THE CASE HISTORY OF A STALINIST HUMBUG

There is nothing simulated about Monty Johnstone's frantic response to the Socialist Labour League's criticisms and denunciation of the sellout in UCS by Stalinists James Reid and James Airlie.

He has nothing but praise for these leaders of the shop stewards' co-ordinating committee who turned the most powerful post-war movement against Toryism into an operation to save private industry, prevent a genuine occupation of the shipyards and save the credibility of the Tories in Westminster.

No mean achievement-even by reformist standards. No wonder even some of the Tories are amazed.

If the rectorship of Glasgow University is all that bourgeoisie can find to reward their most faithful StalinistChristian servants for this tremendous service, it must rank as a singularly churlish act in the history of the British bourgeoisie.

But let us not forget Johnstone. He writes:

'When the Clyde workers under communist leadership refuted this pernicious pessimism by forcing substantial concessions, its main lead opened • story with the stirring words: "The government decision to invest £35m in the Upper Clyde is in no sense a victory for the working class." A case of sour grapes.' Why did the government decide to inject the £35m in UCS? To answer this is to pose another question—why did the Tories decide to shut down UCS and what were their motives?

The Tories, it is true, acted on the Ridley Plan and the report of the 'four wise men'. This report was drawn up in the period before Nixon's August 15, 1971, decision to deNicholas Ridley value the dollar and demonetize In the pre-August 15 period, British shipbuilding was in the doldrums mainly because the Japanese shipbuilders were able to compete very efficiently against Britain because of an under-valued yen, a highlydisciplined labour force and massive technological changes.

Even then the capitalist class was divided on the question of viability. As the Shipbuilding Industry Report—published in September 1971—stated:

"There were signs of improvement at the beginning of 1971... Old and troublesome contracts had been completed; the labour force had been brought into line with future requirements; settlements had been reached with the unions and the company's order book was such that new orders for early delivery could be taken on satisfactory terms.' The report forecast that 'with the end of loss making orders, more settled industrial relations and improved production, the company should make the long-awaited turn to profitability' One thing that the ruling class was unanimous about, however, was that UCS as it stood then was a dead duck. Reorganization was essential— and this meant a complete shake-up in labour productivity and discipline.

Press, Friday May ON