What happened in Bolivia?

[p028] What happened in Bolivia Hit ’em Hard!’ and the President responded like a little boy, ‘T’ll hit ’em hard.’ LECHIN The demonstration, between the laughter and the hissing, again demonstrated that Lechin was a totally worn out and sur- passed figure. The newspaper ‘Ultima Hora’ (August 23) which totally supports him, wrote: ‘Lechin spoke amid booing and demands that he make his posi- tion clear. This veteran manipu- lator of crowds with his revo- lutionary oratory was unable to impose his domination. He stated concepts perhaps different from those he hoped to utter succéed- ing in asking for the unity of all left forces and the taking over of the property and businesses governing military team, which would consider that only through resting on the masses and giv- ing them adequate firepower could they at least neutralize the gorila right. This position was completely wrong. It did not take into account that Torres preferred to capitulate to his fellow gene- rals before arming masses who. showed signs of taking the road to socialism and whose mobiliza- tion put in serious danger the army as an institution. The course taken by events initiated at the end of 1970, the incompacity demonstrated by the military leadership of gaining, the confidence of the exploited, of purging the army of the extreme right and of finding a left solution to the political General Torres. of those who supported the con- spiracy.’ Here he appeared as an ailing Belzu. The anti-fascist march had a smiling face, explainable if it is taken into account that all were sure that the enormous size of it had already by itself crushed the fascist conspiracy. A few hours later it would be clearly seen that the military rebellion could only be crushed by picking up the gun. WRONG In October of 1970 the work- ing class occupied the political scéne without arms, as a simple mass. By then it was clearly understood that in order to be able to defeat gorilismo it was indispensable to put a gun in the hands of the politicized worker. At this time everybody thought — including we Marxists—that the arms would be given by the impasse, forced a limited strata. of young officers, ranks, and lower level officers to even come to the conclusion that if the des- truction of the army were neces- sary for socialist victory there would not be reason to oppose it. An anonymous proclamation of ranks and lower officers pro- duced confusion and not a few beliéved that the army was totally divided between ranks and officers, and that the troops would disobey any order given to fire on the people. Now we know that things occurred dif- férently. The proclamation which originated in the Air Force at La Paz had little repercussion in the rest of the armed forces. The government, whether or not it had anything to do with this act, looked for ways to take advantage of the proclamation and encouraged the economic demands of the lower strata of the armed forces. Nevertheless, thé rise and radicalization of the masses made an impact every day more and more on the masses of the army, probably in greater méasure of an impact on the mass of the army, every day, probably in greater measure the younger offi- cers, in this way beginning its distintegration which was com- mon to all the bourgeois institu- tions and to the established order itself. The growth of the revolution- ary wave undermines the base of the armed forces (the soldiers are, for the most part, workers, peasants and smiddle-class_ele-: ments with political and union experience) and ends up destroy- ing them little by little, more than by defeating them in formal battle. The soldiers flee or dis- obey the orders’. of their superiors, who must be careful of those who fight in the streets and their subordinates. Then the people have within their reach their natural arsenal. This is what already occurred on April 7, 1952. ; In the night of the 20th the Political Command centered prac- tically all its discussion on the: problems of arms. Until then President Torres and his minis- ters had offered, one time or another, to give arms to the people, a promise that awakened excessive illusions in certain sections of the workers. Understanding that the fascist conspiracy was advancing through all the land and the menace of its victory became more serious évery moment, it was agreed to send a final committee (Lechin, Mercado, Lora, Lopez, Reyes, and Eid) to the Government: Palace to let the President know that if he did not. keep his promise to deliver arms, the Popular Assembly would follow its own path. Torres in order to justify his negative answer, said that if he were to disarm the soldiers in order to deliver the guns to the workers, the officers would respond by rebelling. We could not say if, at any moment, the President seriously’ thought about delivering arms to the workers. It seems that he utilized the promise as_ black- mail against his opponents to the right and the left. What is evi- dent is that he found himself sharply pressured by the military not to do it. ORURO The rumours circulated insist- ently that the military hierarchy threatened Torres with rebellion if he delivered the arms. It was on this occasion that Torres. made known his plan to recap- ture Oruro, an operation which, according to him, would be con- summated at 6 o’clock ‘in the morning, August 21. 73

[p029] defected, the state radio ‘Illimari’ kept on sending coded messages to that city to the effect that ‘Operation Centipede — Flying Eagle’ was to be consummated at nightfall. As a result of this criminal lie the workers assaulted the city and were virtually mass- acred by the army troops. On the 21st, approximately at 10 o’clock the Minister of the Interior, J. Gallardo, and the Minister of Public Health, Javier Torres Goitin, appeared in per- son at the COB, where the Political Command and its Mili- tary Command (they had been called into permanent session) were working, to make it known that the Castrillo regiment had rebelled, that within a few minutes the Great Headquarters of Miraflores would be attacked in order to capture it. The plan consisted in having the Colorado regiment, commanded by Major Reuben Sanchez and the quart- ered regiment in San Jorge pro- vide ground cover for the people which would press mas- sively against the fortress. In the ‘Confederacion de Fabriles’ 400 Mauser and Garant rifles were given away, many of them in bad shape, and 2,000 rounds of ammunition. neocnin called by radio for all the masses to meet with their Colonel Banzer: Gorilismo leader. arms in the plaza of the stadium. He asked for aid to send clan- destine emissaries who could contact the workers, at that time concentrated at San Jose and sur- rounded by military forces. The operation was given the name ‘Centipede — Flying Eagle’. The - leftist delegates from Oruro, among them Emilio Perez, were satisfied with this solution. In the middle of the deélibera- tions of the Political Command, two members of the POR showed up who represented the miners of Siglo XX and Huanuni, who remained quartered in the vicin- ity of Vinto, unable to defeat the rangers who guarded Oruro. These workers had only dyna- mite, and although the sensible thing to do would have been to retreat to their bases to await arms, since there existed little possibility of getting them, they remained in their precarious positions waiting for the arrival of loyal troops. Later it was learned that the regiments sent by Torres to rescue the strategic point of the plateau promptly went over to the rebels. Due to the masses finding themselves disarmed, the real battles were engaged not in ‘the streets, but among the mili- tary commands who utilized the regiments of soldiers like chess ‘pieces. Even though the regiment in charge of recapturing Oruro had Workers armed only with sticks of dynamite facea fully-armed troops. 74 Fourth International Winter 1971/72

[p030] Right away more than 2,000 peoplé met. That Saturday was a day of great tension. La Paz was shaken by the explosion of dyna- mite the night before by the miners of Milluni. The Minister of Government had promised that his troops were going to occupy Laikacota hill, which divides Miraflores from the centre of the city and has great strategic importance. But Castrillo’s troops set machine gun nests in there. Thé Military Command stationed it- self close to the Siles Stadium in order to be able to direct the military operations. But it could not do so effectively because of lack of reliable information about the situation in general. It depended exclusively on Radio Illimari, which gave mis- leading reports for tactical rea- sons, and from information that was given by means of police radio. Another small stock of old Mauser rifles arrived at the stadium that soon disappeared amid the thirst for weapons. Other small quantities of muni- tions were received. MASSES The masses attacked the Min- istry of War and brought out large amounts of guns, the majority of which were useless. In the streets near the stadium there were workers and students and, in smaller numbers, other elements from other _ social classes. The majority of these forces belonged to the political parties of the left. - The idea did not occur to those who were there, and less to the leaders of the Political Command, to attack the Great Headquarters. The firepower of Castrillo was too strong. The objective was to wait until the loyal troops forced the fortress to surrender and then the attack would occur. Those who at noon marched towards the stadium were sure that they were going there to organize themselves and to finish off the operation ‘led from the Presidential Palace. The truth was that the regiment from San Jorge did not move. At about 6 or o’clock the Min- istry of the Interior asked the armed people to go to Triangular Park about 200 metres from the Great Headquarters. The masses ignored the request because that would mean sending them right to their deaths. Gallardo said it was a way to increase the pres- sure on the Great Headquarters. The people who were near the stadium were attacked from Laikacota hill by the _ rightist snipers who were posted in the buildings of the area. Many fell dead and wounded, victims to the combined fire. What happened in Bolivia Workers and students decided to capture Laikacota. When the mission was almost a_ success they were asked to leave the hill because, it was said, planes were going to attack the rightists who held the hill. The truth was that at 5.35 the Air Force, which had withdrawn its support to the government and sent an ultimatum to Sanchez to lay down their arms at about 3.00, flew around the battlefield to attack the Colorados regi- ment and the civilians. At last the workers and students suc- ceeded in silencing the guns of Laikacota. Only later was it known that at 1.30 p.m. General Roque Teran, the Commander in Chief of the army, went to the Presi- dential Palace to announce to Torres that he should flee. Roque was captured by the popular militias, but they only asked him for arms, thinking that he was still loyal to Torres. ‘But the meeting between the two gave no results and there followed a bitter discussion.’ (From ‘Ultima Hora’, August 23.) The same Roque had to carry out the uncomfortable mission of discussing with the troops of the Colorados and asked them to stop the fire. When the Colo- rados refused to stop, he then took his jeep and at the same moment fire from the machiné guns was heard. Captain Terrazas and another officer died when they tried to cover Roque. Roque suffered a wound in his leg and was taken to the Military Hospital (‘Ultima Hora’). In that way was punished the one who betrayed his General Captain. THE ACTION Men and women willing to smash fascism were posted in marginal areas (Alto San Pedro, Villa Victoria, Auga de la Vida, Calvario) and weré_ throwing dynamite. At noon the Andino regiment and the Viacha motorized regi- ment were back in La Paz after deserting in Oruro. At 4.30 young people and miners went to the Minister of Defence to look for arms. They had been told they were going to get arms there. Result: more déaths and wounded. TANKS At 8.45 Torres left the Presi- dential Palace, the same one who until 7.00 was urging the masses to keep fighting to the end. The August 24 press con- firmed that the former president did not even take the time to resign from his post, and was in the Peruvian embassy with others of his officials, including General Sanchez. The tanks of the Tarapaca regiment, which sowed terror and desolation in the streets of La Paz, entered at 8.00 p.m. in the heights of the city (Munaypata and Villa Victoria). The State Radio broadcast unrealizable instructions to sabotage’ the march of the tanks. When the tanks were near the Plaza Mur- rillo, Radio Illimari stopped transmitting and Torres fled. At the same time the few elements that were left in Miraflores from the Political Command (Lechin, Alandia, Lora) met for the last time, ignoring the real situation. Rumours kept coming in that the Great Headquarters had sur- rendered. Three tanks took possession of the Plaza Murillo and four others went to Laikacota, whose fire caused the majority of deaths. Machine-gun fire and dynamite blasts lasted until the next morning. The air force continued its cleaning-up operation, always having Laikacota as their objec- tive. In Santa Cruz the decree that created the military triumvirate which took the place of Torres was made public. (Jaime Floren- teno, Merdula, Hugo Banzer, Andus Selica). But it had no life except on paper. On August 22 Hugo Banzer swore himself in as the new president and dif- ferent ministers were chosen from the MNR and FSB, which, together with the Army, form the Nationalist Popular Front. UNIVERSITY The first hours of the morn- ing of the 22nd the University of La Paz was militarily occupied and it was said that inside it remained around 20 armed students. The following day a mediation board was _ chosen (Archbishop of La Paz, diplo- mats, Red Cross, students) to seek a way out for those refugees in the University. At noon about 500 students blocked Village Avenue = and agreed to meet in assembly. Many were sitting in front of the tanks to stop them from returning to the University. The Army ordered the stud- ents to dissolve themselves as a group. They said that a shot was heard from the upper floors. The airplanes, tanks and soldiers attacked the students, killing seven persons and wounding over 27. The students said that their compafieros were murdered in cold blood and others were arrested. More than 200 students were put in jail after this assembly. FASCISTS ‘Since noon groups of people called by the State Radio were getting together to show their ‘Tesla cinema. support to the new government of the Nationalist Popular Front’ (From ‘Presencia’, August 23.) Groups of Movimientistas (supporters of the MNR) set up their general headquarters on Colon Street, in front of the They made the rounds of the streets of the city on motorcycles distributing propaganda calling on everyone to join the meeting. The Falang-. ists carried out an assault on the Confederation of Secondary School Students on Yanacocha St to install their offices. The crowd concentrated in the Murillo Plaza was not small but there were no university stud- ents or workers. They began to group around the MNR and FSB layers of the middle class (small merchants and proprietors, public émployees, unemployed. entrepreneurs) who want an institutionally and socially stable regime with guarantees for them and greater opportunities for economic advancement. Thé slogans that began to be thrown up satisfied their desires, verb- ally: An end to anarchy and abuse: to assert order; work and discipline; respect for private property; banishment of com. munism and of violence and their replacement with law, etc. BANZER Colonel Hugo Banzer, with ail sincerity, even though in imper- fect and stammering Spanish, clearly defined his political posi- tion: ‘I shall follow the steps of Busch, Villarroel and Barrientos,” he said. In a defiant tone he let it be known that he will con- tinue to be a gorila and his biggest and dearest dream is continuing the fascist politics of Barrientos. Banzer is already to the right in relation to the Torres government. Even though both speak of nationalism, this is no more than particular expressions of the petty-bour- geois nationalist process initiated in 1952. OPPORTUNISTS The action of Movimientista Tema Pelaez and the Falangist Mario Gutierrez were much more damaging, revealing for everyone. It was evident that they were dealing with two opportunists. Their spéeches were frequently interrupted by hisses and some hours before, when they tried to enter the palace, they were sworn at and rotten oranges were thrown at them. Meanwhile, during the high- sounding speeches of the leaders, the militants of the two parties in the filthy alliance exchanged punches. In fear that the fragile alliance would be broken into a million pieces, they have desig- 75

[p031] nated to ministerial posts some nonpartisan technicians (even though they were ultra-conserva- tive elements politically speaking) so they can act as buffers in the internal government struggles. Given thése conditions, the army would continue to be the decisive force. The party base of the regime is being totally split. PAZ Seven. years after his over- throw Paz comes back to the country under apparently sur- prising circumstances. Over- thrown by Barrientos and Ovando for not being able to bridle ._ the turbulent toiling masses of workers, he is brought by these same Barrientistas to peddle everything contrary to what he said and did when in power. It was not in vain that he remarked, in an emotional tone, that he returned to the father- land now not to make the errors of the past. Which were those errors? His leftist blunders? His ties with labour, which dragged him into what today is called chaos and anarchy? Returning he formed an alli- ance, that he wished strong and eternal, nothing less than with Falangism, which was an expres- ‘sion of the vulnerable interests ‘of bossims, of the great miners and of the industrialists who struggled bitterly against the communist deviations of the MNR. The alliance between the Fal- angistas and Movimientistas makes one ask which of them has really taken the position of the other. The positions assumed by Gutierrez in the last years, the intransigent struggle against the left that arose in his own party, the conspiracy on the ‘side of gorilismo demonstrate that the FSB continues to be the political expression of reaction. It is the MNR that went over the positions of the Falangists. Paz returned to the country as one of the surest servants of the State Department of the USA and it is this fact that forces him to bloc with the Barrientistas and Falangistas. ILLUSIONS Paz is now an eminent expon- ent of counter-revolution. His main weapon is_ revolutionary nationalism which has_ been totally overcome by the Bolivian objective situation, by the radi- calization of the masses and by the evolution of the class con- sciousness of the proletariat. This nationalism which in 1952 could appear revolutionary and stir up many illusions in the masses is now unmistakably reactionary. Paz knows fully that the masses are convinced that he betrayed his old preaching and has become a rightist; this is why he emphasizes that his nationalism is of the left. Surely the movimientista chief dreams of returning to the presi- dency in the next elections. Nevertheless, Banzer says that it is premature to speak of elec- tions. He also says he does not know how long he shall retain power at the moment, since ‘first I must «attend to my obligations to the “people” through the gov- ernment.’ (From ‘Ultima Hora’, August 24.) At the same time he said there exists no sign of the Paz garri- son demanding elections for May 1972, even though there is obvi- ous proof that the resolution adopted by 500 officials of the army was to this effect. They répeat what already occurred in 1964, the profes- sional politicians are sure the victorious generals will surrender power easily. Already we know that the things occurred and will: occur in another manner. Gutierrez and his movimien- tista friends speak of pacifying the country and of stopping the persecutions but immediately the military announced they would destroy the leftists. The battle between revolution and counter- revolution is posed this way. RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL COMMAND THE LATEST events in the country give evidence, once more, that gorilismo, fascist reaction and the servants of imperialism, utilize coups d’etat, terrorism and every means in their vain attempts to crush the revolutionary movement and the working class. The Political Command, in the name of the Popular Assembly, reiterates that its fundamental objective is the construction of socialism and that this can only be achieved through the complete crushing of fascist gorilismo and of re- action, a crushing that entails the destruction of its economic power, disgracefully intact in many sections. The fascist coup that has come advancing and proclaiming with beating drums and the national catastrophe that it so desires has a preventive character with reference to the inevitable majority workers’ partictpation in COMIBOL and the sure victory of the Bolivian people and working class, which will be the definite victory of socialism. The defence of our cause which is the cause of the men and women which inhabit this land, obliges us to reject with all energy and decision the fascist provocation. In this crucial moment we believe it is our duty to point out that the reaction can comfortably conspire, utilize part of the apparatus and the resources of the state, due to the doubts, weakness and dangerous oscillations from the right to the left of the Torres government. The Bolivian people can neither agree with nor complicate itself in such conduct and makes known that any concession to fascist gorilismo, any agreement with it, amounts to a sharp blow to the revolutionary process, a betrayal of national interests and a marked service to imperialism. On account of the above, the Political Command, leadership of the revolutionary and anti-imperialist united front, calls on all Bolivians, men and women, the workers and advanced intellec- ‘tuals, the soldiers and revolutionary military youth, to stand up for combat, to win the streets, to crush definitely and totally coupist gorilismo, the stone age right wing and the servants of imperialism. The Political Command calls on all Bolivians to defend their revolution, which is their own future; to save the country from 76 all that is arrogant and to tear up the counter-revolution by the roots. :BOLIVIANS: The people are at war to the death with fascist gorilismo. As in any war the central objective consists in defeat- ing and crushing the enemy. The exploited confide only in their organizations and their own force, and it is around these that they must mobilize. LA PAZ, August 21, 1971 STUDENT-FACULTY STATEMENT THE Student-Faculty Assembly and students from Universidad Mayor de San Andres who met on August 23 decided: 1. To declare that university autonomy is one of the basic principles in our institutional Bolivian life, a right that we cannot give away. 2. University autonomy that was gained in a democratic act in 1932 and which appeared in the Political Constitution of the state is violated wherever there is a change in the government that decides to overlook the university authorities and when armed forces break into the university areas and buildings. 3. The UNSA will be intransigent in the defence of uni- versity autonomy. 4. The student assembly decided that until the authorities that were chosen in 1970 or the new authorities are recognized by plebiscite to be realized soon, it assigns the control and administration of the University to the deacons and delegates of the schools of Law, Medicine and Pharmacy. 5. To ask the government of the republic for immediate withdrawal of all troops and police from the areas and university buildings. 6. Demand guarantees and liberty of all students and professors who are in jail or are being prosecuted. 7. Ratify its full support to the platform of the 1970 revolution. 8. Declared mourning for those who were killed in the events of the last days. LA PAZ, August 23, 1971 Fourth International Winter 1971/72

[p033] ae lowed by further ins TT

[p034] TO EXPOSE AND TO FIGHT the countless distortions in the field of Marxist theory by Stalinism, past and present, would require—and indeed does re- quire—a large number of analyses and even whole books. The particular forms of class-collaboration proper to the Stalinist bureaucracy and its appara- tus are always given unmistakable expression in the revision of Marxism and in the debasement of theory. Opportunism in the workers’ movement has always been accompanied by revisionism, which is always inevitably linked with a contemp- tuous and cavalier attitude towards theory, an attitude well known among the Stalinists. Faced with an ever more blatant class-collabora- tion between the Stalinists and the bourgeoisie, the working class and the youth are starting a powerful movement for new alignments on an international scale, nourished by the crisis of Stalinism. Various groups are born and develop which, as a reaction to Stalinist opportunism, seek ‘new roads’ to revolution. It is inevitable and quite natural that in these conditions there are born and develop various theories, the only novelty of which consists mostly in a renewal of forgotten and outdated doctrines. But there are many who, among these ‘theoretical seekers’, announcing that they are seeking to rid Marxism )of Stalinist deformations, manage to rediscover Marx. If the international working class, despite its efforts, has still not won the decisive battle against capitalism, the reason lies undeniably in the poli- cies of class-collaboration practised by the Stalin- ist and reformist leaders of the labour movement. But, from another side, this situation also shows the weakness of the Fourth International which, in the face of Stalinism, has not yet been able to defeat this leadership. So the reconstruction of the Fourth International, and the building of its party, is not only a political struggle, but a theoretical one too. Engels long ago warned the labour move- ment of the capital importance of the theoretical struggle. He set an example with the decisive battle against Diihring. Lenin’s fight for the build- ing of the Bolshevik Party was intimately linked to his theoretical struggle, to the development of Marxism. For ‘only a party guided by a vanguard theory is capable of fulfilling the role of a vanguard ~ fighter’. Our task of reconstructing the Fourth International obliges us to pursue the theoretical struggle for the defence and deepening of Marxism. It is with this perspective and this aim that we must examine and criticize the various ‘theories’, particularly those which proclaim themselves to be anti-Stalinist,’ referring to Marx and Lenin. A special place belongs to Georg Lukacs, whom many ‘left’ intellectuals, even communists, regard as the model of a Marxist who stood up to Stalinism. Precisely in the last few years, at the very time of the intensification of the crisis of Stalinism, there has been a growth of publicity around Lukacs, publicity which presents him as always being an anti-Stalinist, as one who defended Marxism against Stalin and his suc? cessors. Thefe are many who do not hesitate to call Lukacs the ‘only Marxist’ of our epoch, the ‘greatest Marxist thinker’ etc. We feel obliged to 78 look into all this, but within the restricted frame- work of this article, it is, obviously, only possible to trace out his political itinerary. To begin with, it is important to note that if, in recent years, Lukacs’ audience has grown, it is because he himself has become more active. Since 1964, Lukacs has intervened incessantly in the most varied domains. Without speaking here of the reason for this activity, which will be examined later on, let us indicate some of his interventions. Since 1967, he has made public declarations on the following subjects: the Greek putsch; birth con- trol; discoveries in physics; St. Thomas Aquinas’ philosophical system; cybernetic machines; plan- ning reforms; new Hungarian films; the formation of the galaxies; the present power of the Stalinists; structuralism, ‘happenings’, etc. One could wonder, is there any subject on which Lukacs has not made a declaration? . Yes, there is. He has made no declaration against the intervention in Czechoslovakia, nor against the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn from the Union of Soviet Writers. The very active ‘only Marxist’ of our time has remained totally dumb. Yet he would have risked much less than numerous Hungarian militants and intellectuals who raised their voices in protest. Lukacs’ ‘Marxism’, just like his political itinerary, which is inseparable from it, appears in condensed form in this attitude. Departure In the last analysis, every man is the product of his time. To understand Lukacs’ itinerary we must at least sketch out the historical conditions in which he began his career and which have left their stamp all along his path. These conditions were determined by the defeat of the 1848-1849 revolution, a defeat in Germany and all the coun- tries of the Hapsburg empire. If we seek to under- stand the reason for the ease with which the Holy Alliance, that feudal enemy hated by all, won through against the immense movement of the ‘springtime of the peoples’, we find in the back- ground the complicity of the European bourgeoisie. The English bourgeoisie, basing itself on a favour- able balance of forces, and inflicting a defeat on the Chartist movement, was the powerful organizer of the: victory of the Holy Alliance. As to the German bourgeoisie, it had abandoned its own revolution and thrown itself into the arms of Prussian absolutism, frightened as it was by the barricades of the Parisian proletariat. The power- ful revolutionary wave of 1848-1849 was in fact the unmasking of the counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie. The German revolution con- firmed this much more, since of all the bour- geoisies which had not yet made their revolution, it was by far the most powerful. Even before 1848, this bourgeoisie was ‘brutal against the proletariat and petty-bourgeoisie, cunning towards absolutism and feudalism’, as Mehring noted. From the first days of the revolution, it ‘was more frightened of the tiniest popular movement than of the total of Fourth International Winter 1971/72

[p035] _ S$. ies all the revolutionary plots of all the governmenté. Engels’ Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany is the analysis of this betrayal. The con- clusion that Marx and Engels drew from it was formulated in 1850 in the famous ‘Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League’. We must quote a passage from the Address, whose ten pages or so of text have, until now, been the bugbear of all the revisionists and class collabora- tors who have tried to cast it into oblivion. Marx and Engels wrote: ‘Whilst the petty-bourgeois democrats want to end the revolution quickly if possible, our interests and tasks lie in making the revolution permanent, until all the more or less established classes are swept aside, the proletariat conquers power, and the unity of the workers is so advanced, not only in one country but in all the dominant countries of the world that competition among the workers of these countries ceases, and at least the dedsive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the working class.’ In Hungary, much more backward than Ger- many or even Austria at the time, the very weak nascent bourgeoisie was under the leadership of the middle nobility, the leading class of the 1848- 1849 revolution. But if the German bourgeoisie, feeling the working class on its heels, could in 1848 only be counter-revolutionary, the middle nobility in Hungary was, so to speak, ‘naive’. It had seen nothing comparable to the revolt of the Silesian weavers who in 1844 terrified the German bourgeois. Thus the backwardness of Hungarian conditions becomes the revolutionary virtue of its middle nobility. The emancipation of the serfs, the introduction of parliamentarism and demo- cratic rights, could be more far-reaching than in Germany since they were realized particularly against the landowners, protected by the foreigner, the house of Austria. The rebellious middle nobility could only hope to hold power thanks to these measures. We must still not forget that the Passing of power into the hands of the most