The Communist Congress at Moscow

[p026] THE COMMUNIST CONGRESS AT MOSCOW By ARTHUR DICKINSON For the first time in thirteen years, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held a national congress at the begin- ning of October. No one explained why there had been such a long lapse since the last gathering in 1939, and no one ventured to ask why. The ‘“‘discussion’’ was more in the nature of a parade of high officials and their uniform declarations than of an interchange of opinions. A portion of each speech and most of the interjected applause was reserved for hosannahs to Stalin, unfailingly received either with “tumultuous” or “tempestuous” enthusiasm, amidst which “all rise’. It was, to judge from reports in the Cominform press, a sickening Byzantine spectacle with little resemblance to a representative labour gathering. Nevertheless, this deformation of what was in Lenin’s day the policy-making body of revolutionary Russia had some significant revelations for socialists. Even through the haze of fixed statistics and obscure theorizing, an out- line of the present state of Soviet society managed to emerge. It is a picture of a flourishing and expanding economy in which planning on the basis of nationalised means of production overcomes the destruction of war as well as the backward heritage of the past, the resistance of the old world order, as well as the dead hand of the ruling bureau- cracy. It is also a picture of a society facing a great new crisis before it takes a -decisive leap into the socialist future. This is a crisis of growth in which the last vestiges of private property in agriculture must be overcome ; a crisis. of expansion in which the final struggle with world capital- ism must be faced. The “party”? of Stalin, the bureaucracy of the Soviet state—this congress showed—is attempting to resolve this crisis in characteristic fashion: by seeking some means of compromise between the classes both at home and abroad which will as far as possible maintain the status quo. 25

[p027] UNPRECEDENTED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS Even if we discount exaggerations, the figures presented by Malenkov, Beria and others show a prodigious advance for Soviet and Soviet-bloc economy. Despite the devasta- tion of World War II, it appears that industrial production in the USSR is more than double that of 1940. Poland, Czechoslovakia and the other East European countries have similarly surpassed their pre-war output. None of the capitalist countries, not even the United States, which did not suffer destruction during the war but built up its industrial plant as never before, can match that kind of a rise. Soviet production increased no less than twelve-fold in the period between 1929 (when planning was first under- taken) and 1951. In that same period, production in the U.S.A. grew only two-fold, in Britain only 1.6-fold. In the Eastern regions of the USSR, the industrial growth of the Soviet republics (Uzbek, Azerbaijan, etc.), towers above the bordering capitalist states (Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, etc.). The increase in health facilities and edu- cational opportunities is equally phenomenal. All in all, such economic expansion and social advance as the world has not seen before. This picture is all the more impressive if, besides the ravages of the Nazi invasion, we recall the great purges before the war, which tended to stifle initiative by their terror; the forced collectivisation of the peasantry which disrupted relations with the countryside for years: the enforced trans-settlement of those peoples like the Volga Germans during the war, which must have caused terrible dislocations. It demonstrates the immense power inherent in a nationalised economy and its vast superiority over capitalism, even under adverse conditions. 26

[p028] INCOME FIGURES CONCEAL CRISES ELEMENTS The recital of figures bearing on distribution of income, on the other hand, afford a glimpse into the crisis elements at work in the Soviet economy. We say a glimpse, because what the figures reveal is unintentional and was not, in spite of the big hullaballoo about self-criticism at the con- gress, meant to be disclosed. For they reflect on the privileged positions of a broad bureaucratic stratum, a subject which is taboo under Stalin. In the years between 1940 and 1951 Malenkov told the congress, ‘“‘real income (purchasing power)’’ of industrial workers and office employees together increased by about 57 per cent.; that of “working peasants’? by about 60 per cent. The contrast becomes somewhat more marked when Malenkov forecasts an increase of 35 per cent. in real ‘wages and salaries and of 40 per cent. in the real income of collective farmers for the next Five Year Plan. It is left unexplained why a greater increase in peasant income than in workers’ wages should be planned in a socialist state, particularly one preparing to ‘“‘go over to the higher stage of communism’’. Even more interesting is the figure for distribution of income given by another main speaker at the congress, Laurenti Beria: ‘Between 1940 and 1951 the combined income of wage and salaried workers and of peasants in- creased 78 per cent.’’ Like Malenkov, Beria stresses that he is speaking of real income. What intrigues the attentive reader of these reports is a comparison between this figure and those of Malenkov. Both arbitrarily club together different social categories in ‘their income figures. A statistical breakdown which would differentiate between the factory manager and the factory ‘worker, betwen the high state functionary and the ordinary -civil service employee, between the agricultural worker and the peasant proprietor is nowhere to be found. This would disclose what the statisticians are at pains to conceal. Thus, Beria clubs together “wage and salaried workers and 27

[p029] peasants”. Malenkov speaks of ‘‘industrial and office workers’’ on the one hand, and of “working peasants” on the other. If we assume that both speakers referred to the same social categories, the discrepancy in their income figures: would be inexplicable. According to Malenkov, the aver- age for the three categories would be 584 per cent. Accord- ing to Beria, it is 78 Obviously something is being covered up by these figures. Either there are salaried ‘‘workers’’ taken into account by Beria who make much higher salaries than Malenkov’s office workers; or there are peasants who have a much higher income than the ‘‘working’’ peasants; or both. If we bear in mind the wartime boasts about ‘“‘kolkhoz (peasant) millionaires’’ and—to take but one example—the disparity between, say, a foreman’s salary and a workers’ wage in 1940,* it is clear that both suppositions are valid. In other words, the figures intended to conceal, but actually revealed by implication the existence of a very considerable rake-off by a well-to-do section of peasant-proprietors as well as by a state, industrial and party-political bureaucracy. No protests were or could be made against this state of affairs at the congress. There is evidence elsewhere, however, of wide dissatisfaction and grave concern over the problems thereby raised for Soviet economy. At the congress itself there was no genuine discussion of policy. There was, instead, constant eulogistic reference to articles by Stalin, published under the title ‘‘Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR”’ in the party magazine Bolshevik on the eve of the congress. These articles appear to sum up a prolonged discussion on economic ques- tions in the guise of an interchange of opinion on a proposed new textbook on political economy. There is * Maurice Dodd, in “Soviet Economic Development Since 1917”, cites the figures as from 500-1,100 rubles per month for the -former, 200-300 for the latter. This is an income range for foremen up to five times more than that of workers. 28

[p030] no reference to the congress in these articles, although they are dated from April to September 1952. The “‘line’’ contained in them nevertheless dominated the so-called deliberations at the congress. STALIN ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE USSR Stalin polemicises against views of persons (Notkin, etc.), whose names have not been previously heard of, and of others who are not named at all. Nor are any of these differing views published. We thus have a discussion of party policy which took place not at the so-called party congress, but in private; a discussion in which only the views of Stalin but not of his opponents are disclosed. Moreover, Stalin really throws more obscurity than light on the subjects under discussion. Nonetheless, with all these handicaps, Stalin’s contribution must be taken as the key to the congress and to the policy flowing from it be- _ cause he arrives at certain conclusions which have been sanctified by the congress as party policy. The bulk of Stalin’s latest literary effort is devoted, as the title indicates, to the domestic scene. While couched in ambiguity, adopting the form of a highly theoretic dis- cussion, it appears to pursue two concrete objectives. One is to outline a course in Soviet economy which is facing a number of pitfalls as a result of the crisis of growth it is undergoing. The other is to find a new path in foreign policy in view of tne “‘cold war’’ stalemate and the approach- ing war danger. Stalin starts with a lecture to some “young comrades” about the objective character of the laws of science, parti- cularly the laws of political economy, which they pre- sumably want to change by government decree. They are, he says, “‘staggered by the colossal achievements of the Soviet government” and “imagine” that it can “do any- thing’. Stalin thus has a great time knocking down straw men. But what actually appears to worry the “young comrades” is the continued existence of commodity pro- duction with its tendencies toward capitalist restoration, with its money economy and its great disparity in incomes 29

[p031] thirty-five years after the October revolution—especially at a time when the leaders say that they are going over to “communism, the highest stage of socialism’’. Their attitude reflects the dissatisfaction of a growing working class regaining its spirit of self-confidence with the economic upsurge. They are questioning the words of leaders which are in such glaring contrast to the Soviet reality. They are questioning the whole wherefore of the bureaucracy and its privileges. Stalin’s real rejoinder to them is to point to the con- tinued existence of the “collective farm peasantry” as a class apart from the workers and with interests different from them. “The collective farms are unwilling to alienate their products except in the form of commodities, in exchange for which they desire to receive the commodities they need. . . . Because of this, commodity production and trade are as much of a necessity with us today as they were thirty years ago, say, when Lenin spoke of the necessity of de- veloping trade to the utmost.” In pointing to the problem in agriculture as a justifica- tion for bureaucracy, Stalin reveals that there has even been demands from the Right for the state to sell means of production, tractor stations and other machinery, to the collective farms, to increase their independence. In other words, there have been tendencies toward capitalist restoration about which the “young comrades’’ expressed fears. In his argumentation, he rejects this pressure from the Right as well as from the Left. Collective-farm pro- perty, and commodity production, he says, “* are being: successfully utilised by us for the promotion of the socialist economy.” On the other hand, he warns: “It would be unpardonable blindness not to see at the same time that these factors are already beginning to kamper the powerful development of our productive forces,. since they create obstacles to the full extension of govern- ment planning to the whole of the national economy. There is no doubt that these factors will hamper the continued 30

[p032] growth of the productive forces of our country more and more as time goes on. The task is therefore to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective-farm property into public property and by introducing—also gradually—products exchange in place of commodity pro- duction.” Stalin thus confirms the development of a crisis of growth in the Soviet economy. While he promises a “gradual’’ solution of it as a verbal concession to pressure from the Left, in the immediate period ahead he proposes to main- tain the status quo. True to the conservative character of the bureaucracy, he recoils from drastic steps in agriculture like the organi- sation of “‘collective farm towns’’, “‘collective farm cities’’, ‘‘Agro-Cities’’ proposed by agronomists at the end of the war, which gained popularity for a time. (See Malenkov’s. speech at the Congress.) The bureaucracy senses in further great advances toward a socialist economy which would bring the organisation of agriculture into accord with the rest of production, a danger to its own existence and resists them with the inertia of all ‘‘obsolescent social forces’, to borrow a phrase from Stalin. For the powerful Soviet working class, however, new advances in agriculture are not only bound up with a solu- tion to the crisis in the economy but with their own ad- vance to freedom from want and to liberation from the yoke of bureaucratic rule. A NEW “ THEORY ” ABOUT WARS The world press has made much of that section of Stalin’s article in which he predicts the greater likelihood of war between rival capitalist countries than their com- bined assault upon the USSR. Stalin reasons as follows: The second world war has brought about the disintegration of the “‘single, all-embrac- ing world market” and the creation of two parallel world markets, socialist as well as capitalist. The former, inclu- 31

[p033] ding the USSR, China and the ‘People’s Democracies”, is developing apace despite the attempted strangulation of the Marshall Plan, which even aided it indirectly. The capitalist market is consequently bound to shrink more and more. The countries of the “socialist world market’ will, in fact, soon “feel the necessity of finding an outside market for their surplus products.” Stalin thus implies that the non-capitalist countries will soon be able to bring economic pressure to bear on the capitalist world market, which will weaken it even more. This, in turn, he argues, makes invalid the view “some comrades hold, that owing to the development of new international conditions since the second world war, wars between capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable.” On the contrary, the hold of the U.S.A. on the capitalist world is overrated. So is the idea that the “foremost capitalist minds” have been “sufficiently taught” by the two world wars to avoid inter-capitalist wars. “High profits” are the decisive element motivating the capitalists. That is why Britain and France, Germany and Japan will be compelled to break out of the embrace of the United tates. There are grains of truth in this reasoning. But it leaves out of account several decisive and countervailing factors. First, in the chase for “high profits” U.S. capitalism holds an economic whip-hand over the other capitalist countries similar to that of the monopolist over a host of bankrupt small entrepreneurs. It can “foreclose the mortgage” on them at any time. Second, Wall Street is hardly likely to sit with arms folded and wait until new Five Year Plans put the USSR and its satellites in a position to underwrite the economies of one or more of the other major capitalist countries. It is bound to drive home its economic ad- vantage to conclude the organisation of the capitalist world for the assault on the non-capitalist nations in the briefest possible time. The election of Eisenhower is a sign of this. Stalin, however, hinges his “theory” on a presumed lesson from the past. Contradictions between “socialism” 32

[p034] and capitalism are stronger in theory than contradictions among the capitalist countries, he grants, but that was also true before the second world war. Still, Germany attacked Britain and France first. On the other hand, the U.S.A., Britain and France were compelled to join the coalition with the USSR against Germany. The inference is that something similar can happen again. In this connection, he appears to have been reminded by someone of another difference in the present situation. In contra-distinction to pre-war days, when the working class in Europe had undergone defeats and the colonies were comparatively quiescent, there is since the war an undefeated working class in Europe and a surging colonial revolution. Capitalist countries at that time therefore had greater freedom of action. There is the argument, says Stalin, that “‘since powerful popular forces have come forward today in defence of peace and against another war’’ imperialism can no longer generate war. At this point, Stalin enunciates the thesis’’ at which his whole “‘theory” is really aimed : “The object of the present-day peace movement is to rouse the masses of the people to fight for the preservation of peace and for the prevention of another world war. Consequently the aim of this movement is not to overthrow capitalism and to establish socialism—it confines itself to the democratic aim of preserving peace. In this respect, the present day peace movement differs from the move- ment of the time of the first world war, since the latter movement went farther and pursued socialist aims.” There are, to be sure, numerous sources of friction within the Atlantic Alliance which tend to become intensified as the arms programme unfolds. But these do not warrant Stalin’s conclusion that the antagonisms are strong enough to culminate in a war by any of the secondary capitalist countries against the United States. The great changes in the world situation brought about by the Second World War prevent a repetition of armed conflict between two contending groups of imperialisms and push to the fore- front instead their combined assault upon the Soviet Union, 33

[p035] the colonial liberation struggles and the revolutionary Labour movement in its various forms. The overwhelming predominance of the American colossus and the struggles for self-preservation by the weakened ruling classes in the subordinate capitalist countries prohibit the kind of military adventures previously undertaken by Germany, Italy, and Japan. Stalin himself cannot be unaware of this. What, then, motivates his assertion to the contrary in his article ? ‘There are two sets of reasons: one designed for internal consumption, the other for external purposes. On one side he wishes to allay the fears of another imperialist assault upon the USSR which is widespread among the Soviet population by exaggerating the divisions and diffi- culties among the enemy and pointing to the superior unity and power of the Soviet camp. On the other side he is calling the attention of the Communist parties in the nations of the Atlantic Alliance to the growing divergen- ces there so that their leaderships may exploit them to the advantage of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Finally, Stalin is thereby informing the heads of the lesser capitalist countries that the peace movements spon- sored by Moscow and its agents are not directed toward the overthrow of the capitalist regime, but rather to the establishment and support of capitalist governments which will pull away from Washington and effect a rapproach- ment with the Soviet Union. THE KREMLIN’S TWO-SIDED POLICY However the possibility of such inter-imperialist con- flicts was a minor theme of the congress. The main line revolved around the heightened danger of war against the Soviet Union and the “anti-national’ character of the bourgeoisies which are selling the independence of their peoples for dollars. This idea was set forth in Stalin’s closing speech, amplified by Malenkov, Molotov and others, and emphasised in the Cominform reports. How did the congress propose to combat this danger in the field of foreign policy? Since there was not much 34

[p036] talk of seeking an accord with the United States, there is evidently just as little expectation of arriving at agreement in Moscow as in Washington. The spokesmen at the congress set forth two variant dines for counteracting the Pentagon’s aggressions and mili- tary preparations. They underscored the need to probe and press the possibilities of disintegrating the Atlantic coalition by detaching certain of the most discontented members from it. In accord with this aim they addressed themselves to the representatives of capitalism in Western Europe along the following lines. If any of these govern- ments would quit the Atlantic Alliance, they could then count upon trading with the East, making big profits, and securing support from the Communist parties. If however, these governments persisted in aligning them- selves with the war-makers, they would not only forfeit any hope of social peace but run into grave economic difficulties. And, in the event of war they would risk the end of capitalism itself. Thus, with one hand the Soviet bureaucracy held out the offer of a deal to the capitalist rulers in Western Europe, while threatening them with the direst consequences if they refused. The Stalinist-inspired peace movements emanating from Stockholm, Warsaw and Vienna fit into the framework of the first alternative. They are being primarily promoted to mobilise pressure upon the capitalist regimes to come to terms with the Kremlin. As Stalin said, they do not pursue anti-capitalist or socialist aims. Malenkov was careful to stress that they constitute ‘tan anti-war coalition of different classes and social strata,”” which at most would help bring about a shift in government or official policy away from Washington and toward friendship with Moscow. _ But suppose these overtures are not accepted and the capitalist regimes of Western Europe persist in their present hostility toward the USSR ? This is by far the most likely state of affairs, since none of the secondary powers are in a position to turn around on its axis, defy American imperialism, and depart from the Atlantic Alliance. To 35

[p037] take this road under present world conditions would re- quire staunch socialist convictions and leadership backed by a bold, determined and powerful labour movement. In that event the congress threatened the rulers of West- ern Europe with mass oppositional movements organised by the Communist parties. The bourgeoisie would then be stigmatised as “‘anti-national’’ betrayers of the father- land and subjected to continuous harassment by Stalinist guerilla tactics manipulating the mass organisations under their influence. This dual character of the Kremlin’s approach to the capitalist classes of Western Europe helps account for the contradictions and vacillations observable in the con- duct of the Communist Parties in these countries. On one hand they strive to disconnect the bourgeoisie from the Atlantic Alliance and, when these efforts prove un- successful, they swing over to anti-capitalist attitudes and try to draw the masses into adventurist actions directed against these capitalist governments. MOSCOW’S MOVES AGAINST THE LEFT Despite its growing economic strength and the deep- ening crisis of world capitalism which. acts in its favour, the Soviet bureaucracy today finds itself in a precarious position. It seeks to balance itself between the contending class forces on the world arena and to steer a middle course between imperialism and the ascending revolution- ary movement. The aggressions of imperialism compel it in self-defence to countenance measures which involve a partial mobilisation of the working masses against the capitalists and encourage the struggles of the colonial peoples. At the same time the Kremlin takes precautions to insure that these anti-capitalist movements do not pass out of its control or go beyond the limits prescribed by its strategic necessities and diplomatic manoeuvres. The Kremlin fears the advancing forces of the world revolution on its left as much as it dreads all-out attack by imperialism and is obliged to safeguard itself on both fronts. It must contend with the forces of socialist revolution 36

[p038] first of all in its awn domain. Stalin’s reply to the critics of his economic policies indicates that the bureaucracy can no longer rely upon the M.V.D. alone to silence dissent. The arguments of the critics must be publicly met and answered. Malenkov gave still more direct evidence of the existence of oppositional voices in his statement that former oppositionists endure and his warning that frac- tional activities directed against the monolithism of the party must be hunted out and suppressed. These opposi- tionist elements are especially concentrated in the educa- tional departments of the party, that is to say, among its most informed and advanced circles. The bureaucracy is obviously disturbed by this re-emer- gence of unalloyed revolutionary tendencies within its very midst which refiect the discontent permeating the broad working masses. The Soviet bureaucracy is also encountering resistance to its rule from the workers in the satellites of Eastern Europe. This conflict is at the bottom of the arrests, trials and executions of entire segments of the Communist Party leaderships in these countries. Albania (Koxi Doje) ; Bulgaria (Kostov); Hungary (Rajk) ; Poland (Gomulka) ; Roumania (Ana Pauker). One month after the Moscow Conference, these purges were crowned by the Slansky- Clementis trials in Czechoslovakia. Apart from other con- siderations, these murderous measures were taken to tighten Moscow’s grip over these countries and to stamp out criticism of its policies, not only from the advocates of capitalist restoration and the agents of U.S. imperiaism, but also from the working masses who desire to move toward socialism free of the exactions and oppression of the Kremlin. The spectre of a recurrence of Titoism haunts the Kremlin. THE MARTY-TILLON AFFAIR There is finally, the Marty-Tillon affair which has con- vulsed the Communist Party of France for the past several months. Although neither have yet spoken for themselves in public, it is clear from the accusations against them that, since 1939 and certainly since 1944, these top leaders held 37

[p039] views on the key political problems facing the French work- ing Class considerably to the left of the official Stalinist line and closer to genuinely revolutionary Marxist posi- tions. Even if they did not actively oppose the Kremlin line, they committed the “crime” of disagreeing with it. According to their accusers, Marty and Tillon contended, for example, that the French working class should have taken power at the Liberation in 1944, instead of dis- arming the workers and supporting de Gaulle. They be- lieved that the French workers could get rid of capitalist rule through their own efforts without the aid of the Soviet army. They favoured united action between the Com- munist Party and the Socialist Party. Most unpardonable of sins, they considered the Trotskyists as a tendency in the workers’ movement and not, as the Moscow frame-up artists insist, as ‘‘paid agents, spies,”’ etc. A most instructive aspect of the campaign against Marty and Tillon is the unintended disclosure that the C.P. leadership deliberately held back the French workers from taking power in 1944-45 out of deference to Stalin’s pacts with Churchill and Roosevelt. The Political Bureau state- ment attacks Tillon for having said at a recent meeting that “it was ridiculous to accuse us of having wished to take power on May 28, 1952 (during the anti-Ridgway demon: strations) when we could have taken it in 1944 but did not do so in order to remain loyal to our pledges.” Although the Political Bureau denies that there were such “pledges” to refrain from revolutionary action, thé whole context of their statement affirms their existence. It advances two main arguments to refute Marty-Tillon’s alleged contention “that the working class should have taken power at the Liberation.” On national grounds they assert, it was advisable not to provide de Gaulle with a “pretext” to use the Anglo- American armies to crush the working class and ‘“‘to pre- vent him from establishing a Fascist dictatorship.” Ac- cording to this reasoning, the only thing for Maurice Thorez to do was to order the workers’ militias (F.T.P.) to turn in their arms to de Gaulle’s generals and for the Communists to enter de Gaulle’s government—as they did!’ 38

[p040] Realising, however, that this sort of argument by itself could hardly be swallowed by the party ranks, the Bureau puts forward another justification for its 1944 surrender, on international grounds : “A reversal of alliances, leading to a common front of the capitalist powers against the Soviet Union was a possi- bility. If a pretext had been given them, the Americans who came to France as eleventh-hour soldiers would not have hesitated, in their fear lest the Soviet army should advance too far in the West, to ally themselves with Hitler in Europe and Japan in Asia to range all the forces of international capitalism against the land of socialism.”’ In these admissions the Political Bureau actually confirms Tillon’s intimation that a working class seizure of power in France was sacrificed in 1944 for the sake of Soviet diplomacy. It is now a matter of record that the policy imposed by the Kremlin upon the French C.P. and its scorn for the independent power and pospects of a revo- lutionary movement had disastrous results in the postwar period. It helped French and European capitalism to its feet, made the Atlantic Alliance possible and thereby weak- ened the position of the “‘land of socialism’’ as against the forces of international capitalism in the ensuing cold war. The main lesson to be drawn today from the Marty- Tillon affair is that the Stalinist bureaucracy is capable of duplicating this derailing of the independent revolutionary struggles of the workers whenever this suits its special interests and strategy. The events above-mentioned all point to the existence of powerful submerged currents of working class protest swirl- ing within the depths of the Stalinist world. They indicate that its monolithism conceals deep differences and divi- sions. For socialists it is important to note that these manifestations of criticism emanate not from the right but from the left. They reflect the irrepressible demands of the revolutionary push of the masses toward socialism. This is not only aimed at the abolition of imperialism but operates in the last analysis to undermine the Moscow bureaucracy itself and to weaken its reactionary control over large sections of the international labour movement. 39

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