IN THE YEAR OF THE RAT NIXON MEETS MAO

The hostility of American imperialism to the Chinese Revolution has been a major factor in world politics since its triumph in 1949. Yet President Nixon began his unprecedented visit to Peking as the honoured guest of Mao Tse-tung yesterday.

Ever since Nixon's laconic announcement of the visit in a TV broadcast on July 15 last year, it has been widely assumed that it will mark a major historical turning point not only tor diplomatic relations between the two countries, but for the whole world. Whether this is so will depend upon the outcome of the meeting which Nixon declared 'was to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides' The defeat of Chiang Kai-shek was a blow to US ambitions to dominate the Asiatic mainland and the whole Pacific area following the defeat and eclipse of Japan. It was equally unwelcome to the Soviet bureaucracy which saw in the nationalist regime a factor of stability in the Far East and had opposed a bid for power by the Chinese Communist Party.

The period after the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek saw American policy shifting to support for puppet regimes in Asia. The aim was to contain the revolutionary upsurge and prepare for a counter-revolutionary roll back.

The Korean war, in which the S Korean puppet regime was almost destroyed, showed the dangers inherent in this policy and revealed the new strength of China as a military power. The resistance to the French in Vietnam and subsequently their defeat at Dien Bien Phu and withdrawal forced the Americans to move into SE Asia.

Although unable to defeat China during the Korean war or even to destroy N Korea, the US did not renounce the aim of returning to the Chinese mainland. Military and economic aid on a massive scale was extended to Chiang Kai-shek, whose declared aim this was. China was ringed by American bases at which bombers stood at the ready 24 hours a day poised for atomic attack. The aim was to turn the Pacific into an American lake and to prevent the extension of the revolution anywhere in Asia.

FORMIDABLE The consolidation of the Chinese Revolution after 1949 and the failure to destroy N Korea obliged the US to build up the Japanese economy, which was later to become a formidable trade rival. A virtual embargo was put on trade with mainwily Géneral.

The Chinese attitude de Gaulle is a reflection of their basic diplomatic aims which even during the 'cultural revolution' were only overl aid by rhetoric.

What these aims are can be inferred from the Chinese position on concrete political questions, from their actions rather than from their propaganda. The main aim it is toe the theory of socialism in one country, is to ensure the territorial integrity of China. In this they include Taiwan, which is still in the hands of Chiang 1956:

It takes into account that the Chinese Revolutio cannot overunown by methods which same time weighs the The weaknesses threat the Soviet Union and the desire of the Chinese bureaucracy, after the storms of the 'cultural revolution', for a period of calm to deal with pressing internal problems.

Just how deep and dangerous been, impossible with any degree accuracy.

during so cultural t who Strong measures have been taken WCIC esponsibl for breaking revolution' China's liplomatic ties with the capitalist world. same time, the rumours concerning the fate of lin Piao point to the existence in the bureaucracy of a wing which wanted to negotiate settlement with the Soviet Union. that the group at the sun on no che re lai, supported ba Mad wish lis Canready deal capitalist world to enable China break OUL her dangerous isolation. after all, Stalinist existence Policy of 'peaceful co have never abandoned the which flows from the theory of 'socialism in one country' If anything comes of the Nixor visit to China, it can only be o the lines of a kind of Yalta agree ment applying to SE Asia and the Pacific zone. us sphere accepting of in fluence and the abandonment of any pretension to give revolution ary leadership in Asia It is not difficult to see what the Maoists First there is the restoration Formosa and the recognition n dinion tie ritesper tableite and admission to the United Nations last November makes this logical course for the Americans be the withdrawal of of US forces rom Vietnam and the conclusio of a clear that China's allies in Indo-China and in N Korea are apprehensive of a sell-out in both areas.

The Chinese leadership has made virtually no public comment on the prospects for the talks, very much about the forthcomine nor have the popular media said arrival Nixon. This may because, ATTAR TWO of anti-American propaganda it is NO SUN what th effect will be.

For Nixon with his reputation as a confirmed anti-communist, there is little to be lost from the visit and much to gain. In election year, it puts him squarely in the public eye with media coverage only paralleled by moo landings He will only conclude a deal which imperialism and any improvement relations or increase in trad which results from the visit will enable it to be proclaimed least a modest success. If it fails nothing much will have been lost;

The conveniently blamed onto intransigence of the Maoists and will not do Nixon's election prospects any harm.

While the Chinese bureaucracy and imperialism have certain common ground ir counterbalancing the influence of the Soviet Union, for Nixor a deal with the Soviet Union incomparably more important than a deal with Peking. He may see rening merely a stepping stone to Moscow. SUPER-POWER Chou En-lai insists that China is only concerned with Asia and has no ambitions to be a super. power'. On this basis he hopes to settle the outstanding problems which have poisoned Sino. American relations and establish moons overdre that zone while protecting China against the predation of Tapan and the Soviet Union oreign policy has Toreron never been a revolutionary, internationalist policy and a deal with American imperialism would representinese have always wanted change in principle the United Nations, ve have their Mantru place inste on t the Security Council Chin the Nixon visit proves "successful', if it results in some Peking and pact ashington, it will kind of or deal between kill any remaining illusions about Me ism, the official orthodoxy of ure revolutionary character the Chinese bureaucracy. leader LIn Plao (right) with Mao Tre-tung and Chou En-lal. His fate la stlll surrounded with rumours

February keeping with their situation'.

Palma indicated that in the specific case of Bolivian exiles: 'We must state that most of