An Insufficient Document

[p050] ‘An insufficient document’ By Livio Maitan Rome, May 15, 1968 IF URGENT TASKS had not prevented me from under- taking the job during the next weeks, I would have liked to explain in detail the reasons that led me to abstain at the time the US adopted the first draft for discussion at the world congress [‘The New Rise of the World Revolution’]. Unfortunately I must limit myself to the substance of it by reproducing the text of a letter which I sent to the US (United Secretariat) on May 15.1 First of all some remarks of a methodological nature. We were in agreement that it was necessary to prepare some theses, whereas the draft does not have that character (except, to a large degree, the first chapter, Which, moreover, is by far the most satisfactory). Even abstracting from the lapses in edit- ing, which are very bad, on which I am not calling as much attention as appears to me to be called for, we are confronted with a descriptive document, in which conjunctural appreciations are very frequent and which from this fact give it rather the nature of a general resolution. I do not have any objection to the congress adopting such a document in addition, but we need something else now. I thus suggest re- affirming the decision to adopt theses aimed essentially at arming or re-arming the movement on certain major questions which are posed at this convulsive stage of the world situation. Within this framework, I believe it would be useful to base our generalizations not on general appreciations but on analyses of certain typical cases, or typical in representing a tendency (for example, the experience of recent years in Czechoslovakia, the Syrian experience, the guerrilla struggle in Thailand). I will take this up in the different chapters. I will indicate my opinion on certain problems, at times by following more or less what is said in the draft. 1. It should be noted that in my letter the number- ing of the chapter does not correspond to the num- bering in the final document, which added Chapter II on France. 100 (I) It was clear to us from the beginning what were the causes and the limits of certain defeats suffered by the colonial revolution, particularly begin- ing in 1964. It was not a matter of a structural evolution unfavourable to the revolutionary tendencies (nowhere in the world has there been any stabilization whatsoever of the economic and social structures of the colonial and semi-colonial countries), but of the interaction of the two following fundamental factors: (a) The crisis of the imperialist system and the maturing of the revolutionary forces on a world scale operated in such a way that the growing over into a socialist revolution became more and more a problem of the immediate future, a concrete imperious neces- sity. This pointed to inevitable dramatic confroritations, in which the outcome was determined essentially by the lapse in the subjective factor (which only in certain cases can be explained as owing to reasons pertaining primarily to the economic and social structure). (b) The victory of a socialist revolution in Cuba and the disintegration of the colonial system in Africa were a major lesson for American imperialism, which adopted a line that took the offensive much more than in the preceding decade, demonstrating its determina- tion to exploit to the fullest extent its enormous military potential and its political and economic weight. The new economic expansion in the US, while not the most direct cause of the imperialist counter- offensive—as some people have held—-was unquestion- ably one of the essential conditions for unleashing this counter-offensive and for its partial successes. The war in Vietnam was, from all the evidence, the culmination of .this more aggressive policy of imperialism. It cannot be denied that in the first phase it permitted imperialism to score considerable gains, above all preventing the Vietnamese revolution from gaining a complete victory on a national scale, which would have been perfectly possible in the immediate future in the absence of foreign military intervention. The Indonesian affair was also, at least in part, a Fourth International, Winter 1969/70

[p051] by-product of this same intervention. But as the test of strength became prolonged and deepened and the Vietnamese organized their extra- ordinary reply, the war became a verification of the overall relation of forces. The imperialists ran into an outcome that was exactly the opposite of what they wanted; namely, they revealed for the whole world to see their incapacity to liquidate the Vietnamese revo- lution, despite the timorous and wait-and-see attitude of the USSR, and, in fact, China also, thereby suffer- ing a historic setback. At the same time the limits of the receding of the colonial revolution in 1964-1967 was confirmed by the clearer and clearer fact that the regimes set up by counter-revolutionary coups (par- ticularly Brazil and Indonesia) proved absolutely incapable of achieving any economic and _ political stabilization that was at all durable, having to once again confront the threat of considerable mass move- ments and active nuclei of guerrillas. After a certain respite, the crisis of imperialism has once again become aggravated and the most probable tendency unquestionably is that of further aggravation : (a) The unfavourable relation of forces on a world scale, revealed particularly by the last phases of the Vietnamese conflict, will continue. (b) It has been proved once again that ‘reform- ist’ solutions of the problems of the so-called under- developed countries are objectively impossible. (c) The inter-imperialist contradictions are be- coming sharper and sharper on the economic level (crisis of the monetary system, etc.). (d) The economic power of the United States itself is running into more and more substantial limits (crisis of the dollar, etc.). (e) Last but not least, a radical change has already developed—and is going to develop more profoundly in the future—with regard to the domestic situation in the United States, which for 20 years has represented an essential element of the power of imperialism. If all of this is true, if the fundamental perspec- tive is that of a coming aggravation of the crisis of imperialism within the near future, then it must be emphasized that a possible solution—through a partial compromise or through a prolonged truce—of the Vietnamese conflict would, upon the whole, have a secondary importance (except, perhaps, in the event of a compromise very unfavourable to the Vietnamese, a hypothesis which seems to me completely unlikely). Revolutionary struggles would continue in any case on a broad scale, particularly in Asia, other explosions would occur and other conflicts would break out and there would probably be other points where things came to a head, replacing Vietnam in this regard. (II) A whole part of this chapter, ‘The End of the Long Imperialist Boom’, seems useless to me because it only repeats—in a very cursory way, more- over—what we have already said in several more rounded documents (it is from here on, moreover, where the tone and rapid comment of an article becomes predominant). I think it is necessary to centre the analysis on the central points; namely, the aggravation of the inter-imperialist competition, the new explosion of financial and industrial concentra- tions which mark the growing internationalism of Pabloite Congress: Latin America capital and the monetary and financial crisis. It is correct, in my opinion, to stress the importance of the greater synchronization of the cycle in the different capitalist countries and in this respect richer and more concrete elements must be brought into the analysis. On the other hand I do not think it would be useful to insist on ’29 as the essential point of departure. It is quite improbable that such a dramatic blow-up will occur within the near future, if we con- sider only the strictly economic aspect. But it would be a mistake to forget for a single instant that the world context today is incomparably more critical, more revolutionary, and thus even economic pheno- mena more limited in themselves could have much more explosive social and political repercussions. (To mention only one aspect, would the working class of the advanced capitalist countries, including that of the United States, be inclined to accept at the present time, after the improvement it has experienced in its standard of living for 15 to 20 years, even a part of the sacrifices imposed during certain periods in the 1930s ? It appears to me absolutely improbable. . . .) There is another problem which the document Mentions in passing and which ought, instead, to be treated a little more amply. This is the question of the outlets which imperialism can obtain through eco- nomic agreements with the workers’ states. It is essential to indicate the real meaning and trend of agreements of this nature. Politically there is no doubt that the agreements already reached, for example, between the USSR and Fiat, have been advantageously exploited by the bourgeoisie (this goes still more for the agreements concluded by the bureaucracy with the oligarchical Latin American governments). But, in the final analysis, the other aspect of the problem is more important, because it is a question of verifying whether this could constitute a new safety valve for the imperialist. economy in its difficulties (if only a safety valve of limited efficacy). On this level, I agree with the opinion expressed in the draft, but it should be insisted on .a bit more. In addition, it should be stressed that the international context makes such operations more difficult and uncertain. (III) The chapter, ‘The New Stage in the Crisis of the Bureaucratic Regimes’, etc., does not corres- pond to our present needs in analysis nor to the demand to give a clear response to some questions that are being posed at this stage among broad layers of the revolutionary left. The stress in the draft is rather on refuting the ‘optimistic’ interpretations of the economic reforms. But in the circles of interest to us the prevailing criticisms are ‘ultra-left’, stimulated among other things by the massive propaganda of the Chinese. For us then it is a question of : (a) Critically examining the analyses that claim that the democratic reforms imply the restoration of capitalism or a serious drift in that direction. (b) Stating as correctly as possible the conse- quences of the ‘reformist’ course on the structure and internal differentiations in the bureaucracy and on its ideological evolution. . With regard more particularly to Yugoslavia, it is time to draw a balance sheet that is not based on merely recalling the analyses of the 1950s (a valuable contribution in this respect was offered in the article which appeared in the QI in November 1966). Person- ally, I do not believe that Yugoslavia has reverted to 101

[p052] a capitalist state; but the problem actually posed is: It is necessary particularly to indicate the meaning and significance, among other things, of tHe following phenomena : (a) The substantial development of a capitalist accumulation in the countryside. (b) The presence of foreign capital to a not insignificant degree in the industrial sector as well as in the tertiary sector. (c) The suppression or close to it of the mono- poly in foreign trade. (d) The growth of the petty-bourgeois layers who draw their income from tertiary economic activi- ties strictly dependent on support from abroad. By precise and serious analytical replies on all these .questions—which are of concern, I insist, not only to the ‘grouplets’ of state caps or the remnants of Bordigism but to very broad sectors of the revolutionary youth—we will be able at the same time to score points on the methodological level, refuting all kinds of impressionistic concepts and any more or less ‘new’ theory based on an abstract utilization of economic categories independently of concrete social categories. As for China, there will be a separate document on the big internal crisis and I.do not propose that it be taken up likewise in the general theses. But there is an aspect concerning the influence which China and the Maoist current are exercising in the world situa- tion and in the revolutionary workers’ movement which should be examined here. I believe that we should not forget or brush aside what we were the first to stress; namely, that the evolution of the Chinese leadership and its polemic against the Soviet leadership and the majority of the Communist parties could not fail to have absolutely important conse- quences. This aspect has been rather neglected by us in our most recent phase in which we were often occupied in polemicizing, correctly, against the apolo- getic interpretations of the ‘cultural revolution’. But, despite the attitude of the Chinese in the Vietnamese affair, despite their responsibility in Indonesia, despite the lamentable bankruptcy of almost all the orthodox Maoist groups, we must not lose sight of : (a) That the international line of the Chinese remains objectively more progressive than the Soviet line and there is no ground for equating them. (b) That China is aiding and stimulating some sweeping guerrilla movements in several Asian coun- tries. (c) That the Chinese criticism has had an in- contestable effect in the revolutionary ripening of broad layers of the new revolutionary left in the advanced capitalist countries. (d) That despite certain traits of the ‘cultural revolution’, the attitudes and conceptions of the Chinese leaders continue to operate objectively in a direction diametrically opposed to that of Stalinism. (The comrades will obviously understand that I am utilizing the term Stalinism here in the more specific sense of the word and not as a synonym for bureau- cratic concepts and praxis in general.) (IV) (‘Resumption of the Colonial Revolution’, etc.) With regard to this chapter, I will limit myself to stressing : 102 (a) That in a document of this kind conjunctural appreciations on the possible outcome of negotiations over Vietnam should not be introduced. (b) That the part on Latin America should be left aside until the special document is ready. (c) That the part on the Arab revolution is absolutely insufficient, and particularly the apprecia- tion on Syria, insofar as it is outlined, is too limited. (I hold, in contrast, as I mentioned above, that the evolution of this country merits a separate analysis.) (d) That the part on Africa, which contains inexactitudes, moreover, should be developed on the basis of what was achieved in the document at the previous congress. (e) That it is correct and imperative to call attention to the capital importance of the Indian revo- lution, but the paragraphs of the draft are far from being satisfactory. (V) (‘On the Imperialist Countries, the Crisis of the Workers’ Movement’, etc.) The document should be centred more clearly on the following questions and ideas: (a) We are in a phase of major crisis for the Social Democracy in Europe as a whole. If one recalls the objective and even subjective role which the Social Democracy has played in the past decade as a stabilizing force owing to its influence on the working class in most of the capitalist countries of Europe, its decline and the serious diminution of its grip appear as an important factor of social and political dis- equilibrium. (b) The explosion of the student movement on a mass base never before seen in the advanced capitalist countries (the roots and threads of which should be explained broadly) has shaken the political equilibrium of countries like France, Italy and Germany and created grave difficulties for the traditional bureau- cratized parties and unions. We have entered in reality into a new phase of the historical crisis of the workers’ bureaucracies. (c) If one considers the cumulative effects of the economic tendencies outlined in the draft, of the major crisis of the Social Democracy and to a more limited but not less significant degree up to now by the CP bureaucracies, of the explosion of the student youth and the more and more marked appearance of militant layers of the worker youth (the latter phenomena not remaining without effect on the layers of workers in general), if one recalls the almost generally recognized profound erosion suffered by the postwar bourgeois democracy and the Gaullist regime itself, and if, of course, one does not forget for a single instant the fundamental features of the world situation, it follows that we are moving in a series of European countries towards growing economic, social and political disequilibrium and toward major con- frontations even within the relatively near future. The prognoses on the possible outcome of such confronta- tions can naturally vary from one country to another and there is no doubt that within certain countries at least (England, Belgium, for example) the perspectives at the present time do not warrant any optimism. But it is necessary above all to ascertain whether the fundamental tendency which I am indicating really exists, and, in case of a positive answer, to draw ail the consequences. Fourth International, Winter 1969/70

[p053] (d) If the hypothesis advanced in the preceding point is well founded, the tactical rearming of our European movement is not only a necessary task but also an urgent one. We will discuss this question within the framework of the debate on the draft concerning the tactical orientation, but I will say right now that the line expressed in the report at the last IEC requires substantial rectification. The orientation which we have followed, more or less in all the countries of western Europe, beginning in 1952, is visibly outmoded and it is necessary to indicate as soon as possible for each country, the lines and new forms of our activity. (IV) (‘The Construction of a New Revolutionary Leadership’). It is correct to begin, as the document does, with two essential facts : (1) In a general cbjective sense, the situation has never been so favourable for the construction of new revolutionary Marxist leaderships. (2) Despite this, we are running into multiple difficulties. I believe, however, that Walter bypasses a little certain crucial problems. My remarks, thus, are partly in agreement with the document and partly independ- ent of it. (a) It is necessary without doubt to reiterate our reply to concepts of the Marcuse, Sweezy, etc., type. But it is necessary to round it out a little better, by recalling more rigorously certain basic methodological criteria while at the same time providing more specific analytical elements. With regard to the subject of the united front, admit the. I do not understand the usefulness of advancing it here in this form. If the draft is directed against spontaneist deformations which are being propazated here and there in our ranks, I am in agreement on the need to take up the question, but the axis must be considerably different because of the fact that ihe source of the deformation does not reside must oft« . in an opportunist concep- tion of the united front (on the contrary, the united front is criticized most often from a sectarian angle among broad revolutions , layers), but in a pussive adaptation to pressures exerted by new mass move- ments. (b) In order to « ,iain where, in my opinion, the gravest difficulty ahead of us now lies (I will speak here of the new difficulties in the dynamic sectors, leaving aside all the traditional difficulties which, while in decline still weigh heavily), here are some quite empirical examples. In Italy, our organization ran into difficulties beginning from the time when the vanguard movement of the new generation acquired the breadth of a mass movement, and it recently happened that people who agreed with the general concepts of Trotskyism and with our fundamental analyses on Italy, did not accept the invitation to join up with our ranks because, in their opinion, revolu- tionary Marxism has now become a common heritage of broad revolutionary layers and the existence of a specific Trotskyist organization is no longer necessary. In certain countries of Latin America, some militants freely maintain that Castroism has accepted, in prac- tice, concepts of the Latin-American revolution and the world revolution which the Fourth International has traditionally promulgated. They appreciate our activity and are ready, if necessary, to collaborate with The Future of the fourth International us, but just the same they do not consider it necessary or useful to join our movement (such attitudes exist, for example, in the Chilean MIR). In the United States, I heard the comrades affirm—I suppose with good grounds—that the SWP used to ‘have a consider- ably greater number of black militants than today. I do not believe that the essential cause of our difficulties in recruitment and gain in influence in sectors such as those I have just mentioned lies in our subjective deficiencies. There was an unquestion- able delay in the Italian section in understanding the dynamics of the student movement, but the funda- mental orientation was correct, the organization was active and rather dynamic, and, in any case, our errors were never at any time graver than the errors of other competing tendencies. As for the SWP, the honour due it on the Afro-American question is absolutely unassailable and I consider that in truth the interpre- tations and the orientations that our American friends have expressed on this capital question—in the begin- ning with the help of Trotsky—from the 1930s, repre- sent one of the most notable theoretical and political heritages of our movement as a whole. The explanation must be sought in the following direction: on the one hand certain present movements which are being unleashed, by their very scope go beyond the present possibilities of our restricted organizations; on the other hand—and above all— these new movements, which are breaking through or passing over every ‘traditional’ organizational frame- work and in which the militants often display a ten- dency to consider us, too, as part of the ‘traditional’ left, exercise a powerful attraction in circles where formerly we were alone or almost alone in speaking a revolutionary language. In other words: to the degree that the weight of the ideological factor in the choice of political alignment decreases (in the cases in- dicated from the very fact that a series of ideas have become, more or less, common property), it is under- standable that some layers of militants and cadres prefer, at least at .nis stage, to merely join mass movements rather than become linked organizationally with the Fourth International or national Trotskyist organizations. I am not at all ignoring or underestimating other factors operating in the same direction. I am _ con- vinced that the subjective weaknesses and inevitable inexperience of new layers contribute to the indicated tendencies, and, it goes without saying, I hold that we must not make any theoretical concession to spon- taneist concepts. But the actual situation, a difficulty that is real, a serious problem that is posed, must be recognized. (c) Under what conditions will we be able to overcome these difficulties and exploit to the fullest at a later stage the enormous objective possibilities existing for the revolutionary movement ? Our capacity for political analysis and overall theoretical generalization—which is based in the final analysis on our international organizational structure —will be a major trump card in the future, too, naturally on condition that we prove capable of con- stantly renewing and enriching our patrimony. More particularly, our role will be appreciated at its true value by the new movements if we are in a position to express in time and better than any other current their real needs and to outline solutions to the prob- lems which they raise. It goes without saying—in 103

[p054] addition—_that we must continue to apply in the most supple way our basic criticisms through integration in the real movements and avoid any kind of political sectarianism or organizational fetishism. We should not forget what we must do now in many countries with people who are ultrasensitive on this subject. But it is only by successes or revolutionary struggles at the head of a mass movement in one or several countries that we will be able to surmount our difficulties and present contradictions. What is expected from us from now on is that we demonstrate in practice the historical value of our movement and we will be judged essentially on this basis. This can appear, at bottom, to be an elementary truth, but it is a question of inspiring our whole activity with this recognition. It is a question more precisely of deter- mining in what countries we have the best chance of a breakthrough and subordinating everything to the elementary necessity for a success in these countries, and even, if necessary, in a single country. The rest will come later. There are, in fact, several countries where we at present have possibilities for an important break- through (youth movement in France, anti-war move- ment and youth movement in the United States, South Africa with a certain time) and we must unquestion- ably make an effort in the direction of India, but we must place everything above all on a sector of Latin America and you know very well which one. We must exploit the preparatory period of the congress to con- vince the entire movement to operate in practice, every day, with this perspective. Permit me to express myself a little paradoxically: it is necessary to under- stand and to explain that at the present stage the International will be built around Bolivia. * * * August 20, 1968 It is evident that parts of my letter have been outmoded by events, but I consider that certain ideas remain valid. Taking into account, in addition, the final editing of the draft, I would like to add the following : (a) The chapter on the May revolution in France is obviously weak—this is due in large measure to the time when it was written—and I propose that the discussion not be limited to the draft, but take into consideration all the contributions which the different sections and different comrades have made on this subject. I likewise hold the characterization of the May events as a ‘revolutionary upsurge’ to be faulty. In reality France underwent a genuinely revolutionary crisis with the objective possibility of taking power and afterwards there was an ebb in which it is necessary to evaluate precisely its extent and possible duration (I do not wish to examine this problem here, but it must not be conjured away through a term which, at the same time, minimizes and_ simplifies things). I will add that, for my part, I do not like formulations such as we find on page 7 of the French text (‘se rapprocheront beaucoup plus de la norme classique des révolutions prolétariennes’) [‘will draw much closer to the classical norm of proletarian revo- lutions’] which on the one hand does not offer any help at all to understanding the real processes, and on 104 the other provides arguments for those who seize on anything to ‘demonstrate’ our so-called dogmatism. (b) In the chapter on the workers’ states, the remarks which I made and which I still consider valid were only partly taken into consideration. In par- ticular, I consider certain formulations on page 21 to be highly debatable from the methodological point of view. For example, the formulation: ‘La faillite idéo- logique de la bureaucratie s’exprime également dans la crise croissante au sein du “camp” socialiste et du mouvement communiste international’ [‘The bureau- cracy’s ideological bankruptcy is manifested also in the growing crisis in the “socialist camp’ and the international Communist movement.’] is at least un- fortunate, the same as the formulation: ‘La faillite idéologique de la bureaucratie se double d’une crise politique intense’. [‘Thus, the bureaucracy’s ideo- logical bankruptcy goes hand in hand with an intense political crisis.’"] The impression must not be given that we think the essential cause is the ‘ideological bankruptcy’. The contrary is true: the ‘ideological bankruptcy’ is nothing but the outcome of objective contradictions which the bureaucracy is incapable, in the long run, of surmounting and which also prevent it from assuring either an international co-ordination of socialist construction or projecting a revolutionary strategy corresponding to the objective needs of our epoch. (c) With regard to the chapter on the colonial revolution, I remain convinced that it would have been preferable to avoid introducing paragraphs on Latin America without the special document having been prepared. What was written, in any case, is quite insufficient and involves a certain number of loose formulations, which could give rise to misunder- standings. As for the paragraphs on the Arab revolu- tion, I question the opportuneness of indicating very clearly the perspective of a Pan-Arab revolutionary party (such, at least is the impression that can be given by the text). I do not deny that such a perspec- tive would be the most desirable variant, but I doubt that it is realizable within a reasonable period. I think that it is necessary to deal with this subject in a more supple way. (d) Finally, I believe that in this document or in another one, the world congress ought to stress very clearly the organizational implications of the analyses which we have sketched out and which point, funda- mentally, to the conclusion that we are on the ev of new confrontations on a world scale or in numerous regions of the world. I am, in particular, convinced that we will be obliged to adopt forms of illegal activity, even in countries where we have enjoyed relative legality for a rather long period. Our foes have undergone some important experiences—from their point of view—they are re- solved to defend themselves by all means and they have learned to track down even the ‘splinter’ groups, the new vanguard. Our movement, which still remains very weak organizationally, must take all the neces- Sary measures in time to avoid lengthening the already very long list of victims of the repression. We need courageous and devoted militants; but, even more, militants in condition to fight as long as possible. Livio Matain Fourth International, Winter 1969/70