Three documents: extracts from his diary (November 1926) and two letters to N. I. Bukharin (June and March 1926)

[p040] The Interrelationship Between Revolution and Counter-Revolution November 26, 1926 1, Revolutions have always been followed by counter- revolutions in history. Counter- revolutions have always thrown society back, but never back as far as the starting point of the revolution, The succession of revolutions and counter- revolutions is the product of certain fundamental features in the mechanics of class society, the only society in which revolutions and counter- revolutions are possible. 2. Revolution is impossible without the participation of the masses. This participation is in its turn possible only in the event that the oppressed masses connect their hopes for a better future with the slogan of revolution. In this sense the hopes engendered by the revo- lution are always exaggerated. This is due to the mechanics of class society, the terrible plight of the overwhelming majority of the popular masses, the objective need of concen- trating the greatest hopes and efforts in order to insure even the most modest progress, and so on. 3. But from these same con- ditions comes one of the most important—and moreover, one of the most common — elements of the counter- revolution. The conquests gained in the struggle do not correspond with and in the nature of things cannot directly correspond with the expecta- tions of the broad backward masses, who are awakened for the first time in the course of the revolution itself. The dis- illusionment of these masses, their return to routine and to futility is as much an integral part of the post-revolutionary period as the passage into the camp of ‘law and order’ of those ‘satisfied’ classes or layers of classes who had participated in the revolution. 4. Closely bound up with these processes, parallel pro- cesses of a different and, to a large measure, of an opposite character take place in the gene of the ruling classes. The awakening of broad backward masses upsets the ruling classes from their accustomed equili- brium, deprives them of direct support as well as confidence, and thus enables the revolu- tion to seize a great deal more than it is later able to hold. 5. The disillusionment of a considerable section of the oppressed masses in the immediate conquests of the revolution and—directly con- nected with this—the decline of the political energy and activity of the revolutionary class engender an influx of confidence among counter- revolutionary classes — both among those overthrown by the revolution but not shat- tered completely, as well as among those which aided the revolution at a certain phase, but were thrown back into the camp of reaction by the further development of the revolution. The Conditions of the Rise of Stalinism 20. It would be wrong to ignore the fact that the pro- letariat today (1926) is con- siderably less receptive to revolutionary perspectives and to broad generalizations than was the case during the October overturn and in the ensuing few years. The revo- cored party cannot pas- sively align itself in accordance with every shift in the moods of the masses. But it cannot ignore any alteration which is produced by causes of pro- found historical order. 21. The October revolution, to a greater extent than any other in history, aroused the greatest hopes and passions in the popular masses, first of all, the proletarian masses. After the maximum sufferings of 1917-1921, the proletarian masses improved their status considerably. They cherish this improvement, hopeful of its further development. But at the same time their own experience has shown them the extreme gradualness of this process of improvement which has only today reached the pre-war standard of living. This living experience is of incalculable significance to the masses, especially the older generation. They have grown more cautious, more sceptical, less_ directly responsive to revolutionary slogans, less receptive to major generaliza- tions. These moods which un- folded after the ordeals of the civil war and after the suc- cesses of economic restora- tion, and which still remain undisrupted by new shifts of class forces—these moods con- stitute the basic political back- ground of party life. These are the moods which bureaucrat- ism—as an element of ‘law and order’ and ‘tranquility'—banks on. The attempt of the opposi- tion to pose new questions before the party ran up against precisely these moods, 22. The older generation of the working class, who made two revolutions, or the last one, beginning with 1917, is now nervous, exhausted, and, in large measure, fearful of all convulsions bound up with the perspectives of war, havoc, famine, epidemics and so on. A bogey is being made out of the theory of the permanent revolution precisely for the purpose of exploiting the psy- chology of a considerable sec- tion of the workers, who are not at all careerists, but who have put on weight, acquired families. The theory of the permanent revolution which is being utilized in this sense, is of course in no way related to old disputes, long relegated to the archives, but simply raises the phantom of new convul- sions—heroic ‘invasions’, vio- lations of ‘law and order’; a threat to the conquests of the reconstruction period: a new zone of great efforts and sacrifices. Making a bogey out of the permanent revolution is, in essence, speculation upon the moods of that section of the working class, including Party members who have grown smug, fat and semi- conservative. The Interrelation Between the Party, the Youth and the Class 24. The young generation, only now growing up, lacks experience of the class struggle and the necessary revolu- tionary temper. It does not explore for itself, as did the older generation, but falls immediately into an environ- ment of the most powerful party and governmental institu- tions, party tradition, authority, discipline, etcetera. For the time being this renders an_ independent role more difficult for the young genera- tion. The question of the correct orientation of the young generation of the party and of the working class acquires a colossal importance. 25. Parallel with the above- indicated processes, there has been an extreme growth in the Fourth International Winter 1972/73

[p041] tole played in the party and the state apparatus by a special category of old Bolsheviks, who were members or worked actively in the Party during the 1905 period; who then left the Party in the period of teaction, adapted themselves to the bourgeois regime and occupied a more or less prominent position within it; who were defencists together with the entire bourgeois intelligentsia and together with the latter were propelled for- ward in the February revolu- tion (of which they did not dream at the beginning of the war); who were _ staunch opponents of the Lenininst orogramme and of the October overturn; but who returned to the Party after victory was secured or after the stabiliza- ion of the new regime about he same time that the bour- seois intelligentsia stopped its iabotage. These elements, who nore or less accommodated hemselves to the June 3 egime, can be, naturally, only tlements of the conservative ype. They are in general in avour of stabilization, and fenerally against every opposi- ion. The education of the ’arty youth is largely in their tands. Such is the combination of ircumstances which in the ecent period of Party develop- ient has determined the hange in the Party leadership nd the shift of Party policy to he right. ‘he Soviet Thermidor 6. The official adoption of ie theory of ‘socialism in one ountry’ signifies the theo- »tical sanction of those shifts thich have already taken lace; and of the first open reak with Marxist tradition. 7. The elements of bour- 20is restoration lie in: a) the tuation of the peasantry, who 0 not want the return of the ndlords but are still not (terested materially in social- m (hence flows the import- ice of political ties with the 2asant poor); b) in the moods f considerable layers of the orking class, in the lowering f revolutionary energy, in the tigue of the older generation, . the increased specific weight ? the conservative elements. ‘senal of Marxism Bukharin in 1926 was the ideological leader of the rising bureaucracy. Two Letters to Bukharin January 8, 1926 Nikolai Ivanovich: You will perhaps recall that two years ago during a session of the Politbureau at my home I said that the mass of the Leningrad party’ was muzzled more than was the case else- where. This expression (I con- fess, a very strong one) was used by me in an intimate circle, just as you used in your personal note the words: ‘un- conscionable demagogy’. To be sure, this did not pre- vent my remark concerning the muzzling of the party mass by the Leningrad party apparatus from being broadcast through meetings and through the press. But this is a special item and—I hope—not a precedent .-.But doesn’t this mean that I did see tha actual state of things? However in contrast to certain comrades, I saw it a year and a half, and two and three years ago. At that time, during the same session I remarked that everything in Leningrad goes splendidly (100 per cent) five minutes before things get very bad. This is possible only under a super-apparatus regime. Why then do you say that I did not 39

[p042] see the actual state of things? True, I did not consider that Leningrad was separated from the rest of the country by an impenetrable barrier, The theory of a ‘sick Leningrad’ and a ‘healthy country’ which was held in high respect under Kerensky was never my theory. I said and I repeat now that the traits of apparatus bureau- cratism, peculiar to the whole party, have been brought to their extreme expression in the regime of the Leningrad party. I must however add that in these two and a half years (i.e. since the autumn of 1923) the apparatus-bureaucratic tenden- cies have grown in the extreme not only in Leningrad but throughout the entire party. Consider for a moment this fact: Moscow? and Leningrad,’ two main proletarian centres, adopt simultaneously and furthermore unanimously (think of it: unanimously!) at their district party conferences two resolutions aimed against each other. And consider also this, that our official Party mind, represented by the press, does not even dwell on this truly shocking fact. What are those special (7) social (7!) conditions in Lenin- grad and Moscow which permit such a drastic and ‘unanimous’ lar opposition? No one seeks i them, no one asks himself about them, What then is the explanation? Simply this, that everybody silently says to him- self: The 100 per cent opposi- tion of Leningrad to Moscow is the work of the apparatus. This, N. I, is the gist of the ‘genuine state of things’. But Leningrad does not stand alone as regards ‘day-to- day routine’. In the past year we had on the one hand, the Chita business, and on the other, that in Kherson. Naturally you and I under- stand that the Chita and Kher- son abominations‘ are excep- tions precisely because of their excesses. But these exceptions are symptomatic. Could the things that happened in Chita have occurred had there not been among the Chita summits a special, binding, mutual amnesty, with independence from the rank and file as its basis? Did you read the report of Schlichter’s investigating committee on Khersonovism? The document is instructive to the highest degree—not only use it characterizes some of the Khersonovist personnel, 40 but also because it charac- terizes certain aspects of the Party regime as a whole. To the question why all the local communists, who had known of the crimes of the respon- sible workers, kept quiet, apparently for a period of two- three years, Schlichter received the answer: ‘Just try to speak up—you will lose your job, you'll get kicked into a village, etc., etc.’ I quote, of course, from memory, but this is the gist of it. And Schlichter exclaims apropos of this: ‘What! Up to now only oppositionists have told us that for this or that opinion they have been allegedly (7!) removed from posts, kicked into a village, etc., etc. But now we hear from Party mem- bers that they do not protest against criminal actions of leading comrades for fear of being removed, thrown into a village, expelled from the Party, etc,’ I cite again from memory. I know that certain com- rades, possibly you among them, have been Carrying out until recent times a plan some- what as follows: give the workers in the nuclei the Possi- bility of criticizing factory, guild and regional matters, and at the same time, crack down resolutely on every ‘opposition’ emanating from the upper ranks of the Party. In this way, the apparatus- regime as a whole was to be preserved by providing it with a broader base. But this experi- ment was not at all successful, The methods and habits of the apparatus-regime inevitably seep down from the top, If every criticism of the Central Committee and even criticism inside the Central Committee is equated, under all condi- tions, to a factional struggle for power, with all the ensuing consequences; then the Lenin- grad Committee will carry out the self-same policy in relation to those who criticize it in the sphere of its plenipotentiary Powers, and under the Lenin- grad Committee there are dis- tricts and sub-districts, When in 1923 the opposi- tion arose in Moscow (with- out the aid of the local apparatus, and against its resistance) the central and local apparatus brought the bludgeon down on Moscow’s skull under the slogan: ‘Shut up! You do not recognize the peasantry.” In the same apparatus-way you are now bludgeoning the Leningrad organization, and crying, ‘Shut up! You don’t recognize the middle peasant.’ You are thus terrorizing in the two main centres of proletarian dictator- ship the best proletarian elements, re-educating them from expressing aloud not only their views, correct or erroneous alike, but also their concerning the general questions of the revolution and socialism. And meanwhile, the democratic rights granted to the rural areas are unques- tionably being strengthened and intrenched. Can't you see all the dangers that flow from this? ——<—<—______ March 4, 1926 Personal N(ikolai) Ivanovich, I write this letter in long- hand (although I have grown unaccustomed to it) in as much as it is embarrassing to dictate to a stenographer what I have to say. You are of course aware that in accordance with the Uglanov® line there is being conducted against me in Mos- cow a half-concealed struggle with all sorts of sallies and insinuations which I refrain from characterizing here as they deserve, By all sorts of machinations —in part and wholly unworthy of and degrading to our organ- ization—I am not permitted to speak at workers’ meetings. At the same time rumours are being spread systematically through the workers’ nuclei that I give lectures ‘for the bourgeoisie’ and refuse to speak to workers. Now just listen to what luxuriates on this soil, and this, once again, not at all accidentally. I cite verbatim from a letter of a worker party member. ‘In our nucleus the question has been posed why you arrange to give paid reports, The prices of admission to these reports are very high and the workers cannot afford them. Consequently only the bourgeoisie attends. The secre- tary of our nucleus explains to us in his talks that for these reports you charge fees, per- centages for your own benefit, He tells us that for every one of your articles and for your by-line you also take a fee, that you have a big family and, says he, you run shy of funds. Does a member of the Politbureau really have to sell his by-line? Fourth International Winter 1972/73

[p043] etc., etc. You will ask: isn't this silly nonsense? No, to our sorrow, it is not nonsense. I have verified it. At first it was decided to write a letter to the Central Control Commission (or Central Committee), signed by several members of the nucleus, but then they decided Not to, saying: “They will drive us out of the factory, and we have families.”’... In this way a fear has seized the worker-Party member that if he tries to verify the most infamous slander against a member of the Politbureau, he, a’Party member, can be driven from the factory, for following procedure. And you know, were he to ask me, I could not in all sincerity say that this would not happen. The same secretary of the same nucleus says—and again not at all accidentally: ‘In the Polit- bureau the sheenies are running wild.’ And again no one dared to say anything about it to anyone — for the self-same openly formulated reason: they will-drive us out of the factory. Another item. The author of the letter which I cited above, is a Jewish worker. He, too, did not dare to write about the ‘sheenies who agitate against Leninism’. The motive is as follows: ‘If the others, the non- Jews, keep quiet, it would be awkward for me...’ And this worker—who wrote me to ask whether it is true that I sell my speeches and my by-line to the bourgeoisie—is now also expecting that he will be driven any hour from the fac- tory. This is a fact, Another fact is that I am not at all sure that this won't happen—if not immediately, then a month from now; there are plenty of pretexts. And everybody in the nucleus knows ‘that’s how it was, that’s how it will be’— and they hang their heads. the Communist Party are afraid to report to the Party organs about Black-Hundred agitation, thinking that it is they who will be driven out and not the Black-Hundred gangster, You will say: Exaggeration! I, too, would like to think so. Therefore I have a proposal to make: Let us both take a trip to the nucleus and check up on it. I think that you and I— two members of the Polit- bureau—have after all a few things in common, enough to calmly and conscientiously verify: whether it is true, whether it is possible that in our party, in Moscow, in a workers’ nucleus, propaganda is being conducted with impunity which is vile and slanderous, on the one hand, and anti-Semitic, on the other; and that honest workers are afraid to question or to verify or try to refute any stupidity, lest they be driven into the Street with their families. Of course you can refer me to the ‘proper bodies’. But this would signify only closing the vicious circle. I want to hope that you will not do this; and it is precisely this hope which prompts this letter, Yours, L. TROTSKY. ’ Controlled Zinoviev- Kamenev allied in 1924 with Stalin, ® Controlled at the time (1926) by the right wing of Bukharin- Rykov-Uglanov in a bloc with Stalin. * Controlled at the time (1926) by Zinoviev and Kamenev who had broken with Stalin and entered into a bloc with the Left Opposition. * In 1925-1926 numerous cases were laid bare of criminal abuse of power by ranking provincial bureaucrats. The Chita and Kherson affairs were the most notorious instances at the time of corruption, grafting, terrorization of the Party membership and of the populace, and other crimes. * Uglanov was one of the right- wing leaders of the inquisitions and purges against the Left Opposition during the period of the Right-Centre Bloc (1925-1929). ON THE HISTORY OF THE LEFT OPPOSITION Editorial Note: This discus-