Miners since nationalization. Part one

'The strength and pressure of the miners to obtain a seven-hour day should be pressed forward with vigour?

THOUGH the quote above sounds like a demand raised during the recent miners' strike, it was in fact spoken by the late Mr A. Machen at the Barnsley Council of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in December 1959—just ten years ago!

And Mr Machen went on : 'Now we have plenty of coal, stacks of it, mountains of it, the seven-hour day is economically possible and absolutely necessary'.

But it is obvious now— and, indeed, it was obvious then-that a government acting on behalf of the employing class had not stockpiled coal in order to prove the miners' case, but to use it as a weapon against them.

Now, ten years later, miners are having to fight harder than ever before to improve wages and conditions which are an insult.

Dream

What happened to the golden dream of nationalization which-along with hopes of a Labour government— was seen by generations of older miners as their only salvation?

The mines were not nationalized in the interests of the miners, but in the interests of capitalism. For ten years after vesting day, coal was in great demand, urgently needed by big business to rebuild plant after the war.

And they got their coal cheap.

Not even in the House of Commons could an answer be found to one simple question -how much did private industry pay for its coal from the nationalized pits?

But if capitalism did well, the miners did not.

What happened? The leadership of the National Union of Mineworkers—-both Labour Party and Communist Partyencouraged the working of long hours, including the Saturday shift, and • cooperated fully with the management in productivity drives. oves to mechanize the pits, such as the introduction of automated power support units, have only led to widespread redundancies. towns, mainly brought about by certain economic concessions to the working class, it was made clear that the bad weather this year could not be blamed for all the difficulties and shortages existing.

hashing of ctill on Moanwhile hucinece Onal Roard Inver cuncidence Here tan there is increased official backing of the 1 NUM leadership.

Demands disappeared for months in *negotiating machinery. Only unofficial actions won substantial benefits.

INDU HALT MUTANI AURANT AIDIA!

ANI UMDITILUTMENI NUM INTI —NOT A MAN -NUI A MAN TO THE ROAD price-lists all over Yorkshire, negotiated while the strike was Throughout this time the Communist Party-then in a powerful position with Arthur Horner as general secretary, Will Paynter in the leadership in Wales, the Moffats Scotland, and big influence in the Midlands, Kent and Yorkshire-urged the miners to coBrezhner: Blames Khrushchev.

Brezhnev finally drew the conclusion: In order to STOP CLOSURES TO-DAY -SAVE JOBS TUMORROW VIT MUSICAS was well looked after. Massive compensation was paid out and the mining industry is still crippled every year by interest due on the money borrowed to pay it.

And where did the money go?

It went to firms like Cory Brothers, who received nearly £16 million in compensation for mines valued at £12.6 million.

This firm distributed £11 million to shareholders and invested the rest in high-profit industries (including oil refining).

Rich pickings

Cory Bros was one of the biggest coal merchants in the country, making a profit on every ton of coal they handled.

And where did the deputy chairman of Cory Bros serve his country? Where else but on the National Coal Board!

But rich pickings were to be had not only from interest payments and coal distribution, but also from the extensive mechanization of the mines.

One firm engaged in mining machinery was also linked with a pit.

After nationalization the firm's head remained as manager of the colliery, and later became an NCB planning engineer.

Another pit owner worked for the Coal Board for eight years after nationalization and then left to take up full-time assist these areas there is only one answer : irrigate the land'.

Luai subsidence, etc).

This, then, was the result of the union leadership's 'moderation' and 'co-operaCheap coal for big business when it needed it, big money in compensation and interest payments, good profits out of coal distribution and mechanization of the pits, plenty of jobs in the nationalized industry for the former owners.

Today, more than ever, the nationalized mines are at the mercy of large-scale industry and big business.

The largest single market for coal is the electricity generating stations, which last year took 74.5 million tons.

Nuclear-powered generating stations used the equivalent of nine million tons of coal.

While the Board is aiming for continuity of supply of coal from long-life and lowcost collieries, there are at present no long-term contracts for the coal consumed by the Central Electricity Generating Board and competition is growing from nuclear power.

The second important market is the coke ovens, which last year used 25 million tons of coal, mainly for use in crude steel production.

The NCB is working closely with the British Steel Corporation to identify lower cost coals to be introduced into coking blends.

Next comes the domestic market, which last year took 21.8 million tons of coal. Here, too, there is increased competition from alternative forms of heating.

Coal consumption at gas works last year totalled 9.2 million tons. This is a drop of 4.4 million tons from 19671968.

There is a trend to increased production of gas from oilbased plants and, of course, from the use of natural gas. North Sea and imported AVA LAA gas accounted for r 24 natural Robens: Calls minimum wage of £15 generous!

per cent of total gas availability last year compared with 13 per cent in 1967-1968.

Other important markets are overseas. Last year the Coal Board exported 3.4 million tons, mainly to European power stations.

There are also big deals with the giant monopolies.

Associated Portland Cement takes a million tons of coal a year.

Sales to Alcan (United Kingdom) Ltd are also expected to rise to a million tons in the near future.

In these circumstances, to talk of a 'National Fuel Policy' without a socialist policy of nationalization is complete nonsense.

The coal industry is at the mercy of huge monopolies which exist on super-profits.

Without nationalizing the oil monopolies, the private firms which are connected with the construction of the new power stations and the big businesses in steel and cement etc., there can be no security for the miners.

We consider it is reactionary to talk of 'defending' the coal industry by restricting oil, nuclear power and natural gas.

Under a socialist planned economy all these alternative means of power will be developed to the full.

What coal production is necessary will be fully automatic. Human beings will not throw away their lives and risk their health crawling like half-blind animals underground.

Cheated

But this cannot be done miners fighting alone.

It is a political programme for the expropriation of the entire capitalist class.

As such it requires the unity of all the working class behind a revolutionary organization.

It was because this was missing that the miners were cheated after nationalization.

For who now doubts that they were cheated? What has their reward been?

Hard slogging for ten years and then-when the demand slackened—pit closures, sackings, uprooted homes, wages being progressively more and more depressed in relation to the rising cost of living; all accompanied by a persistent drive for more productivity, more efficiency, more discipline.

Any resistance whip of pit closures came cracking over the miners' heads—over 600 pits have been closed since nationalization.

55 collieries were closed in the last financial year-more than in any previous year.

Miners will remember Wilson's flamboyant gesture in 1967 when he intervened to postpone the closure of four pits due to go then.

Every one of these were closed the following year-so much for that bit of showmanship.

The Coal Board's Report for 1968-1969 was analysed fully by David Maude in 'The Newsletter' September 16, 1969. Only a few of the main points need be stressed here.

The Board made an operating profit of £28.6 million which was turned into a deficit of £8.9 million by the payment of £37.5 million in interest charges-but the industry 'can't afford' an eight-hour day for surface men!

Productivity averaged 42.5 cwt per man shift—an increase of 3.5 cwt or 9 per cent over the previous year.

Costs per ton attributable to wages and related expenses went down by Is. 8d.—on a production of 160 million tons, this represents a saving of £I3 million.

Run-down

With this level of production 27,300 men lost their jobs. Yet the government's most recent White Paper on Fuel Policy, published in November 1967, calls for only 120 million tons by 1975.

This compares with Labour's clearly implied promise in the 1964 election year to maintain production at 200 million tons per year.

What is involved now is a rundown in manpower of 10 per cent a year—or something like 30,000 jobs less in the year ending March 1970.

At the same time productivity is to go on increasing.

The Board wants an output of 75 cwts per manshift by the mid-1970s.

This wiil be mainly achieved by an extension of major longwall mechanized faces operating treble shifts.

In the words of the Report:

'As production is progressively concentrated at collieries and on faces where mechanization ensures the highest output rates, a substantial part of the output will be at low cost.' But ask about the eight hour day and seven hours underground!

And Robens calls a minimum wage of £15 on the surface and £16 underground 'generous'!

The Board can boast 'Despite the heavy closure programme and the high rate of manpower rundown recent years, the Board have, by close co-operation with the unions in maintaining good industrial relations, avoided major industrial disputes.' In other words, the leadership of the National Union of Mineworkers has continued its policy of co-operating with the employers while their members go down the road.

Political

Could there be a more outspoken condemnation of any trade union leadership?

But this is not just a trade union leadership.

The miners have always been political from the days of the first Labour MPs, and from the time when the support of the South Wales miners contributed in a major way to the formation of the British Communist Party.

The mining areas are the most solid in their support of the Labour Party in elections, and the mining group of MPs is the largest single trade union section in the Parliamentary Labour Party.

Throughout the years since nationalization, the leadership of the National Union of Mineworkers, nationally and locally, has been largely shared between right-wing Labour men and Communist Party members.

The right wing has consistently supported every measure taken by the Labour government against the miners.

In every strike struggle, the miners came up against this type of leader.

(In other struggles, too, miners got to know the right wing. Glasshoughton miners lobbying parliament over unemployment were told by their MP that Labour pit closures were better than Tory pit closures, because they were planned!)

Continued in tomorrow's