Italy's New Fascists
1973Fourth InternationalStephen Johns Read the scan at ETOL (PDF) →Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: words can be misread, and the end of one piece can run into the next. For anything you quote, read the scan.
[p036] ITALY’S NEW FASCISTS BY STEPHEN JOHNS. _ CREEPING COUP D’ETAT Italy is on the brink of a crisis which may end in civil war. The ruling class is preparing to destroy the trade unions and the left by force. Already the army, police and many monopolies have declared allegiance to fascism— once ‘more a powerful force. in: Italian society.: ‘The focus .of this dramatic ideological. shift is the MSI ~ (Italian Social Movement). Led by Giorgio Almirante, the MSI s $6-seats in the Chamber of peties and is the third big- in. many areas of yen notably Sicily and the south. ‘The MSI is’ ‘a fascist party. It cannot call itself such, since fascism is ‘illegal’ in Italy (as afte gestures, ‘speeches, uni- forms, meetings, etc, of a fas- ¢ist character, regulations the ‘para-military police consist- ently ignore). In public the MSI maintains - a cynical front of ultra-conser- vative respectability. The dup- licity that pervades the move- ment was best expressed by one supporter who remarked, when Almirante became leader —— in 1969: ‘For 15 years under Michelini [the old ‘conserva- tive’ general secretary] the party was dead. We fas- cists ... excuse me... we of the national right were dead . then he came and we all woke up. He was right when he said “less stuffed shirts and more stick”’.’ Almirante, who plasters his walls with pictures of I] Duce Mussolini, says -he is now leader of the ‘national right’— destra nazionale. In fact MSI members are responsible for bomb attacks, terror against militants and the systematic murder of left-wing activists which generally take place be- neath the loving eyes of the police. To carry out this work, the MSI leaders and deputies con- trol bands of armed ‘squadristi’ youth fired by the example of the Black Shirts and the Nazis who are pledged to the physical destruction of com- munists and socialists. (The connections between the MSI and the fascist terror organi- zations will be revealed in to- morrow’s article.) But it is the carefully-con- trived sobriety that is the most sinister aspect of MSI. This image is a deliberate ploy by the fascists to reassure their supporters within the ruling Christian Democratic Party, the state and big business. The capitalist class, as always, is a little squeamish over the methods of fascism. It knows it needs the thugs but does not like their activities thrust under its nose. . . ‘Respectability’ also provides a convenient cover for the rapid developments towards fascism within the police and the special detachments of the army. (The support for fascism within industry and the state will also be analysed in a later article.) The growth of Italian fas- cism is connected directly to the crisis of imperialism and the chronic malaise that grips capitalism in the Common Market. Investment in Italy is stagnant. Unemployment gets higher every month. The home ~ economy is unable to sustain the lira, which was devalued two days ago. This will mean bankruptcy for many small firms which depend largely on imported raw materials. The big monopolies, for their part, are keen supporters of the MSI idea of a greater European economic -commu- nity. This will embrace fascist Spain and the colonels’ Greece. Fourth international Spring 1973
[p037] > a MSI wants to smash all resist- ance to capitalism by destroy- ing free trade unions and con- structing a corporate state on the Hitler-Mussolini model. This is sweet music to indus- trial giants like Fiat, Pirelli and Montedison. The story of the Italian fas- cist revival is a grave warning to British workers. The very forces preparing the reign of terror in Italy are present in the UK and the Common Mar- ket. Alarmed by the fear of crisis, they are also baying for action. Italy proves the imme- diate prospect in Europe is either fascism or socialism. The origins of the MSI are to be found in the remnants and relics of the Mussolini era. The few fanatical fascists left after the execution of Musso- lini in April 1945 regrouped and formed their own party in December 1946. Many of these men now hold high MSI office. Almirante himself had to wait until the end of the war before Mussolini rewarded him with a post. The defeated dic- tator had taken refuge at Salo, by Lake Garda, in the north. From his depleted forces he formed the. government of the so-called ‘Social Republic’. The important post of Min- ister of Culture and Population went to a pro-Nazi, Pavolini Mezzasoma, who appointed in turn a keen fascist journalist called Almirante as the chief of his secretariat. Almirante went to work with gusto. One of his jobs was to call for the execution of partisans and all Italian soldiers who refused to fight the Allied armies. In May 1944, he issued an order giving all Italians 24 hours to rally to the doomed Salo Republic. He warned par- tisans and soldiers: ‘Those who do not present themselves will be considered outlaws and executed by shooting in the back. Almirante always tries to cover up his service of fascism. He was desperate and outraged _- when this information was - posted over wide areas of Italy by socialist councillors a year ago. They called him ‘a shooter, massacrer and _ tor- turer’ of the Italian people. Almirante took them to court and -pathetically denied signing the infamous execution order. The judge thought otherwise and found that the words com- plained of were true. Italy’s new fascists Other Mussolini men include Pino Romualdi, MSI president and senator in Italy’s upper house of parliament. He is an illegitimate son of Mussolini and organised I! Duce’s retreat into Switzerland—not very efficiently since Romualdi quickly surrendered to the communist-led partisans. MSI senator Araldo Di Crol- lalanza was Mussolini’s Minis- ter of Public Works and must have had a hand in building the exhibition centre outside Rome—a temple to the fascist mystique—where the MSI held its congress last week. Many other fossils of the Mussolini era hang around the fringes of the movement. They make appearances at MSI gath- erings and play hero to the youthful ‘squadristi’ who thrill at the days when the jack-boot ruled Italy. One of these fascist pension- ers, General Bergonzoli, in an impromptu address to an en- thusiastic crowd last week, re- discovered some of his male- volent spirit as he spoke. His face flushed and his white beard wagged at the sponta- neous applause (Bergonzoli looks like Ezra Pound, the poet who broadcast for the fascists in Italy. Pound is an MSI cult figure and his works do a brisk sale at the big meetings). - These connections with the past show that fascism never really died in Italy. After the collapse of Mussolini the Com- munist Party and the partisans effectively held the power. But under Stalin’s orders, the CP held back the masses and worked for a coalition with the reformists and the social democrats. no real The coalition ma effort to destroy the fascist movement. In 1946 secret negotiations took place with fascists and they were allowed to stand for parliament. In Rome Almirante and Arturo Michelini were elected deputies in 1946 and in Naples Giovanni Roberti, now the leader of the fascist union CISNAL, was returned. The 1950s and 1960s saw a gradual growth of fascist influ- ence among the middle class. Extra-parliamentary activity included campaigns to secure the release of the few remain- ing hardcore war criminals and the odd bomb explosion. One notable development, however, was the formation in the 1950s of several para- military fascist groups who boasted their overt allegiance to Nazism and terror tactics. These were later to play an important role in the re-birth of MSI. Within the MSI there was a split between the general sec- retary Michelini, who stood for the ‘stuffed shirt’, ultra-conser- vative wing, and Almirante, who called for more ‘stick’ and attracted a big following of new recruits, especially youth. 1968 was the watershed for the MSI. In the elections that year the party won 1,415,000 votes, compared with the CP’s 8,500,000. MSI was still a re- latively small party, but one with substantial pull among the smaller employers, the middle class and the sub- proletariat of the impoverished south. But the events of the next four years were dramatic. MSI was transformed from a peri- pheral, extreme-right tendency to a major political force. A Reuter’s dispatch captures the mood of MSI in May 1972, poised on the threshold of its electoral breakthrough. Over 20,000 fascists had gathered in Rome. A _ banner draped the platform on which the new I] Duce, Almirante, stood: ‘Marxism is the system, death to the system’, it pro- claimed. ; i ‘Fascism and all its trap- pings are banned under a 1952 law,’ Reuter’s Rome correspon- dent wrote, ‘but a sprinkling of black shirts could be seen and one youth jubilantly thrust his hand upwards in the fascist salute as Signore Almirante proudly presented the party’s latest convert. He is General Giova De Lorenzo.’ 4 Fascism had arrived and the election returns proved it. The MSI doubled its vote to 2,894,000 and won 56 seats in the chamber of deputies and 26 in the senate. In the regions it had 32 deputies and 151 county councillors and 2,953 town councillors. It boasted a membership of 400,000 and 7,560 branches all over Italy. In the south and Sicily it had formed a pact with the Mafia and the right-wing Christian Democrats. MC? new had an important say . < 33 AG ~
[p038] wnt ¥-- running of half Italy. Almost all the landowners were sworn fascists. Even more important, big business was swinging rapidly behind the fascist movement. The success of the MSI can- not be simply explained by the attraction its policies obviously had for the capitalist class and frustrated section of the mid- dle class. Back in 1968 support went overwhelmingly to the Christian Democrats—the party officially blessed by the Catholic church. UNSTABLE eeper forces were at work within the country. Italian capitalism is an extremely shaky institution. It has never been able to survive without massive state support. Public trusts, controlled by the Chris- tian Democrats ‘mother’ most industry and ensure that pri- vate enterprise does not face bankruptcy. This structure was always unstable and became more so as the effects of the post-war boom were dissrpated and competition within the EEC grew fierce.. The crisis was made im- measurably worse by an up- surge of militancy by the working class. The years since 1968 were full of continuous class struggle. Generai Strike followed General Strike and despite the desperate CP Stalinists’ policy of confining actions to protest, the working class inflicted serious damage on the monopolies. In the northern factories a new unity between the im- migrent workers from the south and the older indus- trialized proletariat began to develop. The newcomers, stripped of any Stalinist or reformist ideology, plunged from bitter rural poverty into the most vicious regimes of mass production, rapidly adopted a militant socialist consciousness. Strikes and violent clashes between wor- kers znd the military police became daily occurrences. The same tensions Ied to a wave of student protest. This was the background to the rise of MSI which adopted the popular cry of order and posed as the force to deal with communism, There was another significant factor. In Greece the same capitalist: crisis (and the same refusal of the Communist xu Party to mobilize the masses in political and _ industrial action) led to the colonels’ coup. All the eyes of the Italian ruling class were turned to Greece. Here was a_ living example of how to deal with the working class—a point the _fascists never failed to drive home. Support was two-way. Pino Rauti, now an MSI deputy and one of the most hardened fascists in the move- ment, went to Greece at the invitation of the colonels and was welcomed by _ Prime Minister Pattakos. The Greek leader allowed the fascists to organize military training camps on their ter- ritory, while in Italy their agent, Constantiono Plevris, channeled funds into the MSI and put the Greek pro-fascist student movement at the dis- posal of the extreme right. Under the impact of these upheavals the Italian govern- ment became a regime of per- manent crisis. Government followed government, almost as rapidly as strike followed strike. The Communist Party’s refusal to mobilize the work- ing class and campaign for power, strengthened the forces of the right. Amidst the anarchy, the ruling class began to look towards the MSI for salvation. This was the background to the fascist success at the elections. The situation now is very grave. Up to a third of the Christian Democrats, backed by Vatican reactionaries, want to see an MSI victory, There was and is an agree- ment between these right-wing forces and the fascists over terror. The argument they use is that bomb attacks and other outrages can be blamed on the left and stampede the middle class into accepting a colonels’ regime in Italy. One highly-experienced observer in Italy described the policy as one of ‘cre fi coup d'etat’. (LL AN H conspiracy was the murder of Feltrinelli, the left-wing pub- lisher, at the height of the 1972 election. Feltrinelli’s mutilated body was found by an_ clectricity pylon. The remains of a bomb was found nearby. The sug- gestion was that Feltrinelli had been engaged in a left-wing terror attack. The evidence police offered to support their conclusions was exposed as totally incon- sistent by several journalists, Feltrinelli had been mur- dered by the fascists, the police, or a combination of both. No one was _ surprised when, days after the body was discovered, the right-wing Press published lurid stories about two ‘Red Brigade’ hide- outs discovered in Milan. Police conveniently found Feltrinelli’s identity card in one of them. But in April 1972, more concrete evidence of this alliance between the fascists, the Christian Democrats and particularly the army and police, came to light. Pictures were published showing Giulio Caradonna, an MSI deputy and leader of the Rome strong-arm squads, be- fore maps of the Rome region of Lazio. Symbols showed troop concentrations and Com- munist Party strongholds marked with a hammer and sickle. With Caradonna_ were three of his ‘adjutants’, Mario Narduzzi, Fernando Philippi and Bernardo De Palma-—an ex-graduate of the aeronautical college. A letter sent to the magazine ‘Panorama’ explained the plan. It said that a big MSI success in the May 7 elections would lead to demonstrations by the working class. These would be countered with an occupation of key points in Rome by fascist ‘commandos’. The army would be held in reserve ready to crush any popular rebellion. Control of Rome would give the fascists the television net- work, the ministries and_ all the centres of power. The letter explained in detail how the operation would take place over three days. Arrests of lIcft-wing politicians and trade union leaders would begin at an early stage. More- over. the NATO command had given an assurance that it would not. intervene. For foreign consumption the ‘coup’ would be presented as a legal operation to restore order. If election success did not produce the predicted disorder, the plan would change slightly. Squads of fascists would go out attacking trade union leaders and party headquarters to provoke a reaction. Caradonna’s excuse was that the picture was deliberately Fourth International Spring 1973
[p039] taken by the MSI for ‘election purposes’, Later it was pointed out that the hammers and sickles and the names of the army and _ police garrisons clearly visible were hardly consistent with this explana- tion. He then changed his line. The evidence, he said, was ‘photographic’ falsification. The Caradonna affair was concrete evidence that the fascists, the army and police were working to create the conditions for a coup. But more startling relevations were to come, More incidents that sug- gested a conspiracy came to light during the summer last year and, in November, Arnaldo Forlani, who held the important post of secretary of the Christian Democratic Party, made a_ remarkable statement. He claimed that during the last election Italy had been in grave danger of a right-wing coup. a ‘This divisive attack,’ he continued, ‘was prompted by a plot which has substantial financial and _ organizational roots, arising probably not only from internal, but also from international solidarity. ‘This attempt is not finished. We have in a documented fashion and in the areas of our responsibility that this attempt is still under way,’ he added. The statement caused a public outcry. Forlani was pressed to reveal more, especi- ally about the ‘international solidarity’, But he refused. His outburst caused great turmoil within the Christian Demo- crats, a party split into about nine factions, Originally the party attempted to censor the key phrases, but was forced to admit that Forlani had in fact made the accusations, but only after they were published in the left-wing Press. It is worth dwelling at length on these conspiracies. They illustrate one important factor in the development to- wards fascist rule—the con- nections between the fascist movement and the state and, through the state, the ruling class, In Italy it would be both foolish and indeed lethal to imagine that fascism must wait for the emergence of some mass black-shirt force. That force is already waiting in the wings within the army, within Italy’s new fascists the para-military police and the Caribinieri (the armed ‘national guard’). That is not to say eithtr — that fascism can _ suddenly ‘emerge’ as a system from a coup d’etat. A seizure of power by the fascist forces, supported by the forces of law and order, would unquestionably lead to civil war. ’ All over the north, the home of one of the most militant sections of the Euro- pean working class, the banner cf resistance would be raised. The working class would have to be defeated in battle, their organization destroyed, their leaders murdered before a second II Duce could rule Italy. But it is true to say, that while the Communist Party calls on the state to put down the fascists, advanced prepara- tions for a coup are underway. This is the acute crisis and danger that faces every worker in Italy, As always it expresses itself as a crisis of working- class leadership. THE STORM TROOPERS Italian fascism has already reaped its first crop of victims. Hun- dreds of left-wing mili- tants have been murdered or maimed for life by the ‘squadristi’, the storm troopers of the extreme right. The ‘squadristi’ act under orders from the MSI, Italy’s fascist party, which has 56 members of parliament. . Activists in the movement court labour physical attack if they walk round areas . like Rome, where the fascists . have a strong following, with- out protection. No security is offered by the so-called forces of law‘ and order. Most of the police are fascist sympathizers and on occasions have been known to join in the frenzy at outdoor fascist rallies. The army too is firmly on the side of the extreme right. Paratroopers flaunt their alle- giance openly by marching with the fascists and donning the uniforms of the ‘squad- risti’.- Theoretically fascism and all its trappings are illegal in Italy, A law of 1952 makes it a crime to organize a fascist party. The use of fascist speeches, uni- forms, salutes, principles, em- blems etc are also banned by pain of fine or up to ten years’ jail. But the police persjstently ignore these regulations. Fas- cist attacks have been launched right under the eyes of the Carabinieri (the armed ‘national guard’) and riot police take no steps whatsoever to arrest fascists who salute, wear uniforms and carry emblems at meetings and demonstra- tions. Fascists who are wanted in connection with bloody as- saults on the left are allowed to wandey free. Stefano Delle Chiaie, for example, a founder of the fanatical Avanguardia Nazionale (National Guard), is supposed to be wanted by the authorities, yet” he moves openly: around Rome with,no harassment from the police. - The official MSI line is that they neither approve nor dis- approve of the ‘squadristi’. In fact the chain of command goes right from the street cor- ners and the dingy bars where the fascist gangs gather to the top of the party. ‘ There are supposed to be two lines-in the fascist move- ment. The fanatics disapprove of the ‘respectable’ policy of courting the right-wing Chris- tian Democrats (Italy’s Tory Party). They stand for ‘revolu- tionary fascism’—the seizure of power by an uprising. Others back MSI leader Giorgio Almi- rante’s drive to gather all the forces of the right behind him ready for power. But in reality the split. is illusory. The MSI leaders know the ‘squadristi’ are an essential part-of the party’s armour and appeal. Their more exuberant savagery may sometimes be an embarrassment—but they will always be a part of the move- . ment. e The thugs are called in to guard the big meetings and demonstrations. They were there last week at the 10th MSI congress—sons of the wealthy bourgeoisie, who swag- gered round the hall with an exaggerated air of self-impor- tance, and the youth from the working class, driven from the ° € — 35
[p040] ranks of the labour movement by years of unemployment and poverty. The ‘squadristi’ are fed on fascist literature of the most blatant and rabid kind. The Congress bookstalls are ‘loaded with the speeches of Hitler, Mussolini, Ezra Pound, the Japanese novelist Mishima, the philosophy of Nietzsche and histories of fascist rebel- lion—whatever Almirante may say about his movement, he certainly knows what books his supporters like to read. The mentality of the ‘squad- risti’ is also familiar. They read a magazine called ‘I! Borghese’ (literally — ‘the Bourgeois’) edited by MSI ideologue and senator Mario Tedeschi. ‘Il Borghese’ contains non- sensical but lewd and_sala- cious attacks of figures of the feft, intellectuals and artists (except for Eugene TIonesco who gets fulsome praise for attending the fascist’s ‘Con- gress of Free Culture’. Ionesco . said: ‘The revolutions that have been made in the name of justice and freedom have become a living hell.’) ° Adverts invite the ‘squad- risti’ to buy revolvers, rifles, bugging devices, virility potions and elevator shoes (‘Just think, six centimetres... more power, more security, more success’). The magazine reflects the psyche of its readers, their in- Security, paranoia, warped emotional development and a desire to overcome these defi- Ciencies with the mystique of fascism and the idea of being the chosen ones. The history of the ‘squad- risti’ goes back to the end of the war when a few hardened fascists witnessed the collapse of the Mussolini regime, yet avowed to carry on their acti- vities. One of the most important of the new ‘squadristi’ was Pino Rauti an _ unrepentant fascist. Rauti is now an MSI deputy who has escaped a jail sentence in connection with the Milan bank bomb outrage which killed 14 people in 1969, be- cause of the law of parliamen- tary immunity. He now publishes his own newspaper, ‘Presenza’ (‘Pre- sence’) but the start of his political career was less aus- picious. Rauti emerged in 1952 with a pamphlet titled ‘Democracy 36 Here is the Enemy’. His fol- lowing grew and in 1955 he was able to bring out a monthly magazine. In the same year he pub- lished one of Hitler’s Nurem- berg speeches, ‘Race and Cul- ture of Nazism’ (Rauti at the time was a Nazi supporter: he decorated his office with swas- tikas). 1956 was a seminal year for the emergence of the smaller fascist groups. Several were formed, including Rauti’s Ordine Nuovo (New Order— symbol is the axe—see the title head of the series). A decade later Ordine Nuovo boasted 5,000 brown- shirt members and a weekly magazine called ‘Noi Europa’. One of its greatest propaganda drives was towards the army. The movement worshipped a mythical figure called the ‘Cen- turians’, a kind of political, fascist soldiers. The ideal was to transform the Italian troops and police into such creatures (in this the movement had con- siderable success). ATTACKS Other groups formed during the 1950s include Squadrie di Azione Mussolini (Mussolini Action Squad), a secret exclu- sively terrorist group based in Milan. These fascists special- ize in bomb attacks on left- wing premises and murders of militants. Another important band of terrorists are Avanguardia Nazionale, with an estimated membership of 500 thugs. They are led by Stefano Delle Chiaie, who proclaims his dedication to the struggle against ‘neo- illuminism and the alliance be- tween catholic modernism and socialistic reformism in gov- ernment’.) (The ‘illuminati’ conspiracy is continual para- noic obsession in fascist move- ments.) The other Avanguardia Nazionale leader is the Maquis — Felice Genosese, one of the aristocratic fascists now in jail for a bomb attack on a left- wing demonstration. Outside these two organiza- tions, smaller, freelance groups proliferate—Europe _ Civiliza- tion, Tomorrow’s Order, Knights of the Nation, Black Eagles, etc, etc. The biggest of all however is the MSI's own official move- ment, Givoane Italia (Young — Italy). The Front is a tribute to the fascism that the MSI publicly disavows. Its mem- bers have been involved in bloody attacks on the left and bomb attacks. They also organize military- style camps in the countryside. One was discovered by Com- munist Party members in the Zafferana district of Catania, a fascist stronghold. The camp was held on the land of Coco Francesco, the Christian Democratic assessor for Zafferans. The black fascist flag and the Italian tricolour flow from the camp flagpoles. Superimposed on the tricolour was a black fist holding a torch, the symbol of Givoane Italia. The trees on the site were posted with MSI stickers and a wide range of literature written by party leaders was also found. The 50 youth at the camp were given a crash course in fascism from several instructors, which included the construction of bombs and the ‘art’ of karate. There are many . other examples of the direct con- nection between the ‘squad- ristii and the ‘respectable’ MSI leaders. It was, in fact, Almirante himself who gave the open door to the strong- © arm wing when he_ became n-tional secretary in 1969. He was noted as a_ hard- liner and the ‘squadristi’ flocked into the party when he became leader. Rauti was one He led Ordine Nuovo into the MSI claiming: ‘We ‘will give a shock to the move- ment ... we will review it to go towards a completely new kind of state bzsed on recist theory of history, with- out parties.’ (This was not entirely out of tune with MSI _ ideology. In December 1970 Roumualdi, the party president, had said: ‘We believe in the positive side to racial differences and -we pledge ourselves to defend the physical and spiritual form of the Arian race.’) Almirante welcomed _ the newcomers. He called Ordine Nuovo ‘the most consistent, the most serious and the most noble’, of the section of the ‘national right’. Wherever he went in the May elections Almirante was flanked by a guard of ‘squad- risti’ and on occasions he has encouraged them. to violence. In Florence, for example, he told his young followers: Fourth International Spring 1973
[p041] ‘Our youth must be ready fer confrontation with com- munists. I have already been misunderstood on _ previous occasions and I want to pre- vent misunderstanding now. When I talk of confrontation, I mean physical confrontation.’ But the real leaders of the ‘squ:dristi’ within the MSI are parliamentary deputies Luigi Turchi and Guilio Caradonna (Rauti has lost some of his support since Graziani, now on trial for forming a fascist group, pulled some of the Ordine Nuovo out of MSI). Turchi was the man who whipped in the American Italian vote behind Nixon and Caradonna was the centre of the plot by the fascists, army and right-wing Christian Demo- crats to stage a coup d’etat after the May elections last year, Caradonna (45), -is a par- ticularly nasty character. He has close and personal com- mand of the Rome ‘squadristi’ end gathers a 100-strong body- guard round his person. The youth go to war with this battle cry: ‘And we, by the Madonna, are the squadristi of Caradonna’, . He boasts of his strong-arm activities: ‘During my intense activities against Bolshevism and the regime I have been imprisoned more than once, undergoing long periods of detention and numerous trials.’ Caradonna is no longer in prison, but in the Italian parliament and in army circles he is a hero. . Two. eye-witness accounts give testimony to the mur- derous savagery of these strong-arm. squads. One, in April 1970, describes an attack on university students in Catania. .The narrator is Giovanni Centamore, who was badly wounded: r§ Il was standing outside my house with a group of friends in the evening of April 6. It was 8.30 and we were just getting into a car when we were surrounded by a group of about 20 people who - started to insult us with phra- ses like ‘dirty communists’ and other insults. . We tried to ignore the pro- vocation so as not to play their game, and also: because there italy’s new fascists were girls with us. Recogniz- able in the group were fascist ‘Pichiatori’ [fighters] Caudullo, Santogati, Ropisarda, Salmeri, Chiarenza, Marnello, Vitalone and Marotta. We had hardly started to get into the car when the facists took iron bars, ham- mers and clubs from their jackets. They first began to beat us _ savagely attacking those of us who had not been able to get into the car, hitting them on the head till they were knocked out. Then they turned on the car in which 1 and three of my friends were sitting. They broke all the windows and seriously dam- aged the bodywork. At this point we decided to get out of the car and try to help our friends who were still on the ground. But as soon as one of us put his head out, Caudullo gave him a blow on the head with a club which cut open his forehead. -We finally managed to get out of the car and we were followed into the hall of my house and they only stopped when other people arrived on the scene. They fled, leaving Several iron bars on’ the ground. The perpetrators of this attack are still at large. The fascists have big support among the police in Catania. The second incident con- cerns an attack launched by MSI ‘squadristi’ in the univer- . Sity faculty of science. Student Guiseppe Lamartina recounts: The meeting had _ just started, when a group of fascists burst into the room and, without being provoked in any way, began to attack us savagely with iron bars, chains and knives. A student and professor Centineo were seriously injured. went to hospital with a serious head wound. Another student had_ several knife wounds, and professor Gab- riele Centineo had several stab wounds in the head. After receiving these wounds 1 have suffered for several ‘months from serious ,distur- bances. I can’t write, 1 can’t read, I can’t stand strong ‘light and I suffer from terrible headaches and a 9 general lassitude. The fascists recognized in this attack were Caudullo, Vicenzo, Francesto Rajnsarda and Filippo Fatuzzo. They are still free, The last case concerns the communist student Roberto Pecoraio. In January 1972 he was the victim of a murder attempt by fascist Salvatore Ardizzone, a member. of Ordine Nuovo. Ardizzone ambushed Peco- raio as he was distributing leaflets and stabbed him nine times. He fled brandishing the bloody knife. Other students caught him, but not before he had wounded one of his pur- suers, Vito Lanzafame. This time the police were forced to act. Both attacker and victim were arrested for causing an affray. But Ardiz- zone was freed after three months after being charged with causing bodily harm! These are just a few of the examples of the attacks by fascists. They are carried out systematically all over Italy, but more in the south where the fascists feel secure, Violence against the left is an essential part of the fascist policy in Italy. There is over- whelming evidence that the police either support or do nothing to halt this pogrom. But the police are not the only institutions backing the jack boot. THE DOORS TO POWER To be transformed from a sect to a powerful force, fascism needs the back- ing of big business. Only the monopolies can un- lock the doors to political power and finance the campaigns and conspira- cies of the extreme right. _ Italy’s fascist party, the MSI, already commands con- siderable support among the largest banks and industrialists and its influence spreads out to the army, the police, the state administration and the judiciary. . This following can only be explained against the back- ground of economic crisis in the country. The ‘Italian miracle’ ran out of steam around the late 1960s. After two decades of boom, industry slipped into a 37
[p042] malaise from which it has never emerged. Production in 1971 actually fell 2.7 per cent and investment slumped 9 per cent, The performance during 1972 was no better. Invest- ment” is now stagnant despite a record amount of liquid capital held by the banks. The recession has dealt the small businessmen a mortal blow. Bankruptcies are com- mon-place and the devaluation of the lira and the sudden introduction of the Italian version of Value-Added Tax will make things worse. Under VAT the small busi- nessman will be forced to declare his true turnover for tax purposes and the practice of deliberately underestimat- ing his level of business, to avoid the bulk of the inland revenue bill, will come to an end. The giants—companies like the big three, Olivetti, Pirelli and Fiat—also face the future with considerable gloom. Profits are not expected to improve during 1973 and the monopolies face class war in their massive northern plants. It is on this rich soil of crisis that the fascists prosper. It is estimated the MSI shares equally with ~ the Christian Democrats the alle- giance of the small business community and the trend is ever towards the right. Particular support comes from the building employers and shopkeepers in the south, where the fascists are most powerful. Traders in Italy must apply each year for a licence and one is granted only after suitable donations to the party chest. But it is at the top of the industrial ladder that the most significant shift has taken place. The peculiar structure of the Italian economy has always facilitated political control and influence. Capitalism in Italy has always needed substantial state support to survive. In- dustry is sheltered by enor- mous state trusts which pump in funds to guard against crisis and bankruptcy. Only the car industry, food manufacture and rubber are free from state control. However, one should banish the idea of nationalization, eveh on the British model. The state trusts are controlled by political groups who have the interests of private enter- prise engraved on their hearts. The system is more like the ill-fated Industrial Reorganiza- tion. Corporation which pro- vided millions to stabilize the private shipyards of the Clyde under the last Labour govern- ment in Britain. The difference in Italy is that the politicians who control the trusts demand a return in the form of millions of lira to the party funds. One executive described the set-up when he recalled a secret political meeting rep- resentatives of his company attended, ‘All the large corporations in Italy were represented,’ he said. ‘We were asked to guarantee a huge loan to the party.’ Instead his company made an outright gift—‘and had done with it’. Another businessman de- scribes the extent of this corruption: ‘A company gives to political parties in proportion to the amount it thinks will be useful to its projects.” One big com- pany, he said, ‘gives to all the countries major parties. It gives to the communists—so they won’t make trouble—and to the neo-fascists [the ‘polite’ term for MSI] in case they get more powerful’. Bribery (‘bustarella’) is in fact institutionalized. Every major executive has a _ series of envelopes filled with varying amounts of lira tucked away in his desk. If he wants to get a tax concession or win a contract he calls in a ‘con- sultant’, and hands him one of the packages. If the ‘consultant’ shakes his head, a_ larger packet is brought forth, and so on until the required result is achieved. FAVOURS If the economic crisis is the basis of the fascists’ influence in the board room, institution- alized graft and the tradition of political control has cer- tainly smoothed their way to industrial power. There are three groups that are widely considered to look with special favour to the MSI, One is a conglomerate con- trolled by Attilio Monti based on his import-export business. Monti’s influence extends into oil and newspapers. He owns ‘Journal Italia’, ‘Resto Del Carno’, all the popular sports journals and ‘Il Tempo’. All these papers have a virulent right-wing line. One of the major contributors to ‘Il Tempo’ was Pino Rauti, an MSI deputy who was jailed in connection with the fascist bomb outrage that killed 13 people in a Milan bank. A letter has been published purporting to be a communica- tion from a secret agent to Monti asking for funds to be handed over to the MSI. Monti is involved with an- other admirer of the extreme right, the cement king Presenti (his Italia Cementi has a total monopoly of the product). The two industrialists have formed a pact with Eugenio Cefis, the president of Monte- catini Edison, Italy’s biggest chemical and textile combine (it recently added pharma- ceuticals to its empire by taking over the biggest firm in this sector). The Montedison affair is an extremely complicated web of financial intrigue. The company first made headlines over a year ago when its president, Cesare Merza- gora, resigned after eight months at his post. He had discovered a $43m secret fund which was used by industrial- ists who had interests in Montedison for their own purposes — mainly to channel money into parties and news- papers of the right. The president before Merza- gora, Giorgio Valerio, was charged with embezzlement of company funds, accounting irregularities and deception of the public. Several other in- fluential Italian industrialists were charged with him. This scandal led to a re- organization of the company, _the third largest in the Euro- pean chemical industry. It was at this stage that Monti, Presenti and Cefis formed a group and_ began buying up shares, With them in the race was Agnelli, head of Fiat and Pirelli, chief of the rubber monopoly of the same name. The people who suffered most from this game of finan- cial chess were the small investors, led by Giorgio Pisano, a member of the Italian Upper House of parliament for the MSI. - But the clamour from the smal] men and Pisano has died down, despite the continued Fourth International Spring 1973
[p043] poor performance of the group. Observers believe that money is being channelled into the MSI to buy their silence. Theoretically the state trusts are now supposed to control the company. But the Minister of State Ferrari Aggradi sent directives to the state trusts involved not to buy more shares from the private sector of Montedison while allowing the private factions to increase their own portfolios. The trusts have also been excluded from some Montedison board meet- ings. The third man of the right is the most interesting of all— Michele Sindona — Europe’s most secret financier, dubbed the Howard Hughes of Italy. He was involved in the Montedison manoeuvres in the early stages, but has now pulled out, many millions of lira better off, in favour of investment in America, Sindona’s empire is based on his Liechtenstein holding company, Fasco AG. Through this he controls 51 per cent of Banca Privata Finanziaria. Another quarter of the bank is owned by Chicago’s largest bank, the Continental Illinois National Bank and_ Trust Company. The head of this outfit is David M. Kennedy, ex-secretary to the US Treasury and now roving US Ambas- sador in Europe. Branches of Continental IIinois have re- cently been opened in Greece and Taiwan. The other quarter stake be- longs to Hambros, the estab- lishment ‘British merchant bank. Sindona owns the largest English-speaking daily in Italy ‘The Daily American’, which distinguished itself in the May election last year with very favourable coverage for the MSI. CONNECTION Other indications of Sin- dona’s political persuasions are his passionate advocacy of private enterprise—-‘I fight everyone who is in favour of nationalization. Mediobanca wants to stick the state into everything, and I wanted to keep it out. I fought for my ideas not for money.’ Sindona has close connec- tions with the Vatican end has acted with them in deals that excited the Milan stock ex- taly’s new fascists change. His close personal friend is Monsignore Benelli, under secretary of state at the Vatican and leader of the reactionaries who look towards the MSI to arrest the ‘pro- gressive’ drift in some sections of the Catholic church. Sindona’s secrecy has lead to conflicts with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, who investigate ownership and con- trol in industry. A complicated deal once led to a two days suspension of trading for his US interests after a Wall Street Journal investigation. But Sindona, born in Sicily, makes light of this concern. The Americans had the wrong impression. They were worry- ing about ‘black gold’ from ‘gangsters’, when actually it is ‘anonymous’ money from highly respectable people, he says. To Wall Street businessmen he had called together to dis- cuss investment in the US he exclaimed: ‘Ridiculous, if European bankers were to tell as much about clients as American banks do they. would go to jail.’ But it is not only from finance capital that the extreme right are attracting support. Industrialists are also casting a keen eye in a fascist direction. Fiat -chief Agnelli has re- cently become extremely con- cerned about the working class. ‘In Italy today,’ he said, ‘the amount of unproductive and parasitic income has grown at a pathological rate. This is because wages cannot be re- strained in a democratic society.’ He continued: ‘The em- ployers have two perspectives only, enter a head on collision with the working class or a series of initiatives to eliminate waste.’ Agnelli seems to have gone for the first option. Fiat now recruits workers from the fascist union CISNAL, Letters have come to light which re- veal that Fiat chiefs, in asking for CISNAL workers from the south, prefer the ones who have a strong ideological moti- vation, since many southerners had been quickly absorbed into the labour movement within weeks of work in the factories of the north. Fiat’s latest plan is to go to the south and build factories. But big concentrations, where militancy grows fast, will be avoided, The fascists are clearly anchored firmly in the indus- trial structure of Italy, but this influence is paralleled by their growing influence within the State institutions and_ the organs of repression. The pro-fascist attitudes of the police were described in Wednesday’s and Thursday’s articles. Latest evidence sug- gests that there is now a deliberate policy on the part of some police authorities to develop fascist influence within the ranks. The Communist Party newspaper ‘l’Unita’ has for example revealed that recruits to the police and the para-military Carabineri are be- ing obtained through CISNAL and the MSI. The danger to the left of this infiltration is made more acute by a new regulation by which police will have the power to arrest anyone acting in a way that may ‘indicate’ they are liable to cause a breach of the peace. If they do arrive in court, left-wing militants will get little joy. Judges, all over the world, are a most reactionary group of individuals, but there is evidence that this tendency among Italian judges is a little more pronounced. Every year judges speak of their attitude to the job at an inaugural ceremony. From this, their political persuasions can be gauged. From the last inaugurations it is estimated that well over half the judges in Italy sympathize with the extreme right. In the south many have come out openly for Destra Nazionale (the National Right—the monarch- -ist movement now officially part of MSI). Case histories also testify to the bias. CIVIL WAR In the infamous Milan bomb case the anarchist Valpreda was kept in jail for over two years (his ‘co-assassin’ Pinelli, a rail worker, was less lucky, he ‘jumped’ from a police sky- scraper block). The judge on the trial, Falco, prolonged Valperaida’s intern- ment despite the fact that there was no evidence whatsoever to connect him with the attack. He and the prosecutor Occorsio (brother-in-law of Italian pre- mier Andreotti) also had the hearing moved to Rome, a fascist stronghold. 39
[p044] This broke all custom and practice—crimes in Italy are always heard where they were alleged to have been com- mitted, in this case Milan— the major working-class centre and a stronghold of the left. Irf the armed forces too, the fascist command strong sup- port. About 20. high-ranking officers stood as MSI candi-: dates in the parliamentary elections (two admirals, one colonel and three ex-paras stood in the Rome region of Lazio alone). Influence is particularly well developed in the ‘crack’ special forces, the paratroopers and the marines—sections of the armed forces that would be used (as they are in Northern Ireland) to fight a civil war against the working class. Paratroopers march openly with fascists on demonstrations and the ex-paratroopers associa- tion, which organizes periodic re-training for its members, is controlled by fascists. But perhaps the most sinister aspect of the rightward trend in the forces of repression is the apparent fascist influence within the secret and political police. There have been several attempted coups by the ex- treme right with army and police support in Italy in the last ten years. One of the earliest was in 1964—prompted by a crisis in the centre-left coalition led by Christian Democrat Aldo Moro. Head of the Carabineri, Giovanni De Lorenzo’ con- structed a plan to ‘take the initiative’ in the case of a national emergency. Over 1,000 names were passed on to the intelligence service SIFAR by Lorenzo. These were of acti- vists in the left wing and trade union movement who were to be rounded up and flown to internment camps in Sardinia if an emergency was declared. When the economic crisis deepened in May, De Lorenzo sent a personal message to the armed forces and SIFAR officers. A key passage read: ‘We are ready to face the future, united and calm, what- ever may happen.’ Preparations continued. De- tailed orders outlining a plan to occupy the radio and TV studios, the exchanges and the offices of political parties, trade unions and newspapers, were sent out, The plot was aban- 7 doned only after De Lorenzo had intervened and __ the Christian Democrats had re- sisted pressure from the left. When these plans were re- vealed in the radical newspaper ‘Expresso’, De Lorenzo was forced out of office. He joined Destra Nazionale (the monarch- ist movement, now part of the MSI) and took with him 36,000 files on politicians and trade unionists all over Italy. De Lorenzo is now an MSI member of parliament, the files are in a Swiss bank and presumably at the disposal of the fascist movement should the need arise—it is as though the head of Britain’s security services had defected with all his files to the British fascist movement! Since the De Lorenzo affair there have been two known attempted coups from the right. In both cases the security services must have been aware of these plans, but nothing was done. One can only con- clude that the political police in Italy, passively, or actively back moves towards dictator- ship. There is one final point of importance to be made when considering fascist influence within the Italian ruling class. The MSI's power cannot be viewed simply within the Italian context. Regimes of traditional bourgeois demo- cracy in western Europe are now the exception rather than the rule—Spain, Greece and France have all relinquished this form of capitalist rule— and the contradictions of the Common Market are forcing the other regimes in Europe in the same direction. These developments are actively supported by the American's through NATO and the CIA. The American’s sup- port the Greek junta. It is an open secret in Rome that they would like to see a ‘colonels’ Italy, The departure of Gino Birindelli, ex-NATO naval chief in the Mediterranean for example drew approval from many American NATO officers. The development of fascism is in fact a European, indeed, a world phenomena, since the capitalist world is gripped with the same intense economic crisis. This is why the story of Italian fascism has an immediate importance for the British working class. The series so far has been inevitably one-sided. It would be perhaps understandable to assume that in the road to power the fascists face no serious obstacle. This would be totally and completely wrong. Trotsky once said this about similar developments in Ger- many: ‘Fascism is a product of two conditions: a sharp social crisis on the one hand, the revolu- tionary weakness of fhe Ger- man proletariat on the other. The weakness of the prole- tariat in itself is made up of two elements: of the particular historic role of Social Demo- cracy ... and the inability of the Centrist leadership of the Communist Party to unite workers under the banner of revolution.” (Leon Trotsky, ‘The Key to the International Situation in Germany 1931- 1932’, essential reading.) In Italy (as in France, Britain and Germany), the working class, once mobilized politically, is immeasurably more powerful than the forces the fascists at present command. In the final analysis the fascist threat in Italy hangs on the one question of working- class leadership. Easel Only once ASK the new fascists of Italy faced the united strength of the working class and that once they were soundly beaten. The confrontation took place at Genoa in 1960 where the fascist MSI was holding its annual Congress. The Communist Party leadership called together other parties of the left and a General Strike was launched. The response from the work- ing class, which led the resis- tance fight against Mussolini, Was immediate and massive. The factories closed and hun- dreds of thousands of workers streamed into the city. On July 1 the prefect of police called up the trade union Fourth International Spring 1973
[p045] headquarters. ‘Call-off the strike,’ he said. ‘The Congress has been cancelled.’ It was a blow that the fascists remember to this day with hatred and fear. Their punny social forces had been exposed, it had been proved that the human dust they re- presented could be defeated by class action. Over a decade has passed since the Genoa days and the Situation now is far more grave. The fascists have been nourished by the deliberate and persistent refusal of the ultra-Stalinist leadership of the PCI (Italian Communist Party) to mobilize the working class against fascism. The contrast between Genoa and Rome last week, when the fascists held their 10th Congress, was stark and revealing. Until two weeks before the fascists met there was no mention of the Cong- ress or any call for mobili- zation in the two mass com- munist daily papers. Eventually, under _ great pressure from their own rank and file, the Stalinists did or- ganize a protest and a two- hour (!) General Strike in the city. Even this lethargic cam- paign called forth a huge demonstration of 100,000 workers, youth and large sec- tions of the middle class— this, in Rome, a city domi- nated by civil servants, not a noted CPI stronghold. The masses were marched from the Coliseum to Porta San Paola and the monument for the resistance behind the Italian national flag—the Stalinists always pose as the true guardians of the ‘Italian nation’—the only other place such antics were observable was at Palazzo Dei Congressi where the MSI also met be- neath the shadow of _ the Italian tricolour. The Communist Party lead- ers refuse to rouse the work- ing class against fascism be- cause to do so would wreck their policy of collaboration with the capitalist and petty- : bourgeois parties of Italy. Once mobilized in political action, Italian workers would not confine their attack to the fascists—the campaign would broaden out to include the reactionaries in the Christian Deniocrat, Liberal and Repub- lican Parties. This is what the_ Stalinists fear most. It would jeopardize their policy of subordinating e Italy's new fasciste class interests to that of col- laboration with capitalism. Workers would demand their own socialist reforms in place of the Stalinists’ cry for a change in the ‘structure’ of Italian big business. So the Stalinists continue their insane campaign of call- ing on ‘the state’ to put down fascism—insane because ‘the state’ is ncw the main sanc- tuary of the extreme right. And if the fascists did pull off their coup d’état, the Stalin- ists, despite their craven class collaboration, would be among the first to feel the knife. The words of Rome PCI leader Amendola, spoken to that 100,000-strong demonstra- tion, give some impression of the treachery of Italian Stalin- ism. He called, on the ‘people of Rome’ to defend the consti- tution. The constitution the working class are supposed to fight for has a clause specifi- cally guarding the right to free enterprise and in fact re- fkects many fascist influences. Italy’s legal code, for example, is substantially the same as that drafted by Mussolini’s Minister Alfredo Rocco in 1931. Amendola continued: ‘To the fascists . . . Rome reserves the kind of greeting you give to those suffering from the plague: moral isolation, the door closed in their face, de- mocratic vigilance to shatter at once any attempt at provo- cation and fights. We demand resolutely of the authorities that they do not offer any cover ... to these people.’ In fact the fascists found Rome’s door wide open. Thanks mainly to the PCI they held a very successful undis- turbed conference. - Elsewhere in his address the Stalinist leader went to truly amazing lengths to convince the capitalist state of his good faith. To the forces of repres- sion he said: *. . . to the Carabinieri and the police which are present in such large numbers, we ad- dress the generous appeal of Giuseppe Di Vittorio: brother, sons of the people, it is your duty to defend the Republic and the constitution and fight the enemies of liberty.’ Later the police, fully armed and firing tear-gas__ repaid Amendola’s trust by invading Teveri, Rome's main working- class area. They could not have been listening to the Stalinist speeches that night! The kind of policy repre- sented by Amendola speaks for itself. It is no exaggeration to say that the single biggest Prop to fascism in Italy— notwithstanding the army, and the police—is Stalinism—be- cause it is this force that con- founds and diverts a working- class powerful enough and cap- able of driving every fascist into the Mediterranean. There is a long history of Stalinist treachery. It was the CPI which, after the defeat of fascism, helped to restore capitalism in Italy in 1944- 1945. The working class and CPI militants led the resistance. Between the beginning of the fascist collapse, in 1943, and 1946 party membership rose from a few thousand to 1.7 million (membership now Stands at 2.5 million). But the partisans were ordered by the party leader- ship to relinquish their de facto control of the country to the Allied command, then later to the capitalist coalition government. DEFEAT Despite this total lack of leadership an_ insurrectionary General Strike broke out across Italy in 1948 when there was an assassination attempt against the CPI leader Palmiro Togliatti. Factories were occu- pied, road blocks set up and the guns came out. The Stalin- ists took rapid control and within 48 hours the strike was over. This was a turning point. The defeat of 1948 opened the way to long period in which the employers and their parties could re-establish their rule. The CPI, for its part, began to openly avow a reformist line. . It dropped all demands for the expropriation of capital and abandoned the call for an end to capitalist exploitation (for- example Di Vittorio, the leader of the CPI union, said in 1951: ‘This formulation makes quite clear the position of the CGIL and the working class: absolute struggle against all forms of super-exploitation, but full support for the in- creasing development of the productivity of labour, accord- ing to the principles which in- spire the Labour Plan.’) a <u
[p046] Under conditions where Ita- lian workers were the lowest paid in Europe, the so-called Italian ‘economic miracle’ got underway. The Stalinists began to mouth exactly the same for- mula as the so-called left of the Christian Democrats. Both wanted a reform of the ‘struc- ture’ demanding a greater role for the state trusts, which were in fact a fascist development to guard private profits. But this criminal complicity was severely threatened by the economic crisis which broke in Italy in the late 1960s. This, on the one hand, led to a wave of industrial unrest and on the other to the growth of fascist influence in the state and industry. The Stalinist leadership is now caught between these two forces—the stormtroopers of capitalism and the working class. Trotsky once compared to- day's situation in Italy to a pyramid with a steel ball rest- ing on the apex. The ball can roll down one side and break the backs of the working class, he argued. Or it can roll down the other and smash capitalism and the ruling class. To imagine, however, it can remain balanced on the point of the pyramid is Utopia. The Stalinists would like the ball to balance—-so they can continue their collaboration. But this is impossible. What then is the prospect for the Italian working class? Beyond the Stalinists are various left groups. They are critical of CPI policy, but their polemic often lacks depth. Stalinist treachery is often put down to mistakes, incorrect tactical formulation—rarely is the CPI characterized as a counter-revolutionary force in Italian society. Many of the left-wing groups proclaim that ‘fascism is the state’. This perhaps betrays an overestimation of the fascists’ strength and influence. This, as we have seen, is considerable. But mere possession of certain State institutions does not mean fascism. , . For fascism to be estab- . lished, the working class must be defeated in battle, its trade unions destroyed and its lead- ership imprisoned or murdered. The Italian fascists certainly have this on the agenda, but achieving it is quite another matter. 42 The forces of repression can also appear more _ powerful than they are in reality. The Carabinieri and the police look tough with their rifles slung across their backs, their tear- gas, riot shields and clubs. But this force is a poor body of men often recruited from the most desperate sub-proletariat of the south. Its morale and intelligence is low. Under a ‘ united attack of the working class, such a force would be in danger of disintegrating. RALLY The fascists therefore could be smashed by the working class which would rapidly rally the poor peasantry and the petty bourgeois to their ban- ner. One thing prevents them — Stalinism. The key question—how to win the 8.5 million workers who vote for the CPI—is often ignored. Instead many seem to prefer hopeless confrontation with the riot police. This may be courageous, but it is also futile. Only the power of the work- ing class can smash fascism, the police and the army in_ Italy. But the working class can only be won from Stalin- ism with a consistent political campaign. This must be directed against the fascists. By calling for class action against fascism the Stalinist leadership will be exposed. But an essential part of such a programme would be a revolutionary policy demand- ing expropriation of Italy’s de- crepit capitalist system under workers’ control. A policy of concrete action against the fascists, the estab- lishment of factory defence committees, workers’ anti- fascist brigades, details and plans of fascist concentrations etc, must go in hand with a bitter political battle against Stalinist politics and a cam- paigt for a revolutionary pro- gramme. Time ‘is now. desperately short. Italy really does face two prospects—a workers’ state. or a coup d’état bv forces of the. extreme right. A coup, of course. would not be. the end of the ‘matter—it - _would lead to a civil. war, since workers, especially. in the north, will have no truck with Mussolini's heirs~ - * COUP But to fight after a coup would be to fight having already sustained a_ serious wound. To anticipate events is far better. Revolutionary socialists in Italy face a great opportunity. Revolutionary politics and a bitter war against Stalinist policies can rally the working class—many of whom are dis- affected, angry or confused over the laggardly policy of the CPI leadership. Italy, of course, is not Bri- tain. The social predominance of the British working class, its enormous power and organiza- tion, do not aid the develop- ment of fascism. But much the same economic conditions that cause crisis in Italy, cause crisis in the UK. The British ruling class too must inevitably look in the fascist direction. There is another factor that British workers must consider. The monopolies of Europe are looking south to areas like Greece and Spain where the working class suffer super- exploitation and where trade unions are organized under pain of imprisonment. The fascists offer the prospect of bringing both these countries into the EEC and adding Italy for good measure. A civil war in Italy that went in favour of the ruling class would therefore be a blow for the British working class, because it would greatly strengthen the monopolies all over Europe. The best way the British workers can help their Italian brothers is by preparing politi- cally for their own revolution- ary upheaval—by transforming the Socialist Labour League into a revolutionary party and constructing a Marxist leader- ship in the trade unions. This situation in Italy, there- fore, is of central importance to the working class of Britain and Europe. The same econo- mic conditions that plague the Italian capitalist class, also plague the British bosses. They too will have to turn to fascism. The war clouds now gather over Europe—the . first field of a giant class battle may be Italy. Fourth International Spring 1973