NOT INDIVIDUAL 'CONSCIENCES' BUT A RIGHT WING PLOT
By Jack Gale
1973Jack GaleLabour PartyTory governmentCommon Market Read the scan at ETOL (PDF) →Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: headlines and words can be misread, and a caption or advert can run into the text. For anything you quote, read the scan.
Several of those who marched servative lobby on the Common Market vote on October 28, 1971 had been Ministers in the Labour Government.
Roy Jenkins, the Labour Party's Deputy Leader, had been Chancellor of the Exchequer; Shirley Williams had been Minister State for Education and Science, then Minister of State for the Home Office.
Harold Lever had been Paymaster General; Edward Short had been Minister of State for Education and Science; Michael Stewart had been Foreign Secretary; Ray Gunter Roy Mason had been Minister OI Power and then President of the Board of Trade.
This act of treachery saved the from certain defeat-at least half the Tory anti-Market rebels would have stood firm under any circum. stances-and paved the way for the Industrial Relations Act, the Housing Finance Act and state control of wages. as well as entry into the Common Market.
It was a much larger defection than had been anticipated only a few months earlier. As recently as May 10, 1971, 'The Times' had estimated that only "two score or more of Labour MPS vote pro-Market -and that on a free vote.
But the way had been prepared for a large pro-Tory vote by the weakness of the Labour 'lefts', as well as by the duplicity of the Labour leaders. It just is not true, for one thing, that the Labour leaders have consistently stood out for 'satisfactory terms' for British entry and that they would never have accepted the coined Europe o hack are 1973.
The first formal application to join the EEC was made by Harold Wilson's Labour government in 1967.
This application pletely unconditional.
When Wilson presented the application to parliament, he said that 'ought not to be unnecessarily complicated with lesser issues, many of which can best be dealt with after entry' According to a recent study (Diplomacy and Persuasion', by Uwe Thames & Hudson, £2.75) it was at a Chequers meeting on October 22. 1966. that George Brown and Michael Stewart presented • paper on European policy which called for Common Market entry.
Here there was opposition from Barbara Castle, Richard Marsh, Douglas Jay and Fred Peart. Richard Crossman and Anthony Wedgwood Benn 'expressed reservations', but agreed to a 'tentative approach' to the EEC.
According to Kitzinger, the effect food prices raised, but it was felt that if, by the target date for entry (1968), the economy was in an upswing (!) increased prices could be absorbed, and if it wasn't they would be in trouble anyway.
Following this meeting, Wilson and Brown toured Europe. In December 1966 they were in Rome, in January 1967 in Strasbourg, February in Paris and in March in Luxembourg. It was at the end of this tour that the application for unconditional entry was made -and subsequently vetoed by France's President de Gaulle.
The line-up in the Cabinet at that time was as follows: Harold Wilson, George Brown, Michael Stewart, Roy Jenkins, Anthony Crosland, Gerald Gardiner, Anthony Wedgwood Benn and Ray Gunter were in favour of entry; on the other hand, Douglas Jay, Fred Peart, Denis Healey, Barbara Castle, William Ross, Richard Marsh and Herbert Bowden were inclined against, in Cledwyn against. Anthony Greenwood Hughes inclined favour. That left Jim Callaghan, Patrick Gordon-Walker, Richard Crossman, and (outside the Cabinet but involved in its discussions) the Chief Whip John Silkin somewhere in between, in the category of 'maybes' on the strategy, though on the tactics they—like the restagreed on the unconditional application being tabled in Brussels.
CABINET WILSON All of them wanted a vigorous and swift follow-up to the application to leave no doubts as to Britain's seriousness and to get the issue decided soon.
So it was the whole Cabinet. without any hint or threat of resignation, that supported Harold Wilson when he made his announcement in the House, on May 2, 1967, that Britain would apply.
The House approved the application overwhelmingly by 488 votes in favour and only 62 against. A mere 35 Labour MPs voted against applying to join the Common Market without any conditions or safeguards whatever. And 260 Labourites voted in favour and some 40 or 50 abstained Seven Labour Ministers sacked their parliamentary private secretaries for voting against the application-and one who did this was the Minister of Agriculture, Fred Peart, a "Tribune'-ite MP who had opposed entry in the Cabinet, but dutifully voted for it in the Commons.
Labour lost the election of June 18, 1970, and negotiations for Market entry were taken up by the incoming Tory government. What changed? The answer is-nothing!
In fact only 12 days elapsed between the election and the opening of negotiations.
The Tory negotiators, appointed only eight days earlier, simply picked up the dossier prepared for their Labour predecessors. The Foreign Office regarded the application as a bipartisan issue and made no change in its negotiating positions as a result of the change in government.
In fact, Harold Wilson had been so sure of a Labour victory that he ordered George Thomson, Labour's chief negotiator, and his private secretary, Crispin Tickell (who was later Anthony Barber's and then Geoffrey Rippon's private secretary). to prepare-at the height of the election campaign—-the draft of his opening speech at the EEC entry negotiations.
It was this draft that formed the bulk of Anthony Barber's presentation at Luxembourg. Eu ad mI th Cr: nC 10!
ad dc Irı nC (But for the decision of the ectors in june, _ 1970, ould have been Harold Wil. n who received the acco- 1 des of the European capitali class at the end of 1971!) By this time, with no oppotion from the leadershiphich, as we have shown, took • same position itself-and ith no opposition either from e 'lefts', the right-wing, ntry-at-any-price' faction was owing and becoming more in The Guardian' of May I1 e Labour Committee for Irope published a full-page Ivertisement: 'We, the undersigned parliaentarians, are convinced that e causes of social demoacy, world peace, and ecomic advance in both deveped and developing countries ould be strengthened by the Idition of the United King›m, Norway, Denmark and eland to the European Eco›mic Community' This was signed by some ominent European social mocrats-including Willy randt, Guy Mollet and Pietro enni. It was also signed by 10 Labour MPs, of whom ght were Shadow Cabinet embers and 23 more sat on e Opposition front bench. These developments led to owing concern among the irty's rank and file at the creasingly pro-Tory swing ithin the Parliamentary ibour Party. Yet the leadership made an attempt to prevent any discussion of the EEC at the Party's 1970 conference by trying to resurrect an old regulation that no issue could be discussed more than once within three years.
Then they avoided a real discussion by promising a special conference if the parliamentary vote on entry seemed likely to be held before the 1971 Party conference.
In fact such a special conference was held—on July 17, 1971—after a majority of only one on the NEC in favour of calling it.
But this conference was rendered impotent at its outset when it voted by 3,185,000 to 2,624,000 to accept an NEC recommendation that it should be purely consultative and take no decisions.
Hugh Scanlon of the AUEW called on the conference to take a firm decision and to make it binding on all MPs. However, Scanlon himself has not pressed for any action against AUEW MPs who voted with the Tories. These include Charles Pannel of West Leeds and Ben Ford of Bradford.
Neither has Scanlon's 'left twin', Jack Jones of the T&GWU, taken any action against Maurice Foley (West Bromwich), Robert Sheldon (Ashton-under-Lyne), or John Silkin (Deptford).
When the Labour Party conference convened at Brighton in October 1971---a few weeks
I Commons vote taken at the Labour Party's Dre before the vital EEC —a recommen‹ rence NEC opened t dation from the 1960 conference. he door for the «vited the Par- our Party... LEAKS TO staining was fear of being kicked out by their constituency parties or by their sponTeSS The pro-Market right wing was active in the unions as well ac in the Parliamentary March Above left: Robert Mellish, Chief Whip, In political