The Differences between the Two Documents on the 'Cultural Revolution'

[p057] The differences between the two documents on the ‘Cultural Revolution’ Extracts from SWP Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 4, July 1969 By Joseph Hansen, commenting on changes made by the United Secretariat in the resolution on China. Two changes have thus been made: ‘advocates a more militant line to its followers’ in place of ‘pursues a more aggressive diplomatic policy than Moscow’ and ‘bureaucratic centrism’ in place of ‘opportunism’. Let us take the first change—Mao’s diplomatic policy and the line he advocates to his followers abroad. I think two questions are mixed up here. What Mao suggests to members of ‘his cult is not necessarily identical with the regime’s diplomatic policy. Even in the case of a healthy workers’ state the diplomatic policy of the government might be at variance with what the leaders of the revolutionary party in that country might suggest to revolutionists abroad. Thus this change shifts us from the question of Peking’s diplomatic policy to a different subject, the allegedly more militant line it advocates to its fol- lowers abroad. Why this change was made, I do not know. It was not explained at the congress. To strike out mentioning Peking’s diplomatic policy could be taken to mean that it is not worth mentioning or that it is of no interest to us. The substitution is not without its faults in its own right. It could be interpreted as implying that Peking, in advocating a more militant line to its followers abroad, is coming nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism. The insistence that Peking comes nearer than Moscow to the positions of revolutionary Marxism can lead some comrades to conclude that Peking is not only near to those positions but is actually coming nearer or could come nearer. The comrades of the majority, we have deduced, do not hold this position, but they are far from having made this crystal clear. So perhaps we should take a minute or two to explain the consequences of thinking that Peking is coming nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism, or could come nearer. If Mao is capable of projecting a more militant line to his followers abroad, what is to prevent him from projecting a more and more militant line? A revolutionary line, or something close to it? If it is really possible, then we should prepare for it. Pabloite Congress: China But then it is ridiculous to call for a political revolution in China. What revolutionists everywhere ought to do, if the possibility is a real one, is struggle to push Mao more and more in that direction. How- ever, that runs counter to the line of trying to mobilize the masses in China to overturn Mao’s regime through a political revolution. If Mao can project a more and more revolutionary line, then in the intra- bureaucratic struggle between Mao and Liu Shao-chi, we ought to try to form a bloc with Mao in order to crush the danger from the right wing. That would create conditions in which it would be much easier to push Mao further to the left. Fortunately, the comrades of the majority are completely against any such perspective and reject it out of hand. They stand for a political revolution in China. It appears to us, however, that there is a certain inconsistency in this stand and the formulations de- manded by the majority comrades concerning a sup- posedly more militant line advocated by Mao to his followers abroad and the supposedly more radical line pursued by the Chinese leadership towards world revolutionary developments. We wondered what con- cepts they had in mind that led them to insist upon such formulations. Let’s turn to the second change in this sentence on page 15, the change from ‘opportunism’ to ‘bureau- cratic centrism.’ That seems like a very small change, a tiny unobjectionable change, but it turned out to be one of the points that stood out in the discussion on the ‘Cultural Revolution’ at the world congress. In his contribution, Comrade Pierre Frank ex- plained that while he was not the one responsible for suggesting the change, he voted for it. In defence of his vote he said that ‘bureaucratic centrism’ was the correct label ;to put on the policy of zigzagging between opportunism and ultraleftism which the com- rades of the minority themselves included in the original draft. (We would have been willing to settle for the original sentence about Mao zigzagging between op- portunism and ultraleftism in his foreign policy. Un- fortunately the comrades of the majority deleted it.) 107

[p058] In any case, Comrade Pierre said, in defence of his vote, that the formula ‘bureaucratic centrism’ was used by Trotsky in 1928 in his introduction to The Third International after Lenin. It should be mentioned that a new edition of The Third International after Lenin was published this spring in France under the editorship of Comrade Pierre, who also supplied a preface. This edition has been checked against the original Russian manuscript in the Trotsky archives:at Harvard. It is an improve- ment over the old English edition and includes a foreword by Trotsky, written in 1929 after he was exiled from the Soviet Union, which does not appear in the English edition. In the foreword Trotsky mentions ‘Stalinist cen- trism,’ and he also refers to its zigzag course in foreign policy. He calls Stalin’s policies ‘a variety of the same centrism’ as that represented by ‘Friedrich Adler & Co.’ but ‘ based on the ideological and material re- sources of a state that emerged from the October Revolution.’ What Comrade Pierre had in mind, I suppose, was not this foreword, in which the term ‘Stalinist centrism’ is used, but the subsequent item in the French edition, a letter written by Trotsky from Alma Ata in 1928, which actually constitutes an introduc- tion to the main document in the book, the famous criticism of the Draft Programme of the Communist International. In the English edition, this letter, en- titled ‘What Now?’ follows the main document. It is here that Trotsky uses the term ‘bureaucratic cen- trism.’ What did Trotsky mean by this term? To begin with, I don’t think he identified it with zigzagging, although zigzagging is one of its characteristics. For example, Trotsky speaks elsewhere in The Third Inter- national after Lenin of the ‘inevitable Leftward zig- zags of the Chinese bourgeoisie.’ Evidently ‘bureau- cratic centrism’—which certainly does not refer to any bourgeoisie—has a deeper content than mere oscilla- tions in policy. Comrade Peng made what I thought was an effec- tive rebuttal on this point. As he put it, we no longer stand in the period of 1927-28. The situation has changed. As a matter of fact, Trotsky, and the whole Left Opposition internationally, dropped the use of the term ‘bureaucratic centrism’ in reference to the ruling group in the Soviet Union when the orienta- tion of calling for a political revolution was adopted in 1933. Trotsky in 1927 and 1928 had not yet reached the position that a hardened bureaucratic caste had crystallized out in the Soviet Union which could be removed from power only through a political revolu- tion. ‘Comrade Pierre Frank, of course, understands this very well,’ Comrade Peng said, ‘but then he did not explain it.’ Comrade Peng maintained that if one believes there is an analogy between the situation in China today and the situation in the Soviet Union in 1927- 28, then it is inconsistent to call for a political revolu- tion in China. On the other hand, if you call for a political revolution in China, then to be consistent in drawing an analogy with the Soviet Union, you must say that the situation in China today is comparable to the situation in the Soviet Union after 1933, or after it became clearly established that a hardened bureau- cratic caste had seized a monopoly of power and consolidated its position so firmly that it could be 108 removed only by a political revolution. For myself, I would like to add a few observa- tions on Trotsky’s use of the term ‘bureaucratic cen- trism.’ In 1927-28 he distinguished between the Right, which was intertwined with the growing bourgeois tendency observable in the Soviet Union at the time, the Left, represented by the Left Opposition, which was carrying on the traditions and program of Lenin- ism, and the Centre, the key figure of which was Stalin. Trotsky’s terminology, as well as his platform at the time, was shaped by the view that the Com- munist party in the Soviet Union and the Comintern on a world scale could still be reformed. Thus in the letter ‘What Now?’—which I assume Comrade Pierre was referring to—Trotsky states the position of the Left Opposition as follows: ‘In any case, the Opposition, by virtue of its views and tendencies, must do all in its power to see that the present zigzag is extended into a serious turn onto the Leninist road. Such an outcome would be the healthiest one, that is to say, involving the least convulsions for the party and the dictatorship. [Trot- sky means the dictatorship of the proletariat.] This would be the road of a profound party reform, the indispensable promise [premise?] of the reform of the Soviet state.’ (Emphasis in the English original.) We can see in this the consistency in Trotsky’s use of the term ‘bureaucratic centrism’ and his pro- gram of reform rather than political revolution. This is not the end of the matter, however. In 1935 Trotsky returned to this question and brought things up to date both as to terminology and the great historic analogy he saw between the degenera- tion of the French and Russian revolutions. He did this in an article entitled ‘The Soviet Union Today.’ This was published in English in the July 1935 issue of The New International and republished in the summer of 1956 issue of the International Socialist Review. Trotsky explains in this article that ‘bureaucratic centrism’ has given way to ‘bureaucratic absolutism’; or, in relation to the historic analogy he was discuss- ing, ‘bureaucratic Bonapartism.’ In the period 1926-27, Trotsky recalls, the ques- tion of the ‘Thermidorean’ reaction was intensively discussed among the opposition circles. A split even occurred over the question. At the time, Trotsky projected the possibility of a Thermidorean triumph only in the future, and even then, of course, only if the growing rightist tendencies in the Soviet Union were not halted. Looking back, he continued, it can be seen that the analogy was used in a faulty way. Actually the Soviet Thermidor began in 1924. And the Thermidoreans can celebrate, approximately, the tenth birthday of their victory. The present political regime in the USSR, he said, is ‘the regime of “Soviet” (or anti-Soviet) Bonapartism, closer in type to the Empire than the Consulate.’ Trotsky did not say in his article whether he considered it to have been an error to use the term ‘bureaucratic centrism’ in the earlier period. He was concerned only about correcting the broad analogy with the French revolution; and he said that whatever - adjustments this correction might call for, it did not alter the correctness of the programme and policies which the Left Opposition had fought for. These had been vindicated completely by events. We note that by 1929, in his foreword to The Third International after Lenin, he used the term 4 Fourth International, Winter 1969/70

[p059] ‘Stalinist centrism’ instead of ‘bureaucratic centrism,’ and distinguished ‘Stalinist centrism’ as a_ specific variety of centrism, observing that in distinction from centrism in general, as hitherto seen in the workers movement, it had at its disposal the ideological and material resources of the state that had emerged from the October Revolution. By 1935 he had adopted the term ‘Soviet Bonapartism.’ Whatever we may say today about the use of the term ‘bureaucratic centrism’ in the late twenties, it is clear that the shift to the term ‘Stalinist centrism’ and then ‘bureaucratic absolutism’ or ‘Soviet Bona- partism’ did not signify that the Trotskyist movement had taken the view that the Kremlin could no longer follow a zigzag course. During his pact with Hitler, Stalin ordered a sharp left turn for the Communist parties in the Allied countries. Again in the period following World War II, Stalin finally shifted far enough to the left in Eastern Europe to topple a num- ber of capitalist states. All of this has an important bearing on our appreciation of the course of the Chinese revolution, but I will leave that for another time. In relation to the question of using the label ‘bureaucratic centrism’ to designate the bureaucracy in China, Comrade Livio Maitan made the point, if I understood the translator correctly and the translator was translating and not betraying Livio, that the phrase ‘hardened, crystallized caste’ is not a scientific designation. The term ‘bureaucracy’ is meaningful but the term ‘hardened, crystallized caste’ does not signify anything in a scientific sense. I think this relates to Comrade Livio’s view that the term ‘Stalinism’ should be reserved for the specific period of the worst exces- ses under Stalin in the middle thirties, a view I do not at all agree with. Aside from that, we have used the term ‘hardened caste’ and similar terms to designate the development of the bureaucracy to such a point in a workers’ state that it completely displaces proletarian demo- cracy and establishes its own rule. In the political arena, we have recognized this qualitative difference from ‘bureaucratism’ in general by calling for a politi- cal revolution. The attitude of the bureaucracy towards political power—towards proletarian democracy—is a certain indicator of the degree to which a caste has been formed. If it succeeds in eliminating proletarian demo- cracy, refusing the masses any possibility to express themselves; if it prevents the formation of indepen- dent proletarian tendencies and political parties, you can be certain that it has special reasons for this and that it understands these reasons quite well. The point of qualitative change in the crystallization of this peculiar formation is registered by its success in monopolizing state power, which it then uses to con- solidate and defend its special privileges at the ex- pense of the interests of the masses and the revolu- tion. In comparing the bureaucracies in China and the Soviet Union from this standpoint, I would say that differences between the two can be recognized. The Soviet bureaucracy is older, more hardened, more entrenched, with the greater wealth and resources of an advanced industrial power at its command, able to afford a more crass display of opportunism. In other words, a number of differences in quantity or degree can be found—and these are important—but qualita- tively, the two formations are pretty much the same. Pabloite Congress: China In both instances, we are compelled to call for a political revolution and by that fact we recognize that a certain identity or equivalence does exist despite the differences. It may seem that I am belabouring’ the point. But it also seems to be of considerable importance to the comrades of the majority. Even after the discussion at the congress they insisted on their formulation with but a small modification. Here is how it reads in the final draft which is to be published as the majority document: . ‘While not forgetting that the Chinese leadership is led by the defence of its own interests to inspire among its partisans in the world a more militant line than Moscow’s, the Fourth International criticizes the bureaucratic centrist nature of the policy.’ We would very much like to know why the com- rades of the majority are so insistent on the forty- year-old label ‘bureaucratic centrist’ which Trotsky dropped so long ago. These differences will no doubt be resolved rather easily as more information becomes available. How- ever, other differences have emerged that go somewhat deeper. A tentative list of these may prove useful. 1. There are difficulties over the nature of Mao’s foreign policy. We think Mao’s foreign policy is not revolutionary; that he alternates between ultraleftism and opportunism or combinations of the two and that fundamentally he seeks ‘peaceful coexistence.” The majority comrades do not speak so clearly on this. We are not sure if they think Mao’s policy is revolu- tionary, sometimes revolutionary, or just what. In the resolution they assert that it is ‘objectively’ revolu- tionary. They appear to dismiss its subjective, or con- sciously calculated aspects. 3. There are differences, apparently, over the nature of the regime. In our opinion, it represents the interests of a narrow, nationalistic, bureaucratic caste, a bureaucracy of a certain specific character. The comrades of the majority appear to view the regime as ‘bureaucratic centrist’ in the sense of the term used by Trotsky in 1928 to characterize the Stalinism of that period before he reached the conclusion that it could be broken up only through a political revohu- tion. 4. Back of this difference may stand different estimates of the meaning of the term ‘Stalinism.’ We consider Maoism to be a variety of Stalinism. Where the comrades of the majority stand on this is not clear to us. 5. To clarify this difference, or possible differ- ence, may require a discussion of the origin of the Chinese revolution and the role played in it by the Maoists. A number of theoretical questions come up, such as explaining how a ‘Stalinized’ Communist party could come to power in China. Some of these questions have not been probed extensively by our movement. Perhaps it is now requi- site for us to go into all this in greater detail. Such a discussion will most likely prove valuable in remov- ing sources of differences that could prove even more troublesome in the future than they are now. 6. It is possible that differences of a political nature could arise in the course of the discussion. These would hinge on what attitude to adopt toward Maoism and could generate a certain warmth in the discussion. I don’t think this will occur. Nevertheless, 109

[p060] it is worth noting a certain insistence on the side of both the majority and the minority as to the correct attitude to adopt in approaching the Maoist youth. This could adumbrate a political difference. Our opinion is that it is best to make a sharp delimitation and attack the positions of the Maoists in a vigorous polemic while at the same time seeking to engage them, wherever possible, in common actions. Naturally, in a common action working relations have to be established. But on the political and theoretical level, a sharp demarcation is required, otherwise we can lose our own ranks to the Maoists. The majority comrades think that this sharpness is unnecessary and even stands in the way of ap- proaching the Maoists for the purpose of recruiting from them. At the congress, the majority comrades constantly referred to the fact that during the May days in Paris, the Maoists were to be found on the ‘same side of the barricades’ as our comrades. There- fore, they maintain, a sharp tone should not be adop- ted in polemicizing with them. Beyond this tactical question involving the com- rades in Paris in May 1968 we see a much bigger question, the problem of ultraleftism, which goes beyond Maoism—Maoism being only a contributing current, although an important one. How big is the problem of ultraleftism today? How serious is it to the world Trotskyist movement? What are we going to do about it? There are evi- dently differences over how we should estimate this. Our opinion is that ultraleftism has made inroads into our ranks in some parts of the world and constitutes a considerable problem. 7. Finally, looming behind all of these differ- ences is the question of how to go about building a revolutionary combat party. In the United States, this concerns us a great deal. We see it in relation not only to the Communist party, which is no longer the great problem it once was, but in relation to the ultraleftism of Progressive Labour, of tendencies in the SDS and other formations, notably the Black Panthers. We have the impression that other sectors of the world Trotskyist movement face comparable problems in their daily work of forging a combat party. Does unanimity exist on how to solve these problems? Here the test of practice is decisive and we think it would be very fruitful if a better exchange could be reached between the sectors of our move- ment as to their experiences in grappling with ultra- leftism. In closing, let me indicate where the comrades of the majority think we are in basic agreement and what our opinion is on this. They maintain that we both agree that a privi- leged bureaucracy exists in China, and that there is a need for a political revolution. We think this is a correct judgment in general but that the comrades of the majority are unclear or inconsistent in their characterization of the bureau- cracy and still more unclear or inconsistent in relating the need for a political revolution to their view of the bureaucracy and its policies. They maintain that we both agree that the ‘Cul- tural Revolution’ represented an _ intrabureaucratic struggle in which we supported neither of the two main contending factions. That is accurate in general, in our opinion, but again it appears to us that the comrades of the majority are inconsistent and that various things they argue for really imply offering critical support to Mao in the intrabureaucratic struggle. They maintain that we both agree that the masses were mobilized in China and that this weakened the bureaucracy. We think that is accurate but we differ on the degree to which the bureaucracy was weakened by the mobilization. The area of agreement is substantial and should enable us to undertake an educational discussion without undue friction arising. Finally, I should like to add that in my opinion this is only the beginning of the process of clarifica- tion. We hope for a free discussion throughout the world Trotskyist movement, and we are fully aware of the fact that this takes time. In the next phase, I trust, we will be able to proceed beyond the necessity of examining two texts that on first glance appear to be almost identical. This is a polemic against Radek in 1928. Trotsky examines the arguments against his pre-war theory of the permanent revolution (as expounded in Results and Prospects) and takes up the history of his differences with Lenin before 1917, of which Stalin and his henchmen made so much. _ Trotsky shows that it was Lenin’s criticisms of his attitude to the centralised Marxist party, which he afterwards understood and accepted, that kept them apart. and not their differences on the permanent revolution. 254 pages, 15/- soft cover, 25/- hard cover NEW PARK PUBLICATIONS LTD., 186A CLAPHAM HIGH ST., LONDON, S.W.4 116: Fourth Interrational, Winter 1969/70

[p061] ALGERIA