For a Posthumous Trial of Stalin

[p052] POSTHUMOUS TRIAL OF oT ALIN

[p053] To the editor of ‘Kom- munist’ (Theoretical review of the Central Committee of the CPSU) IN NUMBERS 2 and 3 of your review for 1969 two documents were pub- lished: an article by Master of Sciences (his- tory) Boltin, entitled ‘Moving pages in the noble book of the Great Patriotic War’ and an article entitled, ‘For a Leninist party spirit in the study of the history of the CPSU’ signed Golikov, Murachov, Techkhikvichvili, Chata- guine and S. Chaoumian. An attentive reader of these two texts would have no doubt as to their basic aim: to _ rehabilitate and exalt Stalin. In spite of their authors’ many vain efforts to effect an objective tone, it is not difficult to follow their main thread. On the whole they make a highly positive judge- ment of Stalin. In this way the authority of the main organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU (which in fact approaches the complex problems of social life in an authoritarian manner) is utilized to exalt the pro-Stalin- ist campaign which has been growing in recent years. Moreover, in various news- papers and journals, and re- cently in your journal, the secondary problem of Stalin’s personal qualities as head of state are emphasized in judging him. Leaving aside the _ social thought of our reflective citizens over the last few years, the diplomatic, military and economic successes of an Ivan the Terrible or a Nicholas I, do not change or negate, by contemporary moral standards, the fact that the first was a sadist, responsible for and executor of massive repres- sions, and that the conscience of the latter was always un- easy because of the hanging of five Decembrists.! To make Stalin an exception to this general rule is all the more astonishing as not very long ago your review published examples of Stalin’s negligence, voluntarism and _ flagrant tyranny in the fields’ of economics, politics and art. The old generation and people around 40 years old remember the heritage left 1 The Decembrists were nobles and military revolutionaries who tried to overthrow the Tsarist monarchy in December 1825. They were hung and their wives were deported for life to Siberia. behind by Stalin on March 5, 1953: a catastrophic situation in agriculture, contracted out to the Lysenko - Olchansky group; queues at the bakeries in the surrounding regions; an acute housing crisis; a lack of harmony in the system of salaries and prices; a savage foreign policy which brought us to the brink of war; an unimaginable reign of the diktat in art (going as far as liquidation of ‘heretics’); dozens of people deported; hundreds of thousands of men of all ages—from infants to the very old who had managed to survive — made to rot in camps; and there were many other things. Do we need to remember the The military chiefs who had led the International Brigades in Spain (above) were shot without trial when they returned to the Soviet Union in 1941. Documents from the Soviet Opposition last months of Stalin’s life: the medieval anti-Semitic cam- paign unleashed with the so- called ‘Doctors’ Case’; the show-case of lies at the 19th Congress; the tyrant’s ‘basic’ ideas about socialist economics and linguistics — ‘basic’ ideas that life forces swept away as soon as the tyrant’s strangle- hold weakened. — There was also Stalin’s spiritual heritage: the sinister atmosphere of suspicion and informing, the effects of which, it seems, have still not been overcome. And now your review solemnly recommends work full of servile tenderness for the memory of the ‘master’. (Remember the vulgar luxury of the Komsomolkaya under- ground station or the Lenin- gradskaya Hotel; the story behind them was only divulged several months after Stalin’s death, at the Central Com- mittee Plenum of September 1953.) This ‘master’ was so atten- tive to the specialists’ advice. (As a dazzling example re- member the unique discussion led by this semi-literate chief with followers of the excellent linguist Marr; the liquidation of genetics; the mistrust spread about ‘anti-scientific’ cyber- netics and the theory of rela- - tivity; the discoveries made about feudal Russian history, etc.) Apparently continuing the work of these years, your re- view writes: ‘Historians have at their dis- posal work of eminent leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government .. . Stalin’ (num- ber 3, p. 71). A specific tendency lies be- hind all this: ‘To establish the limits of the cult of the in- dividual’, to separate Stalin from his deeds. Responsibility for the mas- sive repressions then rests on those who carried them out: Yezhov, Beria, Abakumov. It is a seductive but notori- ously deceitful way to pose the problem. Our history has never known the Yezhov cult, but it has known the Stalin cult. Yezhov’s departure did not mark the end of repression. Stalin bears the responsibility as instigator and organizer, for all the government crimes per- petrated during the quarter of a century he ruled the country. 33

[p054] To the editor of ‘Kom- munist’ (Theoretical review of the Central Committee of the CPSU) IN NUMBERS 2 and 3 of your review for 1969 two documents were pub- lished: an article by Master of Sciences (his- tory) Boltin, entitled ‘Moving pages in the noble book of the Great Patriotic War’ and an article entitled, ‘For a Leninist party spirit in the study of the history of the CPSU’ signed Golikov, Murachov, Techkhikvichvili, Chata- guine and S. Chaoumian. An attentive reader of these two texts would have no doubt as to their basic aim: to rehabilitate and exalt Stalin. In spite of their authors’ many vain efforts to effect an objective tone, it is not difficult to follow their main thread. On the whole they make a highly positive judge- ment of Stalin. In this way the authority of the main organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU (which in fact approaches the complex problems of social life in an authoritarian manner) is utilized to exalt the pro-Stalin- ist campaign which has been growing in recent years. Moreover, in various news- papers and journals, and re- cently in your journal, the secondary problem of Stalin’s personal qualities as head of state are emphasized in judging him. Leaving aside the _ social thought of our _ reflective citizens over the last few years, the diplomatic, military and economic successes of an Ivan the Terrible or a Nicholas I, do not change or negate, by contemporary moral standards, the fact that the first was a sadist, responsible for and executor of massive repres- sions, and that the conscience of the latter was always un- easy because of the hanging of five Decembrists." To make Stalin an exception to this general rule is all the more astonishing as not very long ago your review published examples of Stalin’s negligence, voluntarism and flagrant tyranny in the fields of economics, politics and art. The old generation and people around 40 years old remember the heritage left 1 The Decembrists were nobles and military revolutionaries who tried to overthrow the Tsarist monarchy in December 1825. They were hung and their wives were deported for life to Siberia. behind by Stalin on March 5, 1953: a catastrophic situation in agriculture, contracted out to the Lysenko - Olchansky group; queues at the bakeries in the surrounding regions; an acute housing crisis; a lack of harmony in the system of salaries and prices; a savage foreign policy which brought us to the brink of war; an unimaginable reign of the diktat in art (going as far as liquidation of ‘heretics’); dozens of people deported; hundreds of thousands of men of all ages—from infants to the very old who had managed to survive— made to rot in camps; and there were many other things. Do we need to remember the The military chiefs who had led the International Brigades in Spain (above) were shot without trial when they returned to the Soviet Union in 1941. Documents from the Soviet Opposition last months of Stalin’s life: the medieval anti-Semitic cam- paign unleashed with the so- called ‘Doctors’ Case’; the show-case of lies at the 19th Congress; the tyrant’s ‘basic’ ideas about socialist economics and linguistics — ‘basic’ ideas that life forces swept away as soon as the tyrant’s strangle- hold weakened. There was also _ Stalin’s spiritual heritage: the sinister atmosphere of suspicion and informing, the effects of which, it seems, have still not been overcome. And now- your review solemnly recommends work full of servile tenderness for the memory of the ‘master’. (Remember the vulgar luxury of the Komsomolkaya under- ground station or the Lenin- gradskaya Hotel; the story behind them was only divulged several months after Stalin’s death, at the Central Com- mittee Plenum of September 1953.) This ‘master’ was so atten- tive to the specialists’ advice. (As a dazzling example re- member the unique discussion led by this semi-literate chief with followers of the excellent linguist Marr; the liquidation of genetics; the mistrust spread about ‘anti-scientific’ cyber- netics and the theory of rela- tivity; the discoveries made about feudal Russian history, etc.) Apparently continuing the work of these years, your re- view writes: ‘Historians have at their dis- posal work of eminent leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government . . . Stalin’ (num- ber 3, p. 71). A specific tendency lies be- hind all this: ‘To establish the limits of the cult of the in- dividual’, to separate Stalin from his deeds. Responsibility for the mas- sive repressions then rests on those who carried them out: Yezhov, Beria, Abakumov. It is a seductive but notori- ously deceitful way to pose the problem. Our history has never known the Yezhov cult, but it has known the Stalin cult. Yezhov’s departure did not mark the end of repression. Stalin bears the responsibility as instigator and organizer, for all the government crimes per- petrated during the quarter of a century he ruled the country. 33

[p055] In passing, your authors denigrate the historians who ‘concentrate all (?) their atten- tion on mistakes and deficien- cies’ (number 3, p. 70), and who ‘instead of making a real critique of the mistakes and deficiencies linked to the cult of the individual with a Party spirit, blacken the heroic his- tory of our country’ (ibid, p. 73). It’s not difficult to figure out what hides behind this call for a ‘real critique’. The authors themselves define the limits of this ‘critique’. ‘The Party’s point of view is set out in the famous June 30, 1956 resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU: “On the liquidation of the cult of the individual and its consequences”’ (ibid, p. 73). Of course, there is nothing said about the fact that after the 20th Congress there was a 22nd and a whole series of conferences and plenums which in their documents and de- cisions completed the resolu- tion of June 30, 1956. I remember that the voices of people who today are titular members or suppliants of the Politburo were raised at the Congress Tribune and_ at numerous plenums. All, with- out exception, judged Stalin and his creatures — Molotov, Kaganovitch, Malenkov—deva- statingly. I will give several examples that prove my point. N. V. Podgorny: ‘Partici- pants in the meetings and assemblies consider it inadmis- sible that the body of Stalin, whose name is linked to all the enormous harm done to our Party, our country and Soviet citizens, should rest by the side of our guide and great master, Lenin, the sym- bol of all socialist victories’ (CPSU 22nd Congress; steno- graphic account, t.3 p. 116). A. N. Shelepin: ‘A whole series of cynical notes on letters and statements written by Stalin, Kaganovitch, Molo- tov, Malenkov and Voroshilov are evidence of a cruel attitude towards these people, towards leading comrades under in- vestigation’ (Idem, t.2 p. 403). P. N. Demishev: ‘With broken hearts the Muscovites helped in the annihilation of the Leningrad militants ordered by Stalin and Malenkov. A 34 number of leading cadres in the Party, in the economy and in the Soviets belonging to the Moscow organizations also perished, however innocent’ (Idem, t.3, p. 116). M. A. Suslov: ‘Molotov and Stalin even gave their approval to the severest punishments of the militants’ wives who ap- peared on “List Number 4 of Wives of Enemies of The People”. This list included V. A. Dybenko-Sidiakina, E. S. Kossior, A. I. Tchoubar, E. E. Eikhe-Rubtsova and others... During the period of the cult of Stalin’s personality the usual method of dealing with mili- tants whom Stalin suspected of not sharing his ideas, was physical liquidation... . ~ Mayerhold: Theatrical director. Disappeared after criticizing Stalin’s art diktats. ‘The Chinese leaders spoke and wrote about the massive repressions during the epoch of the cult of the individual as if they were merely unimport- ant exaggerations ... They de- fended Stalin’s errors and deviations’ (Report to the CC Plenum, February 14, 1964. In ‘Pravda’, April 31, 1964). All that remains to be said is that sadly enough the Chinese leaders have found fellow travellers in the columns of ‘Kommunist’. Even on the _ questions Boltin’s article touches on — Boltin who writes that ‘Taking into consideration the com- plexity and all the contradic- tions of his character, Stalin was an eminent commander’— even on these questions this whisper can hardly be heard. ‘One of the reasons that the Red Army had to fight under unbelievably difficult condi- tions was Stalin’s under- estimation of the real threat of war’ (‘The Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War’, Moscow 1961, p. 46). The armies on the South- West front were placed in a particularly perilous position and were finally encircled in September, 1941 in the Kiev region. The ensuing situation re- quired the immediate shifting of troops from the front to- wards the East in order to Save the men and the equip- ment. These same troops could then have launched the coun- ter-offensive. But despite numerous pro- posals personally addressed to Stalin by the command of the South-West axis and the front, he categorically forbade the Bela Kun: Shot by Stalin when he fied to the Soviet Union to escape the Nazis. withdrawal of the front-line troops. With that order Stalin signed the death warrant of the soldiers of the - South-West front (see J. K. Bagramian, ‘A Year of Struggle On The Dnieper’, Political Literature Publications, Moscow, 1965, pp. 143-151). From May 17 to May 23, 1942, Stalin rejected proposals from the South-West front to stop the offensive on Kharkov three times. This refusal res- sulted in the complete encircle- ment of the South-West front and the offensive ended in a total retreat by our troops who suffered heavy losses of men and equipment (see ‘The Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War’, abridged, p. 162). i It is not a question of dis- cussing whether Stalin worked out military operations on a world globe or on a map. Any government official can of course make mistakes, We have criticized Stalin, not for his inability to govern, but for his pathological in- humanity and criminal violation of social rules and the coun- try’s laws. Tens of thousands of pages could be written about Stalin’s crimes. But our aim is a more modest one. Using the RSFSR Penal Code published in Mos- cow in 1966 (the most moder- ate one in our whole history), we will try to show that your review defended a criminal who deserved to be condemned to death four times and to serve 68 years in prison under very strict conditions for his crimes if he had only com- mitted them each one time. But as Stalin was always repeating his crimes, the pun- ishment should be multiplied several hundred or thousand times. The resolution of the 20th Congress of the CPSU declared: ‘7. It is considered inopportune that the tomb _ containing Stalin’s shroud remains in the mausoleum as_ Stalin was guilty of serious violations of Lenin’s precepts. His abuse of power, the massive repressions against the honest Soviet citi- zens and other acts committed during the period of the cult of the individual [my emphasis] make it impossible to leave the shroud containing his body in V. I. Lenin’s mausoleum’ (22nd Congress of the CPSU, steno- graphic account, Moscow, t.3, p- 122). This resolution was voted on unanimously by the Con- gress. It was proposed by the Moscow and Leningrad dele- gation and delegations from the Ukrainian and Georgian communist parties who them- selves represented the experi- ence of the workers in their cities and republics. No one has repealed this decision. ° The Soviet Penal Code con- tains articles that punish the actions mentioned in the reso- lution of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. Abuse of power: in a broad sense (article 170, im- prisonment for up to eight years), as well as in the sense of exceeding authority or Fourth International, Summer 1970

[p056] MA NINA CERT Left to right Topolev, aircraft engineer, imprisoned; Gromov, Red Army leader, shot; power (article 171, imprison- ment for up to ten years). 2 During the mass purges people were illegally de- prived of their liberty, which is punishable, according to articles 126 and 17, by im- prisonment for up to_ three years (article 17 of the RSFSR Penal Code, ‘Collaboration’). In this article it says: ‘Collaborators in crime are treated as perpetrators, organ- izers, instigators and _ those who promote the offence’. As in this case it is not known, as in a number of other cases, which crimes were carried cut by Stalin himself, we refer to article 17 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR be- cause Stalin’s role as organizer is obvious. In the documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU it states: “The post-war repres- sions (1949-1950), like the repressions of the years 1935- 1937, were carried out either under Stalin’s direct order, or with his knowledge and ap- proval’ (stenographic account, Moscow 1962, t.3, p. 114). 3 It is known that it was on Stalin’s suggestion that the decision was taken in 1937 to use physical methods to in- fluence legal investigations. This led to beatings, depri- vation of sleep for up to seven days and other torments which the author of these