ‘bring about a direct attack. In either case, the workers’ revolution will become imminent. The present political crisis shows the fragility of the ‘bureaucracy in face of the approach of such a revolution, its fragility before the opposed class forces. Probably it will now try to settle ‘reasonably’ its very sharp contradictions. But it is incapable of becoming reasonable. The path taken by Stalin led the bureaucracy into an ‘unreasonable’ impasse for the maintenance of its power; Khrushchev’s path threw it into another impasse, equally ‘unreasonable’. Even if policy changes indicate the will of the ‘bureaucracy to arrest the bourgeois development, that cannot last long. Through this present crisis, the Soviet bureaucracy now enters a very agitated phase in its history, filled with convulsions, suc- cessive political crises and adventures. The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime is only transitory, the political revolution is approaching. M.V.

[p061] al ED TART EE Hi EH ULRECOH HIGHT Tad HA PLEKHANOV was the key figure in the development of Russian Marx- ism, its ‘father’ according to the sub-title of Baron’s biography. Asa young man he was caught up, despite his gentry background, in the revolutionary fervour of the intelligentsia of Russia in the 1870s. In the passionate debates among the young students and _ intellectuals who made up the _ revolutionary milieu he made his mark initially as an advocate of Bakuninism. Doubt- less he was drawn to this position by what seemed to be its resolute character. Bakunin’s followers, how- ever, placed their main hopes upon what they believed to be the revolu- tionary potential of the peasantry. In this they shared the illusions of many populist revolutionaries who ‘went to the people’, with discourag- ingly little success, in this period. From these failures sprang the terrorist acts of the late seventies Books