APOLOGIA CLYDE

'THE RIGHT TO WORK-The Story of the Upper Clyde Confrontation', by Alasdair Buchan, Calder and Boyars. 65p paperback, £2.10 hard cover. 'The Right to Work' is 147 pages of plain journalese. It contains not one flash of insight or serious analysis of the battle over Upper Clyde Shipbuilders.

Its aim is to offend no-one. Archibald Gilchrist, the new Tory boss of the Clyde, has one on his desk, Harold Wilson could afford to write an introduction to it.

It will be welcomed at the Clydebank headquarters of the shop stewards' co-ordinating committee since much of the book is an uncritical description of the Stalinist yard leadership.

The tedium is only broken by the occasional cringing reference to the 'spirit' of the Clyde, example Mr Buchan's mawkish celebration of wage-labour with which he closes the work:

'In ten years time can a heavy-built ex-boilermaker be expected to look at the 396th perfect micro-circuit he has turned out . . . and still, teel the same emotions when he sees a ship hit the water when he smelt the rusty dust of the drag chains?

'Can he be expected to look at that micro-circuit and feel pride that it's "Clyde built"?

'As long as ships have to be built, it's vital to the Clydeside psyche that we build them. When they stop shipbuilding here, we will loose something within ourselves-— forever.' Now only the middle class— who do not have to get up at 6 a.m. on a cold winter morning and face the grind of a shipyard, mine or factorycan trill this way about capitalist production.

This is, however, a minor criticism. The most serious flaw of the book is its failure to analyse the 'work-in .

Buchan says the work-in was the brainchild of the Stalinist convenor of the Scotstoun yard, Sammy Barr, and one tłat the yard workers adopted. piece of 'theatre' and not real workers' control.

This is an extremely superficial appreciation of the UCS campaign. Buchan exposes himself when he comes to explain why the Stalinist-led stewards did not take any action that would precipitate a confrontation.

We are told, for example, that they did not take oven the UCS boardroom on a permanent basis because they wanted to avoid symbolic acts which gave the impression that the strength of feeling behind the 'work-in' was being generated deliberately.

A bizarre conclusion that uvEs LUL Anan nat sunlain why tha wuy LIC liquidator was allowed at all stages to carry on the normal winding-up of the company.

Buchan's only observation of the decision to allow the liquidator in the yards is: 'It was felt at this stage of the conflict it was a wiser policy to ignore rather than obstruct his work' ¿On just why it was wiser and on why the stewards delivered all the ships completed, the author says not a word.

The root of the confusion (if it is confusion) lies with a complete failure to appreciate the role of the Communist Party faction in the yard and its relationshipo with the government through the liquidator and the union leadership through men like Danny McGarvey of the boilermakers.

The work-in idea is, in retrospect, an ideal tatic for the men who want peaceful co-existence with capitalismthat includes Reid, Airlie and Barr.

It gave an appearance of militancy, but in fact was the ideal scheme i for avoiding trouble with the liquidator. It also provided a smokescreen for the endless negotiation with the various capitalists who wanted to buy a piece of UCS. More important it took the political heart out of the union leaders on the Clyde.

On the relationship between the stewards and the union officials, Buchan says:

'It is the nature of things for officials to compromise and shop-floor representatives to cry sell-out, it is in a sense what they were both elected to do.' In fact connection between the forces was more subtle and more deadly.

To characterize the Stalinist as antagonistic towards the bureaucracy is wrong-as wrong as describing them. to the left of the union leaders.

Rather, the Stalinists-and men like McGarvey at some point-unite behind the mutual aim of attempting to avoid a political show-down at all costs.

This happened on the Clyde after the stewards had pledged no co-operation with the exhead of Govan Shipbuilders, Hugh Stenhouse.

Previous to the Stenhouse interlude, the policy had been to negotiate only with a buyer who wanted all the divisions.

But after a government warning that a refusal to cooperate with Stenhouse's bid for Govan and Linthouse would lead to closure of all the yards, the stewards changed their policy.

This was a crucial stage of the UCS struggle-the retreat really cleared the way for all the subsequent concessions by the shop stewards.

But it goes un-noticed, or at least unrecorded, by Buchan. He describes the mass. meeting where the change of policy occurred as ohe of the most militant ever held in the yards.

But 'The Scotsman' reached a different conclusion. This paper reported:

'Mr James Reid had told the morning's mass meeting that while there should be no cooperation—on employment— with the new company, the "dialogue" with the government would continue. He said the men would be seeking wild, handsome Scottish face' "cumulative proposals covering the four labour forces yards and their ', but explained that this did not mean they were insisting on the retention of the UCS group in tact.?

It was this policy switch-as always introduced amidst a torrent of 'militant' demagogy —that provided the basis for recognition of Govan Ship-, builders.

One can only speculate on the causes of Buchan's omissions, but they cover-up for the role of men like Reid and Airlie.

• He dismisses the whole episode of betrayal in one breezy paragraph: 'The interest of Stenhouse marked the end of the political struggle. No matter what show the coordinating committee put on, the time for intransigenece was over.' He says the fight now became one based on 'industrial negotiations'.

In the final chapter Buchan asks if the work-in was. a success. The most basic test, he says, was whether or not it saves jobs.

At the time he wrote the book, 400 men had joined the work-in and about the same number had left. This, says Buchan, was an achievement.

I wonder what his verdict would be now. In February, 182 workers remained in the protest-1,418 had left.

I am sure better and more detailed books will be written on the Clyde-Buchan does not even • discuss the most important factor in the Clydeside crisis: the great slump in shipbuilding caused by the depressed level on commodity To describe the work as a serious attempt to evaluate the battle on the Clyde is to give it more credit than its worth. At most it is an apologia for Stalinist policy and the union leaders.

Press, Thursday