The struggle for Marxism in the United States: III American Trotskyism with Trotsky

[p037] STRUGGLE FOR MARXISM IN THE U.S. some kind of working-class defence work in con- nection with the Dewey Commission investigation of the Moscow trials but this was not done. He warned against devoting so much space in the New International to people like Eastman, Hook, and Lyons, and the friendly tone taken towards such people in the magazine. In 1939 he wrote his famous letter to Shachtman protesting against the Shachtman-Burnham article ‘Intellectuals in Retreat’, in which Burnham declared his oppo- sition to dialectics and Shachtman declared his indifference to Burnham’s opposition. On all these points Trotsky was hitting at the essential weakness of the intellectual section of the SWP. This section saw itself as a part of the American intellectual community rather than as an integrated part of the proletarian re- volutionary party. The indifference or actual opposition to dialectics was part of the dues these intellectuals needed to pay in order to be part of this community. As long as they used the same basic method as the Hooks, Eastmans and Lyons, then they spoke the same language, were part of the same community. The development of the SWP as a Marxist party required the breaking of these intellectuals methodologically from the basic empiricist method of the American intelligentsia. It also required a more personal, subjective kind of break. The intellectuals needed to break from the petty-bourgeois circles and life and to integrate themselves personally in a working-class party. They needed to learn how to talk to workers, how to recruit workers, how to be an integral part of a working-class party. Trotsky wrote Cannon especially on this question time and time again in the period from 1937 to 1940 but to no avail. Trotsky’s appreciation of Cannon’s Struggle for a Proletarian Party was undoubtedly based in large part on Cannon’s strong emphasis on this point.16 Over the years there has developed a simplified myth of Trotsky’s attitude towards the role of intellectuals in the party. Trotsky is seen as taking a totally negative attitude toward intellec- tuals because of their petty-bourgeois background and conversely taking a totally uncritical attitude towards party members of proletarian origins. A close reading of Trotsky’s writing shows nothing could be further from the truth. He valued the intellectual elements in the SWP most highly and made great efforts to facilitate their development. He notes: ‘After our American section split from the Social- - ist Party I insisted most strongly on the earliest 16. Ibid., p. 165. 83 possible publication of a theoretical organ, having again in mind the need to educate the party, first and foremost its new members, in the spirit of dialectic materialism. In the United States, I wrote at the time, where the bourgeoisie systematically instils vulgar empiricism in the workers, more than anywhere else is it necessary to speed the elevation of the movement to a proper theoretical level.’17 He viewed it as the task of the intellectuals to facilitate the general theoretical development of the proletarian section of the party. The pro- letarian section of the party, though prepared for rapid theoretical development by its actual position in capitalist society, would not develop theoretic- ally if simply left alone. Thus he stated: ‘It is precisely the party’s penetration into the trade unions, and into the workers’ milieu in general that demands heightening the theoretical qualifi- cation of our cadres. I do not mean by cadres the “apparatus” but the party as a whole.8 And further: ‘If the proletarian section of our American party is “politically backward”, then the first task of those who are “advanced” should have con- sisted in raising the workers to a higher level. But why has the present opposition failed to find its way to these workers?’!9 So concerned was he about the role which this section of the movement could play in the development of the party that in the middle of the discussion itself he wrote Shachtman: ‘I believe that you are on the wrong side of the barricades, my dear friend. . . . If I had the possibility I would immediately take an airplane to New York City in order to discuss with you for 48 or 72 hours uninterruptedly.’20 Thus Trotsky’s approach towards the intellec- tuals in the party was clear. He sought to integrate them into the party by breaking them from the method of the petty-bourgeoisie and fusing them in the concrete with the proletarian section of the party. Such a fusion would have facilitated with great rapidity the theoretical development of the party as a whole. Instead these intellectuals deepened their split both with the method of Marxism and with the proletarian section of the party. Trotsky had no other course but to deepen his break with them and to hope that the struggle would lead to a development of the healthy section of the party which was willing to combat this desertion of Marxism. 17. Ibid., p. 114. 18. Ibid., p. 103. 19. Ibid. p. 145. 20. Ibid., p. 64.

[p038] FourTH INTERNATIONAL, AUGUST 1965 (2) TROTSKY AND THE YOUTH Material on Trotsky’s approach to the youth movement is not as easily documented as his relations with the older intellectual strata in the party. However, its general outlines are clear. Throughout this 1937-1940 period Trotsky actively sought to counter what he saw as an unserious, dilettante spirit in the Trotskyist youth organisa- tion. He wished to instil in these young people the seriousness of the revolutionary struggle and the need to integrate themselves into a proletarian movement. He sought to break these students and young petty-bourgeois from their milieu and transform them from radical students into pro- letarian revolutionaries. A turning point in this whole process was the resolution on the youth question at the Founding Convention of the Fourth International in 1938.7! This resolution, which was in the tradition of the early days of the Young Communist International,?2 sought to orientate Trotskyist youth towards the problems of the young workers and the un- employed workers in particular. Following this convention the YPSL Fourth (as the Trotskyist youth was known in that period) devoted con- siderably more attention in its publication 21. ‘Resolution on the Youth’ The Founding Con- ference of the Fourth International (Socialist Workers Party, New York, 1938), p. 121. 22. Resolutions and Theses Adopted by the Third Congress of the YCL (Berlin 1923). (3) TROTSKY AND Trotsky always understood the critical import- ance of the working-class cadres of the party. The workers in the party were always his first concern. All his efforts and urgings on the intelligentsia were aimed at getting this intelli- gentsia also to recognise the critical importance of this section of the party and to assist him in aiding the proletarian comrades’ development. He understood that critical in the long run were both the growth and the development of the proletarian section of the party. Trotsky’s approach towards Cannon flowed from this assessment of the working-class cadres of the party. Trotsky was not an uncritical defender of Cannon the man, nor of Cannon’s regime. He had made his position clear in 1932 on many of the organisational weaknesses of Cannon. He could not help but be aware of his theoretical short- Challenge of Youth to the problems of young workers.23. However, this attention was clearly of an artificial journalistic nature, and very little concrete work was done by the young Trotskyists among working-class youth. Thus this whole vital, dynamic section of the American proletariat went largely untouched in this period. This itself had a serious negative effect on the SWP. Following this Trotsky urged several measures on the YPSL Fourth: the point of these was obviously to break down the intellectual dilletant- ism of these youth. It was Trotsky who insisted that the YPSL Fourth get themselves a uniform, red flags and other paraphernalia and learn to march in proper style. No pacifist was Trotsky. Again Trotsky’s approach towards bourgeois youth was not a hostile one. young people, he felt, could play a very vital role in the building of the party. But this would happen only if they really broke from their petty- bourgeois background and integrated themselves fully into the revolutionary movement. This did not happen. It is difficult to see how it could have happened in the SWP of the 1930s with its bloc rather than fusion of constituents, and with its almost total lack of theoretical development. 23. Challenge of Youth (Young Peoples Socialist League—Fourth International, New York), July 1938 issue and following. THE WORKERS comings. However, he had a high regard for Cannon’s role in developing a proletarian orienta- tion for the American party. It was precisely the solid organisational base of the Améfican party and its constant work in the mass movement which distinguished it from all other Trotskyist parties, which made it the most important Trot- skyist formation of the period. Cannon had con- tributed in no small way to this development. Precisely because Trotsky valued so highly the proletarian cadres of the party, he did not take an uncritical attitude either towards those cadres or towards the Cannon group within the party which had the confidence of those cadres. Workers in the trade unions are no more born ‘natural’ Bolsheviks than are intellectuals or students. While they are generally free from the kind of petty-bourgeois pressures which bear upon these

[p039] STRUGGLE. FOR MARXISM IN THE U.S. other sections of the party, they have their own specific weaknesses and are under other pressures within the trade union movement. Their strength is that these weaknesses are the weaknesses of the class itself, and to the extent that a revolutionary party comes to grips with them it is involved in its most fundamental work of all—the education of the vanguard of the working class. It is especially in a period when the party is expanding its working-class cadres that the most conscious attention must be paid to the theoretical development of these cadres. This is no auto- ‘matic process and it requires the greatest of efforts and internal struggle on the part of a conscious leadership. As Trotsky summed it up in the previously quoted statement, which deserves restatement here: ‘It is precisely the party’s penetration into the trade unions, and into the workers’ milieu in general that demands the heightening of the theoretical qualification of our cadres.’ Just as with the intellectuals and students, Trotsky’s concern about this section of the party dates back at least to his arrival in Mexico in 1937—that is, to the beginning of the period in which Trotsky was able to observe the American Trotskyist movement from close at hand. Trotsky’s essential concern was that the party was adapting to the ‘progressive’ anti-Stalinist elements inside the trade union movement and that this adaptation was paralysing the party as far as: (1) a concrete political struggle against Roosevelt whom these progressives supported and (2) an orientation towards the healthy forces within the Stalinist movement. This adaptation also meant that the trade union cadres of the SWP, while functioning as class-conscious trade union mili- tants, were not being developed into revolutionary communists. In particular Trotsky was highly critical of the party-dominated teamster paper, put out under the supervision of. Farrell Dobbs, the North-west Organiser, which he felt was a-political and which made no attempt to implement the line of favour- ing independent class political action worked out in connection with the Transitional Programme. In fact Trotsky pressed the party hard on this score precisely during the discussions around the Transitional Programme in early 1938. In 1939, as is testified in In Defence of Marxism, Trotsky urged a special orientation towards the Stalinist rank and file. He urged this on both Cannon and Shachtman but nothing was done about it. In 1940, when the question came up again for dis- cussion with Trotsky after the split with Shacht- _ question, 85 man, Hansen summarised the past period as follows: ‘Yesterday Comrade Trotsky made some remarks about our adaptation to the so-called progressives in the trade union, he mentioned the line of the North-west Organiser and also our attitude in con- nection with the elections and the Stalinists. I wish to point out that this is not something com- pletely new on Comrade Trotsky’s part. More than two years ago during the discussions over the Transitional Programme, he discussed exactly these same points and had exactly the same position, with due regard for the difference in time and that then it was not the elections but the farmer-labour party that was to the fore. Comrade Trotsky also has written some letters regarding the Stalinists and the need for a more positive line toward them.’24 In April of 1939, just a few months before the outbreak of the factional struggle, Trotsky held a series of very important discussions with Johnson and other Negro comrades on the party’s Negro work. It is important that it was Trotsky who forced upon the SWP the importance of the American Negro, a question almost totally neglected in the past period. In fact in 1933, Arne Swabeck, in discussions with Trotsky on the same was not even aware as to whether American Negroes in the South spoke a different language!?5_ In the course of this discussion Trotsky was deeply concerned as to why the SWP so far had neglected work in this field. As he sought to discover’ the reasons for this it was precisely the proletarian section of the party and its leadership that came under his criticism: ‘I believe that the first question is the attitude of the Socialist Workers Party toward the Negroes. It is very disquieting to find that until now the party has done almost nothing in this field. It has not published a book, a pamphlet, leaflets, nor even any articles in the New International. Two comrades who compiled a book on the question, a serious work, remained isolated. That book is not pub- lished, nor are even quotations from it published. It is not a good sign. It is a bad sign. The characteristic thing about American workers’ parties, trade union organisations, and so on, was their aristocratic character. It is the basis of opportun- ism. The skilled workers who feel set in the capi- talist society help the bourgeois class to hold the Negroes and unskilled workers down to a very low scale. Our party is not safe from degeneration if it remains a place for intellectuals, semi-intellectuals, skilled workers and Jewish workers who build a 24. See appendix. 25. ‘Documents on the Negro Struggle’, Bulletin of Marxist Studies, No. 4 (Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1963), p. 12.

[p040] 86 very close milieu which is almost isolated from the genuine masses. Under this condition our party cannot develop—it will degenerate. ‘We must have this great danger before our eyes. Many times I have said that every member of the party, especially the intellectuals and the semi- intellectuals, who. during a period of say six months, cannot each win a worker-member for the party, should be demoted to the position of sympathiser. We can say the same on the Negro question. The old organisations, beginning with the AFL, are the organisations of the workers’ aristocracy. Our party is a part of the same milieu, not of the basic most exploited masses of whom the Negroes are the most exploited. The fact that our party until now has not turned to the Negro question is a very disquieting symptom. If the workers’ aristocracy is the basis of opportunism, one of the sources of adaptation to capitalist society, then the most oppressed and discriminated are the most dynamic milieu of the working class.’26 Over half a century earlier Engels used almost the same language to characterise the native born workers of that period! The problem was still with the Marxist movement. Once again during the actual factional struggle with Shachtman Trotsky was to raise this issue. This is particularly important because it meant criticising that section of the party which sup- ported him and thus running the risk of aiding his opponents. But he felt it was important enough to risk that, so important in fact that he put the critical section in italics in his ‘From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene’: ‘It would be asinine to think that the workers’ section of. the party is perfect. The workers are only gradually reaching clear class consciousness. The trade unions always create a culture medium for opportunist deviations. Inevitably we will run up against this question in one of the next stages. More than once the party will have to remind its ~ own trade unionists that a pedagogical adaptation to the more backward layers of the proletariat must not become transformed into a political adaptation to the conservative bureaucracy of the trade unions. Every new stage of development, every increase in the party ranks and the complication of the methods of work open up not only new possibilities but new dangers. Workers in the trade unions, even those trained in the most revolutionary school, often display a tendency to free themselves from party control. At the present time, however, this is not the question.’27 While this was not the pressing question at the 26. Ibid., p. 20. 27. Trotsky, Leon. op. cit., p. 146. FourtH INTERNATIONAL, AUGUST 1965 time of this fundamental struggle Trotsky makes it clear that this could be a pressing question in the future unless the cadre was educated now. This idea guided to a great extent his whole approach to the discussion with Shachtman and Co. It was aimed, not only at reaching those who could be reached in the Shachtman camp but educating his own supporters. He went into det iil on the ABC of dialectics in such a way that the average worker in the party could understand it. Trotsky intervened in particular to prevent a premature split and to prolong the discussion 2s long as possible. It is clear from even the pub- lished exchange between Cannon and Trotsky on this point that Cannon as early as October 1939 was impatient with the struggle and wanted to bring it to an organisational conclusion while Trotsky sought- to extend it as long as possible. Trotsky wrote a very sharp and clear letter to Cannon on October 28, 193928 in response to a letter of Cannon’s of October 24, 1939.79 Trotsky’s letter was ‘inadvertently’ left out of In Defence of Marxism but was published in a foot- note in The Struggle for a Proletarian Party. He warns, after reading Cannon’s letter: : ‘It would be extremely prejudicial if not fatal to connect this ideological fight with the perspective of a split, of a purge, or expulsions, and so on and so forth. You have many new members and un- educated youth. They need a serious educational discussion in the light of great events. If their thoughts at the beginning are obsessed by the perspective of personal degradation, i.e., demotions, loss of prestige, disqualifications, eliminations from _ Central Committee, etc., and so on, the whole dis- cussion would become envenomed and the authority of the leadership would be compromised. If the leadership on the contrary opens a ruthless fight against petty-bourgeois idealistic conceptions and organisational prejudices but at the same time assures all the necessary guarantees for the dis- cussion itself and for the minority, the result would be not only an ideological victory but an important growth in the authority of the leadership.’ Trotsky continued to press this point over and over again throughout the discussion right to the very eve of the split with the minority.30 In fact every peaceful gesture aimed at extending the discussion and preventing a split came from Trotsky, not Cannon. Trotsky was especially disconcerted over the tendency of the rank-and-file 28. Cannon, James P. Struggle, p. 89-90. 29. Ibid., p. 98-99. - 30. Trotsky, Leon. op. cit., pp. 63, 70, 101, 151-152, 161-163.

[p041] STRUGGLE FOR MARXISM IN THE U.S. majority supporters to grow impatient with the political struggle and to wish to get on with their concrete work unimpeded by such a struggle. In response to letters from Cannon expressing the impatience of many of the trade unionists in the party with the length of the discussion, Trotsky writes back, ‘I understand the impatience of many Majority comardes (I suppose that this impatience is not infrequently connected with theoretical indifference).’3! This educational need was also the reason for his proposal in a letter to Warde that he, Wright, and Gerland form ‘the first nucleus’ of a theoretical association within the party to promote dialectical materialism.32 Fundamental to an understanding of this question was a discussion held with the leaders of this section, Cannon, Dobbs, and other, in June, 1940, after the split with Shachtman and less than two months before Trotsky’s death. Luckily the stenogram of this discussion was published at the insistence of George Clarke in 1953—otherwise it would have never seen the light of day. We append it to this article in its entirety so that the reader can see the actual give-and-take between Trotsky and the leadership of the SWP—to judge Trotsky’s assessment of this leadership and his approach to it. “While the concrete issue in discussion was a proposal for a tactical orientation towards the Stalinists, in reality the discussion centred around 31. Trotsky, Leon. op. cit., p. 158. 32. Ibid., p. 100. - 87 the adaptation of the basic trade union cadres of the SWP to the progressives within the trade union movement and the SWP leadership’s failure to do anything about this situation. Most im- portant of all then is the documentation of the fear of the SWP leadership of being forced to break with its collaborators in the trade union movement in order to reach out to the Stalinist workers, then in crisis. Hansen asks Trotsky point blank: ‘I am wondering if Comrade Trotsky considers that our party is displaying a conservative tendency in the sense that we are adapting ourselves politic- ally to the trade union bureaucracy.’33 Trotsky answers frankly: ‘To a certain degree I believe it is so. .... In observing the North-west Organiser I have observed not the slightest change during a whole period. It remains a-political. This is a dangerous symptom. The complete neglect of work in relation to the Stalinist party is another dangerous symptom... . It seems to me that a kind of passive adaptation to our trade union work can be recognised. There is not an immediate danger, but a serious warning indicating a change in direction is necessary. Many comrades are more interested in trade union work than in party work. More party cohesion is needed, more sharp manoeuvring, a more serious systematic theoretical training; otherwise the trade unions can absorb our comrades.’34 33. See appendix. 34. See appendix. (4) TROTSKY’S ASSESSMENT OF CANNON We see a consistent thread in Trotsky’s assess- ment of the Cannon section of the party. It was the most proletarian, and thus the most healthy section of the party. Its existence is what gave the SWP of the 1930s its importance and was a credit to all that was positive and good in the American Trotskyist movement—-and in the American radical tradition. The alliance of Trotsky with Cannon against the petty-bourgeois opposition was natural and necessary. It was an alliance of the party’s strengths against its weak- nesses. However, it was not an uncritical alliance. Trotsky was fully aware that the Cannon section of the party, more than any other section, reflected the empiricism and syndicalism of the trade union rank and file in the United States. It had a disdain for theory and was itself aristocratic and quite distant from the most exploited layers of the proletariat in the United States—especially con- sidering the party’s failures in reaching young workers and Negroes. Lacking theoretical training and having an aristocratic position within the class it could not help but degenerate unless it was educated theoretically. Trotsky devoted his efforts in the last days of his life seeking to impress upon the Cannon leadership the necessity of such theoretical development. The key to this theo- retical development was, in Trotsky’s view, a deeper understanding of the Marxist method itself. It was this, he hoped, that intellectuals like Warde and Wright would impart to the party. Trotsky was fully aware of Cannon’s weaknesses as well as of his strengths. He knew as well as anyone that Cannon had contributed to the crisis of 1940 as much as Shachtman because Cannon

[p042] 88 was incapable of giving theoretical leadership in the party and in this way bringing about a fusion of the best elements in the intellectual and student sections of the party and raising the theoretical level of the proletarian section of the party. To blame Cannon for this is only to compliment him— it is to say that he was the real leader of the party and thus, more than the literary figure Shachtman, was responsible for the party’s condition. Trotsky summarises well his assessment of Cannon at the time of the Shachtman fight and thus explains why he supported Cannon so solidly against Shachtman. ‘Cannon represents the pro- letarian party in process of formation. The historical right in this struggle—independent of what errors and mistakes might have been made —rests solely on the side of Cannon.’ (emphasis ours)3> He did not view Cannon as a finished Marxist leader nor his tendency, which emerged as the unchallenged leadership of the SWP which was to reign for the next 24 years, as a finished Marxist tendency. He saw it rather as a revolu- tionary party in the process of formation—as a force out of which could emerge a Marxist movement in the United States. His remarks of June 1940 just before his death make it completely clear that the emergence of this tendency as a Marxist party would not be an automatic process nor was it guaranteed success. The danger of its degeneration was clearly seen even at this time. In his oft-quoted letter on Cannon’s Struggle for a Proletarian Party, Trotsky refers to Cannon as a ‘genuine workers’ leader’.36 This was a correct assessment of Cannon. Cannon showed his ability 35. Trotsky, Leon, op. cit., p. 61. 36. Ibid., p. 165. Appendix FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, AUGUST 1965 as a workers’ leader in the days of the WW. He reasserted it once more in his long battle in the Communist Party for a proletarian orientation. Once again, he rose to the occasion in the American Trotskyist movement to battle to orien- tate the movement towards the class. Yes, Cannon was a genuine workers’ leader. The challenge that Cannon has faced since his entrance into the CP was the need to be more than a genuine workers’ leader. He needed to go beyond the simply empirical class struggle outlook of a Big Bill Haywood, a Vincent St. John, and the many other fine workers’ leaders in United States history. He needed to become a genuine revolu- tionary communist. To become a revolutionary communist Canncn needed to master Marxist theory. In the 1920s Cannon sought to get over this by taking his theory as given from the Russians. But the Stalinization of the Comintern caused the Russians to turn on him. Emerging on his own in 1928 he looked to Trotsky to develop theory and Shachtman ard his friends to present it propagandistically in this country. This division of labour broke down in the debacle of 1940. Shachtman turned on Cannon and Trotsky had to supplant Cannon for the duration of the battle in order to save the Fourth International itself. But Trotsky soon was killed. Even if he was able to continue to play the role of leadership for the SWP, Stalin’s axe prevented it. Cannon was now for the first time in his life really on his own. The next 24 years was to tell what Cannon had actually learned in the past period. In 1940, after 20 years of American communism, the challenge before the SWP was whether or not it was to become a revolutionary communist formation. The following is a rough stenographic draft—uncorrected by the participants—of discussions with Trotsky on the Stalinists held on June 12-15, 1940.* Cannon: . . The general perspective is quite optimistic. The Stalinists are the problem. By their change in line they dealt a heavy blow. We were forging ahead when they made the switch, paralyzing our work. The workers are unable to distinguish the real difference between us, especially with the faction fight compelling us to give undue emphasis to our defence of the Soviet Union. We need a line of agitation to distinguish ourselves from them. The * Reprinted from Internal Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 10, April 1953 (Socialist Workers Party, New York). Stalinist party still has a powerful cadre of militants. It has a strong trade union machine which draws the workers. The pact seemed to disintegrate them, but it was losing just the democrats. The old mili- tants are more devoted than ever. They believe that the party now has the ‘real revolutionary’ line. We need a more effective counter-attack against the Stalinists. Trotsky: We don’t participate in the presidential elections? Cannon: There are very rigorous election laws

[p043] STRUGGLE FOR MARXISM IN THE U.S. which prevent small parties from getting on the ballot. Trotsky: And the CP? Cannon: The CP buys its way on to the ballot. For example in upper New York where it is extremely reactionary, the CP simply buys signatures from those who make a business of dealing in signatures. For us there is no way to get on the ballot. Trotsky: Your attitude toward the other parties? Cannon: We are running local campaigns in some places for minor offices. Trotsky: What do we tell the workers when they ask which president they should vote for? Cannon: They shouldn’t ask such embarrassing questions. We tried write-in campaigns in previous elections, but it is not serious. Nor can we support either the Stalinists or Thomas. Trotsky: I see there is no campaign in the Socialist Appeal for a workers’ candidate. Why haven’t you proposed a congress of trade unions, a convention, to nominate a candidate for the presidency. If he were independent we would support him. We cannot remain completely indifferent. We can very well insist in unions where we, have influence that Roosevelt is not our candidate and the workers must have their own candidate. We should demand a nation-wide congress connected with the independent Labour Party. Dobbs: For a while some people thought Lewis would run. But Lewis never seriously intended to run. He attempted to bargain with the Roosevelt administration. Now it appears certain that Roosevelt will run. Trotsky: With the centrists the situation is clear. For a long time in the United States, the socialist movement was not necessary. Now with changed times when it is necessary, it can’t have a reformist nature. That possibility is exhausted. At one time the United States was rich in reformist tendencies, but the New Deal was the last flare-up. Now with the war it is clear that the New Deal exhausted all the reformist and democratic possibilities and created incomparably more favourable possibilities for revolution. I talked with E. a few weeks ago. For Roosevelt, but absolutely helpless about further possibilities of democracy. When I questioned him he was absolutely incapable of answering, and I thought he was going to break down in tears like a little boy. The entrance into the war is the end of the last remnants of the New Deal and Good Neighbour policy. The Roosevelt of the third term will be completely different from the Roosevelt of the first two terms. Dobbs: In the CIO and the AFL the leaders have been affected by Roosevelt’s war drive, becoming 89 more and more outspoken for unity. Tobin has become more expressive, more deeply involved. Behind the scenes he moves in co-ordination with the war moves. Dubinsky, one of the original CIO leaders, voted to reaffiliate with the AFL thus weakening Lewis. Hillman, a CIO leader, negotiated a juris- diction agreement with Dubinsky and is cool toward Lewis. There is grave danger of capitulation on the part of the bureaucrats, weakening the industrial workers. Lewis may have to reach unity at the expense of industrial unionism. All these leaders are jumping as Roosevelt cracks the whip. Trotsky: The Stalinists are clearly the most important for us. E. says they lost 15 per cent but that the workers remain true to the party. It is a question of attitude. Their dependence on the Kremlin was of great value to the national leaders. Their line was changed from patriotism to anti-war. In the next period their dependence on the Kremlin will create great difficulties for them. They are anti-war and anti-imperialist, but so are we in general. Do we have a nucleus among them? Cannon: We have a small nucleus in New York and in one or two other places. Trotsky: Sent in? Dobbs: No. They came to us and we advised them to stay and work within. Cannon: We got some with our campaign against the fascists. Trotsky: Theoretically it is possible to support the Stalinist candidate. It is a way of approaching the Stalinist workers. We can say, yes we know this candidate. But we will give critical support. We can repeat on a small scale what we would do if Lewis were nominated. Theoretically it is not impossible. It would be very difficult, it is true—but then it is only an analysis. They, of course, would say, we don’t want your support. We would answer, we don’t support you, but the workers who support you. We warn them but go through the experience with them. These leaders will betray you. It is necessary to find an approach to the Stalinist party. Theoretically it is not impossible to support their candidates with very sharp warnings. It would guide them. What? How? Kay: But in Boston the Stalinists wouldn’t even permit us to enter their hall. They even threw our comrade outside. Trotsky: I know. They have even shot at us. But some tens of thousands of workers are with them. I don’t know exactly how many. It is very difficult to determine. Of course, we would suffer the indig- nation of Burnham. Shachtman would say, ‘See, I predicted it—capitulation to Stalinism.’ There would even be considerable aversion in our ranks. But the question is the Stalinist workers. The working class is decisive. With guarantees, warnings, why not

[p044] 90 Js Browder a worse rascal than Lewis? Both are rascals. consider it? I doubt it. Cannon: The Stalinist movement is peculiar. In France we could approach the Socialists and join them. The Stalinists are large compared to us but small compared with the CIO. The Stalinists are hated by the militants. It is not the psychological attitude of our members but the broad anti-Stalinist movement. If we started to play this kind of politics we would run into this indignation of these militants. For example, the food workers in New York. Our comrades succeeded in creating a strong progressive faction. They may possibly be elected to posts. We built our strength on opposition to Stalinist control of the union. Such a line would disrupt our work. The same is true in the maritime unions and in the auto union. The Stalinists are the main obstacle. A policy of manoeuvre would be disastrous. What we gained from the Stalinists we would lose otherwise. Trotsky: Before entrance into the Socialist Party we tried to analyse the situation in the same way. Before entrance into the Socialist Party we had the perspective of exhausting all the possibilities. We were not closer to Thomas than we are to Browder. Those advocating entry predicted that we would finish with the SP and then turn to the CP. Imagine the CP without holding a specific hatred toward it. Could we enter it as we did the SP? I see no reason why not—theoretically. Physically it would be impossible but not in principle. After entrance into the SP there is nothing that would prevent our entrance into the CP. But that is excluded. We can’t enter. They won’t let us. . Can we make this manoeuvre from the outside? The progressive elements oppose the Stalinists but we don’t win many progressive elements. Everywhere we meet Stalinists. How to break the Stalinist party? The support of the progressives is not stable. It is found at the top of the union rather than as a rank- and-file current. these progressives against us. We need a stronger base in the ranks. There are small Tobins on whom we depend. They depend on the big Tobins. They on Roosevelt. This phase is inevitable. It opened the door for us in the trade unions. But it can become dangerous. We can’t depend on these elements or their sentiments. We will lose them and _ isolate ourselves from the Stalinist workers. Now we have no attitude toward them. Burnham and Shachtman opposed an active attitude toward the Stalinists. They represent a whole period from 1917 up to date. We can’t move without them. The coincidence between their slogans and ours is transitory, but it can give us a bridge to these workers. The question must be examined. If persecutions should begin tomorrow, it would be first against them, second against us. The honest, hard members will remain true. The pro- gressives are a type in the leadership. The rank and file are disquieted, unconsciously revolutionary. Now with the war we will have - FourTH INTERNATIONAL, AuGuSsT 1965 Dobbs: It is not quite correct to say that the ‘progressives’ include only the tops of the unions. The progressives include the rank and file, especially is this true in the big unions. Cannon: They are not cohesive, but in revolt against the Stalinists. Where the Stalinists control the union that is where a real anti-Stalinist movement is .strongest. The Stalinists control the maritime unions by and large and ‘we have a_ powerful experience in development of a progressive revolt against them. Harold: The trade union movement grew by the millions. A new bureaucracy was formed, there was a new stream of union conscious members. In this there were two currents, the Stalinists and the anti- Stalinists. Both streams included both rank and filers ana bureaucrats. Trotsky: But why the difference? Harold: The differences began in 1934 when the Stalinists emerged from the red unions and were taken as a revolutionary movement. Many were corrupted. Many thought the New Deal swing a manoeuvre. The Stalinists made a deal with the CIO tops. They led many unions. They had a reputation of militancy. , No one policy it is true, but they recruited as revolutionists. Now they are not considered revolu- tionists. Many of the best have dropped out. Those remaining are bureaucrats or confused. Cannon: The problem is to get the CP out of the road. There is not a large percentage of revolutionary material in its ranks. They have discounted workers who saw no other force. They attract through the sheer inertia of a big apparatus and a big party. They use corruption where they do not already control the machinery. They use economic terrorism. They do everything the old-time bureaucrats did but on a conveyor system. Unquestionably there are good workers among them, but only a small percentage. It is a terrible danger to risk the condemnation of non-Stalinist workers for the sake of a manoeuvre that would win little. The progressive movement is composed of anti-Stalinists and legitimate rank-and- file forces organised by us. The Stalinists even buy old-time fakers. They provide a legitimate movement of protest which is our main source of recruitment and which comes during the struggle against the CP. In the Los Angeles auto movement, for example, some ex-CPers organised a counter-movement from which we recruited. The Stalinists have built up a terrible hatred against themselves. Seventy-five per cent is genuine workers’ grievances and consists of many former Stalinists animated by a terrible bitterness. A complicated manoeuvre giving the possibility of identifying us with the Stalinists would be wrong. Our main line must be towards the non-Stalinist workers. We must handle the Stalinist question within this framework.

[p045] STRUGGLE FOR MARXISM IN THE U.S. Jeb: I am against the manoeuvre. not entirely rational about this. Perhaps it is mostly from inertia. Cannon wrote about the Stalinists that they are an alien movement in the workers’ movement, irresponsible. Our influence in the progressive groups is a top movement, not a rank-and-file movement, especially in New York. Our position is very pre- carious. Not something that we can look forward to as a big recruiting ground. The Stalinists’ influence in the ranks is quite solid. They make deals with the old-time fakers, but also have a rank-and-file following. In the painters’ union they made a deal with the gangsters but also were supported by the anti-gangster following. We built up a movement, kicked out the Stalinists but couldn’t consolidate or recruit. Stalin- ists operate with corruption but different degrees of corruption. A worker in the TWU who quit the CP in 1938 told us that they are disillusioned with the CP but not enough to join us. They use corruption by degrees—the best jobs are given to the Stalinists, lesser jobs to the group surrounding them, lesser jobs to sympathisers. The militants don’t regard themselves as corrupt—just members of the CP. ‘If we don’t get the jobs, the reactionaries will.’ That seems to be their attitude. But we don’t have contact with the Stalinist rank and file. Before we could take such a manoeuvre we need to organise a nucleus in the Stalinists. Perhaps I am Trotsky: Tf the results of our conversation were nothing more than more precise investigation in relation to the Stalinists it would be very fruitful. Our party is not bound to the Stalinist manoeuvre any more than it was to the SP manoeuvre. Neverthe- less we undertook such a manoeuvre. We must add up the pluses and minuses. The Stalinists gained their influence during the past ten years. There was the depression and then the tremendous trade union movement culminating in the CIO. Only the craft unionists could remain indifferent. The Stalinists tried to exploit this movement, to build up their own bureaucracy. The progresssives are afraid of this. The politics of these so-called progressives is deter- mined by their need to meet the needs of the workers in this movement, on the other hand it comes from fear of the Stalinists. They can’t have the same policy as. Green because otherwise the Stalinists would occupy their posts. Their existence is a reflex of this new movement, but it is not a direct reflection of the rank and file. It is an adaptation of the conservative bureaucrats to this situation. There are two com- petitors, the progressive bureaucrats and the Stalinists. We are a third competitor trying to capture this sentiment. These progressive bureaucrats can lean on us for advisors in the fight against the Stalinists. But the role of an advisor to a progressive bureaucrat doesn’t promise much in the long run. Our real role is that of third competitor. Then the question of our attitude toward these bureaucrats—do we have an absolutely clear position toward these competitors? These bureaucrats are Rooseveltians, militarists. We tried to penetrate the trade .unions with their help. 91 This was a correct manoeuvre, I believe. We can say that the question of the Stalinists would be resolved in passing insofar as we succeed in our main manoeuvre. But before the presidential campaign and the war question we have time for a small manoeuvre. We can say, your leaders betray you. but we support you without any confidence in your leaders in order to show that we can go with you and to show that your leaders will betray you. It is a short manoeuvre, not hinging on the main question of the war. But it is necessary to know incomparably better the Stalinists and their place in the trade unions, their reaction to our party. It would be fatal to pay too much attention to the impression that we can make on the pacifists and on our ‘progressive’ bureaucrat friends. In this case we become the squeezed lemon of the bureaucrats. They use us against the Stalinists but as the war nears call us unpatriotic and expel us. These Stalinist workers can become revolutionary, especially if Moscow changes its line and becomes patriotic. At the time of Finland, Moscow made a difficult turn, a new turn is still more painful. But we must have contact and information. I don’t insist on this plan, understand, but we must have a plan. What plan do you propose? The progressive bureau- crats and dishonest centrists of the trade union movement reflect important changes in the base, but the question is how to approach the base? We en- counter between us and the base, the Stalinists. Kay: To support the Stalinists in the presidential campaign would kill us. They shift their line— Trotsky: Nothing can kill us, Comrade Kay. Kay: Our sympathisers would be driven away. The Stalinists cannot even talk with us. They are. expelled for talking with us. Trotsky: That is a blow against the party. They say that we are agents of this and that power. We say, if your leaders are serious against the war then we are with you, but your leaders will betray you. It is the politics of critical support. Tobin, for example, is a faker combined with a reactionary stupid petty-bourgeois, but, would we vote for him if he were running on an independent ticket for president? Yes. : Kay: But Tobin or Lewis wouldn’t kill us. Trotsky: I am not so sure. Lewis would kill us very efficiently if he were elected and war came. It is not a sentimental question. It is how to break this hypnosis. They say the Trotskyites are agents—but we say if you are seriously against the war we are with you. Even the problem of making them listen to us--we meet that by explaining. It is a very daring undertaking. But the cohesion of our party is such that we could succeed. But if we reject this plan, then we must find another policy. I repeat then we must find another policy. What is it? Carl: We must keep aware of the main task, to

[p046] 92 present ourselves to the American workers. I think that we would be swallowed up in this manoeuvre because of the size of the party. Now we are becoming able to separate ourselves from them—but this manoeuvre would swallow us up. We must be careful to make an independent stand, not as an ‘opposition movement to the Stalinists. Trotsky: It is not a question of entry. And such a manoeuvre would be very short and very critical. The manoeuvre itself presupposes that we are an independent party. The manoeuvre is a measure of our independence. The workers of the Stalinist party are in a closed milieu, hypnotised by lies for a long time. Now the persecution from the war begins. Our criticisms seem part of the persecution and suddenly we appear to support them—because of the bourgeois persecution. I don’t say even that we will actually vote for them—by November the situation can change. The leaders can carry out their betrayal. Hansen: The manoeuvre seems to me to bear some resemblance to our united front proposal to the CP at the time of the anti-fascist demonstrations. At the first demonstration, we made no such proposals. Many of the rank and file of our party criticised us. At the second demonstration we made such a pro- posal. It brought immediate response from the Stalinists. The rank and file were favourably im- pressed and questioned their leaders. The leaders were forced to launch a new campaign against us. _ We gained some members as a result. Trotsky: The analogy holds except that then we had the initiative. Now they have the initiative. Good, we support this initiative. An investigation is needed, a small conference. I don’t wish to exaggerate this manoeuvre. It is not our strategic line, but a tactical question. It is one possibility. * June 14, 1940 Trotsky: Toledano’s speech, reported today in the press, is important for our policy in America. The Mexican people, says Toledano, ‘love’ the United States and will fight the Nazis arms in hand. Toledano indicates complete fraternisation with the democracies. This is the first announcement of a new turn by Moscow. I have a concrete suggestion, that we publish a letter to the Stalinist workers: during five years your leaders were protagonists of the demo- cracies, then they changed and were against all the imperialisms. If you make a firm decision not to permit a change in line then we are ready to convoke a convention to support your presidential candidate. You must give a pledge. It would be a letter of propaganda and agitation to the Stalinist workers. We will see. It is probable that the line will change in some weeks. This letter would give you free possibilities without having to vote for their candidate. FourTH INTERNATIONAL, AuGusT 1965 Dobbs: It seems to me you are considering two asvects of the question. One, you are weighing the _ question as to whether more is to be gained in numbers and quality than would be lost among the anti-Stalinists. Two, the manoeuvre is possible only while they have an anti-war attitude. Trotsky: Yes. The Stalinist machine makes different turns and manoeuvres in obedience to Moscow. Now they make a turn corresponding to the most intimate feelings of the rank and file. Now we can approach them or remain indifferent. We can give support to them against their leaders or remain aside. There is a presidential campaign besides this. If you are an independent party you must have politics. a line in relation to this campaign. I have tried to combine the two in a not decisive but important period. It combines the honest feelings of the Stalinist rank and file and also touches the masses at election time. If you had an independent candidate I would be for him, but where is he? It is either complete abstention from the campaign because of technical reasons, or you must choose between Browder and Norman Thomas. We can accept abstention. The bourgeois state deprived us of the possibility of running our candidate. We can proclaim that every- one is a faker. That is one thing, but events con- firming our proclamation is another. Shall we follow negative or dynamic politics? I must say that during the conversation I have become still more convinced that we must follow the dynamic course. However, I propose only a serious investigation, a discussion, and then a conference. We must have our own politics. Imagine the effect on the Stalinist rank and file. It would be very good. They expect from such a terrible enemy as us that we will throw very cold water on them. We will surprise them with some terribly hot water. * * Cannon: They will probably make a change before we return. Trotsky: Yes it is quite likely. Cannon: We must exercise great caution in dealing with the Stalinists in order not to compromise our- selves. Yesterday’s discussion took a one-sided channel regarding our relations in the unions, that we act only as attorneys for the progressive labour fakers. This is very false. Our objective is to create our own forces. The problem is how to begin. All sectarians are independent forces—in their own imagination. Your impression that the anti-Stalinists are rival labour fakers is not quite correct. It has that aspect, but it has other aspects too. Without opposition to the Stalinists we have no reason for existing in the unions. We start as oppositionists and become irreconcilable. Where small groups break their necks is that they

[p047] STRUGGLE FOR MARXISM IN THE U.S. scorn manoeuvres and combinations and never con- solidate anything. At the opposite extreme is the Lovestone group. In cne union we began without any members, the way we usually begin. Up to the time of the war it was hard to find a more fruitful ground than the anti-Stalinist elements. We began with this idea, that it is impossible to play a role in the unions unless you have people in the unions. With a small party, the possibility to enter is the first essential. In this union we made a combination with syndicalist elements. It was an exceptional situation, a small weak bureau- cracy, most of whose policies were correct and which was against the Stalinists. It was incomprehensible that we could play any role except as an opposition to the Stalinists who were the most treacheréiis elements in the situation. We formed a tacit bloc with the one possibility to enter the union freely. We were weak numerically, strong politically. The progressives grew, defeated the Stalinists. We grew too. We have 50 members and may possess soon 20 more. We followed a very careful policy—not to have sharp clashes which were not necessary anyway so far, so as not to bring about a premature split— not to let the main fight against the Stalinists be obscured. The maritime unions are an important section in the field. Our first enemy there is the Stalinists. They are the big problem. In new unions such as the maritime—which in reality surged forward in 1934, shattering the old bureaucracy, the Stalinists came to the fore. The old-fashioned craft unionists cannot prevail against the Stalinists. The struggle for control is between us and the Stalinists. We have to be careful not to compromise this fight. We must be the classical intransigeant force. The Stalinists gained powerful positions in these unions, especially in the auto union. The Lovestoneites followed the policy outlined by Trotsky yesterday—attorneys for the labour fakers, especially in auto. They dis- appeared from the scene. We followed a more careful policy. We tried to exploit the differences between the Martin gang and the Stalinists. For a while we were the left wing of the Martin outfit, but we extricated ourselves in the proper time. Auto is ostensibly CIO but in reality the Stalinists are in control. Now we are coming forward as the leading and inspiring circle in the rank and file that has no top leaders, that is anti-Stalinist, anti-patriotic, anti- Lewis. We have every chance for success. We must not overlook the possibility that these chances deve- loped from experiments in the past period to exploit differences between union tops. If we had taken a sectarian attitude we would still be there. In the food unions there was an inchoate opposition to the Stalinists. There were office seekers, pro- gressives, former CPers. We have only a few people. We must link ourselves with one or the other to come forward. Later we will be able to come forward. Two things can compromise us. One, confusion with the Stalinists. Two, a purist attitude. If we imagine ourselves a power, ignoring the differences between 93 the reactionary wings, we will remain sterile. Dobbs: The general situation leads me to believe that we would lose more than we would gain from giving the impression that we are locking arms with the Stalinists. We have made connections with re- actionary people but at the same time we have gained some very good trade union elements, bringing them closer to true Bolshevism. We have gained addi- tional footholds. In one basic union we have 22 comrades in the rank-and-file movement. Some playing a very important role. At the last convention one comrade especially got the biggest ovation at the convention when he made his speech. Prior to the convention we had only a small nucleus. Since then we have grown among the rank and file. Trotsky: Can we get them to go against Roosevelt? Dobbs: Yes. Trotsky: For whom will they vote? Dobbs: I don’t know. Maybe Roosevelt. For us to turn to the Stalinists will sow real confusion in their minds. It should not be rushed in any case. Trotsky: I believe we have the critical point very clear. We are in a bloc with so-called progressives— not only fakers but honest rank and file. Yes they are honest and progressives but from time to time they vote for Roosevelt—once in four years. This is decisive. You propose a trade union policy not a Bolshevik policy. Bolshevik policies begin outside the trade unions. The worker is an honest trade unionist but far from Bolshevik politics. The honest militant can develop but it is not identical with being a Bolshevik. You are afraid to become compromised in the eyes of the Rooseveltian trade-unionists. They on the other hand are not worried in the slightest about being compromised by voting for Roosevelt against you. We are afraid of being compromised. If you are afraid, you lose your independence and become half-Rooseveltian. In peace time this is not catastrophic. In war time it will compromise us. They can smash us. Our policy is too much for pro-Rooseveltian trade unionists. I notice that in the Northwest Organiser this is true. We discussed it before, but not a word was changed; not a single word. The danger—a terrible danger—is adaptation to the pro-Rooseveltian trade unionists. You don’t give any answer to the elections, not even the beginning of an answer. But we must have a policy. It is not necessary now to vote for Browder. We are against Roosevelt. As for Norman Thomas he is just a political misunderstanding. Browder however is a tremendous handicap because he has a revolu- tionary’ attitude toward the imperialist war, etc. I understand that the situation is difficult. What I propose is a manifesto to the Stalinist workers, to say that for five years you were for Roosevelt, then you changed. This turn is in the right direction. Will you develop and continue this

[p048] 94 policy or not? Will you let the leaders change it or not. Will you continue and develop it or not? If you are firm we will support you. In this manifesto we can say that if you fix a sharp programme for your candidate, then we will vote for him. I see no reason why we can’t say this with these ifs. Does this signify that we have changed our trade union policy? Not at all. We continue to oppose them as before. : We say, if you seriously consider your attitude to Roosevelt you would have such and such policy in the trade unions. But you don’t have such a policy there. We can’t go along with you in the trade unions. I would be very glad to hear even one single word from you on policy in regard to the presidential -election. Cannon: It is not entirely correct to pose the problem in that way. We are not with the pro- Roosevelt militants. We developed when the Stalinists were pro-Rooseveltian. Their present attitude is con- junctural. It is not correct that we lean towards Roosevelt. Comrade Trotsky’s polemic is a polemic for an independent candidate. If we were opposed to that then his account would be correct. For technical reasons we can’t have an independent candidate. The real answer is independent politics. It is a false issue: Roosevelt versus the Stalinists. It is not a bonafide class opposition to Roosevelt. Possibly we could support Browder against Roosevelt, but Browder would not only repudiate our votes, but would withdraw in favour of Roosevelt. Trotsky: That would be the very best occurrence for us. After laying down our conditions for support, this capitulation would win us a section of the Stalinists. It is not a strategic policy but a policy for the presidential campaign only. The fact is that they have developed this anti-war propaganda. We must consider this important fact in the life of the American workers. We begin with nothing being done about the Stalinists. The ‘progressive’ rank and file are a kind of semi- fabrication. They have class struggle tendencies but they vote for Roosevelt. They are not formed politically. The rank-and-file Stalinists are not worse. They are caught in a machine. They are disciplined, political, Our aim is to oppose the Stalinist worker to the machine. How accomplish this? By leaving them alone? We will never do it. By postponing? That is not a policy. We are for an independent labour ticket. But we don’t even have this expressed in our press. Why? Because our party is embarrassed. It has no line on the elections. : Last January we discussed a campaign in the unions to have our own trade union presidential candidate. We were to propose to him that we would vote for him if he were nominated. Even Lewis. We were to begin the campaigning for a labour president. But not a thing was done. Nothing appeared. Nothing in the Northwest Organiser. FourTH INTERNATIONAL, AUGUST 1965 Dobbs: Perhaps it was my fault— Trotsky: No. That is the bad Hitler theory: of history— I can’t explain it by negligence. Nor just because it is a trade union paper with just a trade union policy. The members of the party could write letters to the editor. What do their trade union leaders believe Why can’t our comrades write to the North- west Organiser? We discussed in detail the technical details. But nothing was done. Why? It signifies an immediate clash with the Rooseveltians—not the rank and file—but a clash with our allies, the machine, the conscious Rooseveltians, who would immediately attack, a clash with our own class enemies such as Tobin. Cannon: It is necessary to counterpose trade union candidates in the field. That would retain our following. But what I can’t accept is Browder as a symbol of the class struggle. Trotsky: That is a bit of false polemics. In January I didn’t propose Browder. But you are reduced to Browder or Roosevelt. Why this lack ~ of initiative? Why were these six months not utilised? Why? It is not reduced to an individual fight, it has general reasons. I discussed with O’Shea two years ago on this same problem and this same necessity. With Jones too. But the North .est Urg.« iser remains unchanged. It is a photograph of our adaptation to the Rooseveltians. a Understand, I don’t believe that it would be advis- able for important comrades to start such a campaign. But even totally unknown comrades could write such letters. He could write the Executive Board of the union, asking them what will be the fate of the workers. What kind of a president do we need? At least five months were not utilised. Completely lost. . So we should lose two or three months more? And Browder suddenly becomes an ideal political figure for me! A little false polemics. How reach a compromise? I ask two or three hundred Stalinist workers. That is the minimum requirement. We can get them by holding their leaders to a class struggle policy. Are you ready to impose this class struggle line on your leader, we ask. Then we will find common ground. It is not just to write a manifesto, but to turn our political face to the Stalinist workers. What is bad about that? We begin an action against the Stalinists; what is wrong with that? I propose a compromise. I will evaluate Browder 50 per cent lower than I estimate him now in return for 50 per cent more interest from you in the Stalinist party. Cannon: It has many complications. Jeb: On the question of adaptation to Roosevelt’s programme by our trade union comrades. Is it true? If so it was necessary for our trade union work. The trade unionists are for Roosevelt. If we want to

[p049] STRUGGLE FOR MARXISM IN THE U,S. make headway we have to adapt—by not unfoldiag our full programme—in order to get a foothold for the next stage. We are still at the beginning despite all the work done. That is one thing, but to make it a permanent policy is another thing. We are against that. What is the right time to make the break. Have we exhausted the period of adaption? Cannon: The failure of the campaign to develop an independent ticket is due to inertia at the centre, the faction fight, the tendency to wait in place of energetic application of policies, a feeling of smallness of the party—psychological faults rather than conscious or unconscious adaptation to the Rooseveltians. The bloc in the trade unions is not a political bloc but a bloc over trade union policy. It is possible to have an active policy in opposition. In 1936 we supported the Socialist Party, not Roosevelt, despite the trade unionisis giving open support to Roosevelt. The ideal situation would be for Comrade Trotsky to use his influence with the government to change the laws. Trotsky: That is the job of the SWP. Cannon: months ago. During the faction fight there was a congressional campaign. Browder was running. Our policy was that it would be best to have our own candidate. We proposed this, -but it was sabotaged by Abern. op But to..go out. and campaign for Browder, just at. the time of war, when we are trying to explain our policy— Trotsky: It is precisely one of the elements of explaining that theirs is a false policy. Cannon: Support for a labour candidate can be justified, but the CP is entirely different. The CP is not a genuine workers’ party. “Dobbs: We are caught short. ” The criticisms are very pertinent. They will be productive of . better results you may be certain. But we feel that this June 15, 1940. ‘Hansen: Yesterday Comrade Trotsky made some remarks about our adaptation té"the so-called pro- gressives in the trade unions, he mentioned the line - of the Northwest Ofganiser and also our attitude in connection with the elections and the Stalinists. I wish to point out that this is not something completely hew on Comrade Trotsky’s part.. More than two years ago during the discussion over the Transitional Pro- gramme, he ‘discussed exactly these same points and had ‘exactly the same position, with due regard for the difference in time and that then it was not the elections but the farmer-labour party that was to the fore. Comrade Trotsky has also written some letters regarding the Stalinists and the need for a more positive line toward them. In the past faction fight We should have started a campaign six. policy would be completely disastrous. We would prefer to sacrifice the manoeuvre for Jimmy Higgins work and put our own candidate on the ballot. It is not a question of Roosevelt. We-will do anything short of supporting the Stalinists in order to go against Roosevelt. Trotsky: Good. But why not write a manifesto, addressing them? Give them- arguments under- standable to them? a But we don’t have a candidate. It is now too late to have a candidate. What is your policy? Good—we will abandon voting for Browder. We will abandon a manifesto. We will make a. leaflet. You would agree with a leaflet on the above lines? We can state our differences with the CP: your party accepts the class struggle only on accidental grounds. "And if the Stalinist worker comes. up to you and asks, will you vote for our candidate? We are a serious party, where do you stand? We must give him a serious answer. We must say, yes we will. vote for him. No party is homogeneous, not even the Stalinist party. We cannot change the party but only introduce a wedge to start some of them moving toward us. Cannon: In 1920 in the first year of the CP in this country, we had a situation similar to this. We were in illegality. A few months before the election and impossible to run our own candidate. We openiy boycotted the elections. It was completely ineffective. Lenin wrote us a letter. He held that we should have voted for Debs. But at that time there was a strong psychological separation from the SP. Lenin’s statement produced quite a shock. And Debs was in prison—not a Browder. Trotsky: Yes. prison. Cannon: There has not been a direct attack: or approach to the Stalinists for some years. Could it be possible? - Although Browder is condemned to * too,,-Comrade Trotsky mentioned. in his polemic ‘From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene’ the following point, which he underlined: ‘More than once the party will have to- remind its own trade unionists that a pedagogical adaptation to the more backward layers of the proletariat must not become transformed into a political adaptation to the’ con- servative bureaucracy of the trade unions.’ I ‘iam wondering if Comrade Trotsky considers that’ -our party is displaying a conservative tendency in*the sense that we are adapting ourselves politically to the trade union bureaucracy. Trotsky: To a certain degree I believe it is so. ‘I cannot observe closely enough to be completely