Statement by the Organization Communiste Internationaliste (OCI) (19.9.71)

[p026] the programme of the proletariat, Fourth International referring only tangentially to Géneral Torres and his govern- ment. The real struggle was and is between the national majority and gorilismo and in it Torres played a role of little importance. Torres kept on balancing on the head of a pin for nine months, thanks to the extreme pressure established between the extremes in_ struggle, which accumulated forces without dar- ing to initiate the attack. There is information that indicates that the US embassy lacked confi- dence in the Torres ‘military regime because it had practically ceased to govern. In one way or another, the factions in struggle made efforts to use the govern- ment as a spearhead against the adversary. The regime born on October 7, 1970, could not at any moment concentrate in its hands total or at least predominant control over the armed forces. It was exhausted in the efforts it made to win over the conspiratorial generals in exchange for the con- cessions, greater each time, that were made to them to the point that at every moment they could move with complete liberty. After each frustrated coup d'etat the gorilas in most cases simply had their jobs changed (there are cases where they were. not Winter 1971/72

[p027] What happened Bolivia? IN THIS issue we re-print a report by Guillermo Lora, general secretary of the POR (Revolutionary Workers’ Organization), on events between August 18 and 23 this year leading up to the right-wing military coup by Col. Hugo Banzer. ON AUGUST 18, the awaited and announced coup d’etat by the right wing of the army broke out, having as civilian support the dismem- bered FSB of Mario Gutierrez (one section headed by Riveros who claims to be a leftist) and the MNR, the faithful servant of US imperial- ism in the so-called Lima Pact. The Minister of the Interior Jorge Gallardo Lozada made the official announcement and _ added that a state of emergency had- been declared. (‘El Naci- onal’, La Paz, August 20.) ‘The Revolutionary govern- ment announces that the fascist coup is underway headed by Mario Gutierrez, chief of the Falange Socialista Boliviana and 72 Guillermo Lora minority groups of the right of the MNR. ‘In the face of rightist sub- version, whose coupist scheme has been perfectly detected, a national emergency is declared and we call together the revolu- tionary and people's organiza- tions to mobilize around the Revolutionary Government in order to defend the conquests of the Bolivian people and to destroy the fascist revolution. The government is in control of the situation in the countryside and stands firm on the postulates of October 7, together with the people.’ Previously it was predicted that the putschist gorilismo [the right-wing bourgeois militarists] would initiate counter-revolu- tionary operations in the perip- hery of the country, having as an axis the military troops stationed in the East. In fact, the subver- sive movement extended itself rapidly to the divisions of River- alta, Camiri, Bermejo, as far as Tarija. These fire pincers—pow- erful pincers certainly, because part of the army was engaged in it—were pressing and closing in on La Paz more and more, not so much in the eyes of the population but on the military hierarchy. The defections of the garrisons counter-* of Cochabamba and Oruro turned the situation of President Torres into an insustainable one, making it impossible for him to recap- ture Oruro, which was strongly surrounded by the Rangers, of Challapata. - The military insurrection began by raising the flag of a furious anti-communism. This must be understood as_ the _ struggle against the decision of the mass and revolutionary organizations to establish a socialist regime and a government of workers and peasants; against the strengthen- ing of the Popular Assembly as an organ of power of the masses and of the proletariat which realizes the slogan of the worker- peasant government; against the danger to the state that majority working-class participation in COMIBOL would mean and the single university under the direc- tion of the proletariat. Said in another way, gorilismo, when discovering that the accelerated advance of the revolutionary pro- cess posed its immediate crush- ing, saw? itself forced to con- summate a preventive counter- revolutionary coup. MILITARISTS The campaign aimed at justi- fying the coup concentrated on the programme of the proletariat, Fourth International referring only tangentially to General Torres and his govern- ment. The real struggle was and is between the national majority and gorilismo and in it Torres played a role of little importance. Torres kept on balancing on the head of a pin for nine months, thanks to the extreme pressure established between the extremes in struggle, which accumulated forces without dar- ing to initiate the attack. There is information that indicates that the US embassy lacked confi- dence in the Torres ‘military regime because it had practically ceased to govern. In one way or another, the factions in struggle made efforts to use the govern- ment as a spearhead against the adversary. The regime born on October 7, 1970, could not at any moment concentrate in its hands total or at least predominant control over the armed forces. It was exhausted in the efforts it made to win over the conspiratorial generals in exchange for the con- cessions, greater each time, that were made to them to the point that at every moment they could move with complete liberty. After each frustrated coup d’etat the gorilas in most cases simply had their jobs changed (there are cases where they were not Winter 1971/72

[p028] deprived of their commands) and in exceptional cases were sent into exile. PLAN The counter-revolutionary plan consisted of taking from Torres all military support, and on the eve of the 19th, the President was, with difficulty, obeyed by 20 per cent of the military com- mands. Inspired in the experience of October, gorilismo worked firmly and patiently to reach a correlation of forces that would be clear and indisputably fav- ourable to them, so as_ to capture all political power with- out a battle and without firing a single cartridge, this in order to prevent the masses from taking over the streets and giving an unforeseeable course to the events. This preoccupation also reached the military chiefs in Torres’ camp, twho showed signs of fearing the masses more than the right wing of the army. From the first moment of the fascist revolt in Santa Cruz until Torres’ leaving Palacio Quenado three short days elapsed. It was sufficient time for the masses to take to the streets. The hundreds dead and the 500 wounded constituted eloquent and tragic proof of this. At ll p.m. on the 20th the Political Command, the body of the Popular Assembly charged with the leadership of the mass movement between sessions of the Assembly, met and decided to call on all the exploited to take to the streets to actively combat the gorila conspiracy. The military command was expanded to include representa- tives of the political parties belonging to the Assembly. DEMONSTRATION On the afternoon of Friday the 2lst a massive anti-fascist and anti-imperialist demonstration was held. The workers responded positively to the call made by the Political Command and the COB (Bolivian Trade Union Confederation). The march lasted approximately four hours. Originally it was agreed to have the rally in front of the Popular Assembly (formerly the Legislative Palace). However because of Lechin’s conciliatory spirit, the Government Palace was used instead. The speakers were far below the spirit which moved the demonstrators and none pointed out clearly the objectives for which we must fight and die. Torres and Lechin were frequently booed, and the latter, speaking under the whip of his adversaries, sought to look’ radi- cal, with slogans of expropria- tion of the properties belonging to the fascist conspirators. Torres again showed signs of his servile follow-the-leader-ism before the mobilized masses. The demon- strators shouted: ‘J.J. (Juan Jose)