THE FRENCH POPULAR FRONT 1936: General Strike follows election victory

The success of the Popular Front in the French elections of April 26 and May 3, 1936, was the signal for a great strike movement which could have been the start of a successful revolution.

At its peak the strike was joined by between 2 and 3 million workers and was the greatest movement of its kind which France had ever seen. It was not called or desired by the trade unions or by the Socialist and Communist Parties, who were partners in the Popular Front coalition with the Radical Party.

As a great spontaneous uprising of the working class it remained unparalleled until the even-greater strike movement of May-June 1968, in which over 10 million workers were involved. But in 1968, as in 1936, the movement gained only small reforms and the working class was pushed back because the vital factor in a successful revolution, the revolutionary party, was lacking.

Yesterday's election in France raises the possibility of a similar working-class reaction in the event of a victory for the left coalition which is contesting the election on the so-called common programme.

This coalition is a carbon copy of the 1936 Popular Front and includes, in the shape of the rump of 'left' Radicals led by Maurice Fabre, the shadow of the bourgeoisie as a guarantee that it does not intend to overstep the confines of capitalism.

As in 1936, the CP Stalinists are the most fervent advocates of the Popular Fronttype policies today, seeking an alliance with. the sections of the ruling class and their servants in order to secure a government prepared to fall in with the diplomatic needs of the Soviet bureaucracy. CP secretary Georges Marchais has given repeated guarantees of good behaviour, accepting the Bonapartist Constitution of the Fifth Gaullist republic and ready to take office under it.

Marchais lives in fear of the working class and strives to hold it in check. The promises of the common programme are intended to deflect the working class from the goal of power by cultivating the illusion that its demands can be met within capitalism by the use of the ballot. But the Stalinists are afraid that a victory will give the workers confidence to fight and that they will break out of the strait-jacket re-imposed after the events of May-June 1968.

An examination of the role which the Stalinists played in 1936 is extremely instructive in understanding their aims. The programme adopted by the Popular Front parties in January 1936 was along similar lines. It was a policy tor the reform of French capitalism, then staggering under the blows of the economic slump of the 1930s.

Only a programme which made no inroads into capitalist private property was acceptable to the Radicals. It promised an improvement in living standards and a reduction in unemployment, but nothing was said about nationalization or even the 40hour week.

Nevertheless, the working class saw in the electoral victory of the Popular Front and the defeat of the reactionaries an affirmation of own its strength. After the second ballot on May 3, spontaneous demonstrations formed up in working-class districts and rejoicing to the strains of the 'Internationale' went on far into the night.

The task of forming a new government fell upon Léon Blum, the reformist leader of the Socialist Party. At the conference of his party he had emphasized that the victory of the Popular Front would not mean that the time had come to make inroads into capitalist property. He made clear: We are going to act within the framework of the present regime, whose very vices we have denounced.' Although the mainstay of the Popular Front, the Communist Party was not prepared to enter the government. Secretary Maurice Thorez had argued in favour of participation. He was outvoted on the Political Bureau and this position was backed up by Moscow. It was claimed that the presence of communists in the government would harm the Popular Front by frightening middle-class people!

It was only a year or two previously that the Communist Party had been following the ultra-left line of the so-called 'third period' with its theory of 'Class against class' and its main slogan 'Soviets everywhere'. The call for soviets was still being heard from workers in 1935 and 1936, although it had been abandoned by the Party.

Thorez himself raised the call for soviets when speaking in the debate on the fascist demonstrations of February 1934. But with the adoption of the Popular Front line, such ultra-left slogans — which for the working class represented genuine revolutionary aspirations-had to be dropped.

In fact the Party tried to give every guarantee that it had now become a respectable 'democratic' party. Jacques Duclos told the Press on May 7, 1936, that the Party would respect private property. The Political Bureau called for the defence of the franc and the maintenance of the gold standard. In a letter to the Socialist Party it denied having called for the setting up of popular committees.

Not surprisingly, when the CP recently held an election meeting to which businessmen were invited in Paris, the same Jacques Duclos gave the same assurances as in 1936.

After the election results had been announced, Waldeck-Rochet declared: 'The electors did not vote for revolution; we are not putshcists nor partisans of all or nothing. We will accept our responsibilities in co-operating in the improvement of the conditions of the working classes within the framework of the present system.' At this time the CP leaders saw themselves not as aspiring cabinet ministers, as they do today, but rather as having a special mission to work among the working class to ensure that it did not go outside the reformist limits imposed by the Popular Front with bourgeois politicians. This was their role during the strikes, which took them by surprise.

The first strikes began in Le Havre and Toulouse on May 1l. The Bréguet aircraft lactory in Le Havre was occupied by the workers, who struck because the management had sacked two union officials who had taken the day off on May 1. A similar strike took place in the Latécoère aircraft factory in Toulouse. In both cases the strike was won, sacked men were reinstated and the workers paid for the time lost. IMPOSSIBLE Whatever the immediate demands of the strikers, the occupation of the factories rity of the capitalists and the directly challenged the autho state. The government rejected the idea sens neared in troops because it was Henrea this would aggravate the conflict. In any case, the army was mould have been who more likely to join the striking workers Later, when member of the general commanding the Paris garrison how many troops would be required for the job. was clear that it was impossible. In fact, the general told him, to get the workers out of the factory he would have-to call up the reservists among them inside to eject the rest.

The trade union officials, many of whom were CP members, tried to keep the strikes under control. May they succeeded in working out agreement for Renault which said that a wage increase 'would be examined as quickly as possible'. That night the workers accepted the agreement and left the factory.

But it was only round one. Although some factories sumed normal working in the wake of Renault, the strikes were spreading and their impact was beginning to be felt in the provinces and outside the engineering industries which had so far been in the vanguard of the movement.

After a weekend in which themselves themsesses wehat congratulating over, the strikes spread despite the efforts of the trade rapidly again from Tune unions to start negotiations.

Within a few days they had spread to hotels, restaurants, petrol distribution, who clothing.

and in many cases did not even belong to a union were occupying their places of work or going. home.

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