The Chinese C.P. and Hungary

[p028] The Chinese C.P. and Hungary Michael Banda (Some comments on the statement of the Chinese Communist Party entitled: “More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.”) WHEN Kruschev’s speech was made public in all its terrifying detail, it exploded on the leaderships of the international Stalinist movement with the stunning suddenness of a stick of gelignite thrown among a shoal of fish. The most stunned and embarrassed amongst them were the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. For almost thirty years they had regarded Stalin as their infallible guide, their impeccable teacher, their genius theoretician, their glorious leader. Stalin’s every utterance was treated by them as an historic de- claration, every act as an event of international signi- ficance, every book and pamphlet as a masterpiece of Marxist-Leninist literature and a permanent contribu- tion to dialectical materialism. Even at the time of the Twentieth Congress a Chinese edition of the “Short History of the C.P.S.U. (B)” (which Kruschev and Mikoyan criticized for its serious omissions and in- accuracies) was being printed in millions of copies for sale throughout China! It may be said in parentheses that the Chinese Communist leaders, notwithstanding their fulsome praise of Stalin, had to throw overboard in fact (though not in theory), all the absurd, non-revolutionary and anti-Marxist “theories” of Stalin before they could lead the Third Chinese Revolution to complete victory. If Stalin’s “theories” had persisted the Chinese CP would still be seeking a reconciliation with Chiang Kai Shek and the Kuo-Min-Tang in the form of a coalition gov- ernment. But the tide of history, more powerful than the subjective desires of Stalin, forced the CCP leaders to break with the Kuo-Min-Tang, cross the Yangtse and launch the struggle for power. In this way, without ever realizing the far-reaching implications of their historic victory, the Chinese Communist leaders helped to undermine the ideological and material basis of Stalinism. History, capricious and perverse as it may be, has never been on the side of idols and their worshippers. Through the medium of N. S. Kruschev it revealed Stalin to all the world as an uncultured bureaucrat, a shrewd charlatan and a ruthless and unscrupulous tyrant. The damning revelations of Kruschev succeeded in eliciting from the Chinese leaders a cautious and ambiguously worded statement. It said nothing new but attempted to rehabilitate Stalin in the eyes of the Chinese people. That was in April 1956. For nine months an inscrutable and seemingly portentous sil- ence followed. World labour waited in suspense for a supplementary explanation. But it waited in vain. While the Chinese leaders by their silence were trying to gloss over the crimes of Stalin, History, shamed and saddened by the evil consequences of its ST own villainy, was preparing to write a_ bloody and tragic epilogue to Kruschev’s speech. This was the glorious Hungarian Revolution. SOVIETS AND WORKERS’ COUNCILS The national uprising of the Hungarian people against police oppression and bureaucratic tyranny— personified by the Rakosi-Gero clique—passed like an electric shock through the world labour movement. By their self-sacrifice, heroism and amazing tenacity the Hungarian people demonstrated their implacable hatred of Stalinism and their determination to consign it—cult and all—to the limbo of a barbarous past. By instinctively setting up self-governing workers’ coun- cils and by socializing the industrial enterprises the Hungarian workers furnished a dynamic and irrefut- able proof of the socialist character of their revolution and of their inalienable right to govern Hungary for themselves. It is no wonder that even the CP of Jugoslavia which supported the second Russian intervention was forced to make a volte face and support the workers’ councils against the Kadar regime. In a speech made in the National Assembly, in December 1956, Foreign Minister Kardelj recalied the attitude of Lenin, who raised the slogan of “All Power to the Soviets” even though the Bolsheviks were a minority in them. Lenin recognized the Soviets not merely as a form of organi- zation but as the spontaneous expression of workers’ power, which, given a revolutionary leadership, could realize the dictatorship of the working class. Similarly, Kardelj stressed, the workers’ councils in Hungary were the “only real Socialist force” and they were quite capable of curing themselves of anti-socialist influ- ences once they took over complete responsibility for government. Kardelj considered a government based on workers’ councils as “the only socialist outlet from the internal crisis of Hungarian society”, and concluded that the Hungarian Revolution was “the first major in- stance of violent settlement with those obstacles to fur- ther socialist development which are the product of a bureaucratic system in transition from capitalism to socialism.” (Tanjug 11/12/56). With these words Kar- delj hit the Stalinist nail on its bureaucratic head with unerring accuracy. The speech of Marshal Tito at Pula and the speech of Kardelj in the Assembly was too much of a canary for the Chinese leaders to swallow in one gulp. Their reaction to Tito and Kardelj took the form of a long and turgid document pompously entitled “More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.” That this document contains crude methodological errors and distorts the truth beyond recognition is not difficult to prove. But before that is done a few words shoud be said on the probable motive for the publica- tion of the statement.

[p029] THE REASON WHY The Chinese Communist leaders rule over a vast area populated by hundreds of millions of culturally and technically backward peasants. The working class which is growing rapidly still remains small in relation to the peasantry. The productivity of industry and agriculture ranks China amongst the most under-deve- loped countries of the world. Yet in order to advance economically and to put an end to rural misery and backwardness China must industrialize. Industrialization, however, is conditioned by two important factors: a) the amount of surplus value which the regime can extract from the workers and peasantry—without jeopardizing its own social base—in order to provide the funds for investment; b) the amount of economic, technical and finan- cial help that the regime can get from outside. The Chinese leaders, pursuing the Utopian theory of Socialism in One Country, are attempting to ex- tract from the working people more than they can possibly give. The stubborn resistance of the peasan- try to all attempts at forcible collectivization and the dissatisfaction of the working class to the bureaucratic- ally-centralized management of state enterprises reflects itself in the periodic zig-zags of the regime in its eco- nomic policy and the frequent re-scaling of the five year plan. In its external relations the Peking regime faces a far more difficult problem than it does at home. In order to make up for the serious shortage of capital and the primitive technique at-home, China must avail herself of all the financial and economic resources of the West. But .access to the money-markets of London and New York is barred by the presence of the Seventh Fleet and the import of valuable machinery and raw materials remains blocked by the Battle Act. Conse- quently China looks to the Soviet bureaucracy for its industrial equipment. Nobody can blame the Chinese leaders for trading with Russia. It is entirely justifiable and progressive. But trading should be restricted to material things like commodities. When trading extends beyond its legiti- mate limits to include political principles then it ceases to be trading. The Chinese Communist leaders are guilty precisely of this crime. They have traded their right to criticise the Soviet leadership for roubles and tractors. And why do they do it? Because they believe, as the Soviet bureaucrats do, that given a period of “peaceful co-existence” they can build a self-sufficient Socialist economy in China through their own effort and with the help of the Kremlin. From this point of view the struggles of the international working class are of little importance and the Hungarian Revolution be- comes, in their eyes, an impediment to the construc- tion of Socialism in China, since it is aimed at the dominant partner of the Sino-Soviet Alliance. This seems the only logical answer to the question. It is of course not surprising or accidental that the British CP leaders and the Daily Worker should identify themselves publicly with the Chinese. Having aban- doned the Soviet Road to Socialism in Britain it is therefore natural, if not necessary, that they attack the 58 Soviet Road to Socialism in Hungary. A more flagrant example of their total political bankruptcy could not be found. WHAT IT SAYS The Chinese statement attempts to establish -—— or rather re-establish—five major propositions: 1) that Socialism has been successfully and defi- nitely established in the USSR; 2) that Stalin, despite the fact that he “displayed great nation chauvinism ... lacked a spirit of equality ... wronged many loyal communists... disrupted part of the Socialist legal system ...impaired the principle of democratic centralism and ... estranged himself from the masses to a_ serious extent...” nevertheless “... creatively applied Marxism-Leninism ... defended the legacy of Leninism against its enemies . . . expressed the will and wishes of the people . .. won the support of the Soviet people... proved himself to be an outstand- ing Marxist-Leninist fighter...and...played an important role in history”; 3) that Stalin’s “mistakes” do not invalidate the present political system in Russia and that this system is “in the main suited to the needs of its economic basis”; 4) that it is not necessary to “correct” the socialist system in order to correct these mistakes; 5) that Stalinism is not a system and that Tito “is going too far when he sets up so-called ‘Stalinist ele- ments’ as objects of attack”. That, furthermore, the Kadar regime is “entirely right” to dissolve the Buda- pest and other regional workers’ councils and build up the “Socialist Workers’ Party”. That, finally, the Soviet intervention was a “righteous action’’. As a qualified but deliberate defence of Stalin and the Soviet bureaucracy this statement is unequalled. It is, therefore, necessary to deal with the five propositions separately and in some detail. WHAT IS SOCIALISM ? The historic significance of the Russian Revolu- tion of October 1917 lies in the fact that it snapped the world capitalist chain at its weakest link and gave a mighty impetus to the world revolution. But one link does not make a chain and the beleaguered Soviet state could not possibly, as Lenin explained time and again, build a complete socialist society on the basis of indus- trial backwardness and a low level of culture, so long as it remained isolated from the resources of world eco- nomy. Incidentally, Lenin did not mean by this that Russian workers should renounce the power until the Western European workers had taken power and begun to build Socialism, as the Mensheviks maintained in 1917 (and still do today). Lenin insisted that the Soviet state’s strategy should be to integrate its industrializa- tion programme and the collectivization of peasant farms with the struggles of the international working class and with the needs of its own workers and pea- sants. Stalin, it must be said, never understood and never applied such a strategy. Socialism cannot be equated with the state owner- ship of the means of production or even with a planned economy. It is much more than this. Socialism pre- supposes an extremely high level of development in the

[p030] productivity of human labour — so high that labour ceases to be an obligation, and the necessity for the organs of compulsion (the army, police, judiciary—and even the State Control Commission) gradually dis- appear. The situation in the USSR presents a very differ- ent picture from this. There, productivity remains be- low that of the advanced capitalist states and labour is not only obligatory but, as in the forced labour camps and settlements, compulsory. In the USSR, methods of payment have a capitalist form. State power, as an in- strument of compulsion (the NKVD and MGB) far from withering away, has been greatly intensified. Socialism—the prelude to Communism—signifies the progressive abolition of inequalities in the distribu- tion of the comforts of life. The essential premise for such a development is an economy of abundance. Socialist society is very different from a regime which has failed to raise the living standards of the Russian workers to the level of the American or even the British people, and, certainly, it can never be reconciled with the existence of huge and growing disparities between the incomes of the workers, on the one side, and a swollen, parasitic bureaucracy on the other. State ownership and centralized planning, particu- larly in a once backward country like Russia, can give a tremendous stimulus to the growth of production and productivity but, by and of themselves, they cannot make the property relations in the USSR socialist. To speak of “Socialism” in the USSR today is to confuse a theoretical norm with an ugly and imperfect reality. Only the triumph of the Socialist revolution in the West, by strengthening the productive base of the USSR immensely, can—and will—harmonize the ab- stract norm with concrete reality. Until then the USSR will continue to be what it is now: a transitional society midway between capitalism and socialism. . STALIN: LEADER OF THE SOVIET DRONES The attempt of Mao and his colleagues to rehabili- tate Stalin is naive and somewhat ridiculous. How is it possible for a man to “estrange himself to a serious extent from the masses” and yet express the will and wishes of the people? This proposition becomes credible only on the assumption that Stalin was a modern Mephistopheles or that the Russian people were a lot of indulgent fools. In either case it is nonsense. Stalin was none of the things which the Chinese are assuming him to have been. If he was the chosen defender of Lenin’s legacy, why did Lenin in his “Testament” propose that Stalin be removed from his post of general Secretary? Lenin, before his death, viewed with alarm the rapid growth of bureaucracy not only in the state administration but also—and more serious—within the party apparatus. Lenin hated bureaucracy and fought every manifesta- tion of it with all the energy and passion left in his stricken body. There was however not a trace of sub- jectivity in his hatred. He hated it because he realized that, just as a tree is very often killed by a parasite rooted on a minor branch, so too bureaucracy could strangle Bolshevism and the dictatorship of the prole- tariat (i.e., workers’ democracy exercised through the Soviets). The first condition for making bureaucracy the servant of the Soviets and not their master was the purging and cleansing of the state apparatus, and— above all—the Party, of bureaucratic cynicism and functionary arrogance. It was precisely in this sphere that Lenin—first gradually and then violently—came into conflict with Stalin, the leader and defender of this usurping social caste. It was for this reason, and no other, that Lenin was forced to break off all comradely relations with Stalin. There is no doubt that if he had lived, Lenin too could have suffered the fate of all the other “Old Bolsheviks”. Stalin’s claim to be an outstanding Marxist-Leninist is as Outrageous as are his pretensions to linguistic and military competence. He never defended the real Lenin. While embalming his body, Stalin revised Lenin’s teachings and distorted his views to suit the administrative requirements of the bureaucratic caste and to justify its reactionary role and privileges. He rewrote the history of the Party and the Revolution. He shot, purged and exiled Lenin’s closest collaborators, those who with Lenin had led the Revolution. He dis- placed proletarian democracy for a plebiscitary regime a la Hitler. He dissolved by administrative decree whole Republics and deported their inhabitants to Siberia, thus making a cruel mockery of Lenin’s policy toward the oppressed nationalities. He violated Lenin’s policy towards the peasants by forcibly collectivizing them, and thereby seriously retarded the progress of agricul- ture in general and animal husbandry in particular. By terror, intimidation, administrative pressure and the staging of frame-up trials he transformed the Bolshevik Party (Lenin’s greatest constructive achievement) from a fighting organization of the working class into a party of bureaucrats and functionaries. Byzantine flattery of the “Great Leader” and bureaucratic conformism re- placed democratic centralism as the organizational principle of the Bolshevik Party. He decapitated the Red Army on the eve of World War II by executing nearly all its most brilliant and talented commanders and officers. Lastly, the revolutionary internationalism of Lenin embodied in the programme and policy of the Third International was abandoned in favour of a national-reformist policy of “Socialism-in-one-Country” and nowhere else. The Comintern which Lenin had seen as the general staff of the world revolution, was purged of all opposition and its programme emasculated. What was once the scourge of international capital and the greatest hope of the workers of the world, became un- der Stalin’s leadership, one of the main props of Euro- pean Capital and a glorified border guard for the Soviet bureaucracy. Having betrayed and deserted every major revolution in Asia and Europe, Stalin finally sold the Comintern over the bargain counter for a military- diplomatic alliance with Anglo-American Imperialism. The murder of the Comintern was also the epitome of bureaucratic cynicism! This is by no means a complete catalogue of Stalin’s crimes, but it is sufficient to show how Stalin “defended” Lenin “from his enemies”. WHAT CONSTITUTES A “MISTAKE” ? Stalin, we are informed by Peking, did not commit any grave crimes (and even if he did they were not deliberate) ; he only made a few massive “mistakes”. His

[p031] “mistakes”, so we are informed, were purely individual characteristics. Stalin in other words is above sociology, and any attempt to lay a sociological construction on his “mistakes” is not only wrong but also “revisionist”. In their time, Cain, Caligula, Cesare Borgia, Genghis Khan, Torquemada, and Tsar Nicholas also made “mistakes”. So did Cromwell, Lilburne, Robes- pierre, John Brown, Marx and Lenin. The “mistakes” of Torquemada and Tsar Nicholas consisted in the fact that they tried to cheat history. They tried, like King Canute, to thwart historical development. The “mis- takes” of Robespierre and Lilburne, however, have a different source. They tried to push historical develop- ment beyond its objectively determined limits. The mistakes of the former were in fact crimes against humanity while the mistakes of the latter were genuine errors of judgment. There is a similar qualitative differ- ence between the “mistakes” of Lenin and the “mis- takes” of Stalin. Lenin, for instance, erred in his prog- nosis of the Russian Revolution when, in 1905, as was later acknowledged, he counterposed the slogan of the “Democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry” to Trotsky’s slogan of the “Dictatorship of the proletariat leaning upon the peasantry”. The events of 1917 confirmed Trotsky as against Lenin, but this difference of opinion did not wreck the revolution be- cause both Lenin and Trotsky had a fundamental agree- ment on the stages, international prospects, and class motive forces of the Revolution. Like any conscientious scientist, Lenin was not afraid to submit his theories to the most exacting, empirical tests in the laboratory of revolution, and, whenever they were proved wrong or inadequate, he did not hesitate to amend or reject them. That is why he was prepared in April 1917 to throw out the slogans of 1905, in order to prepare the party for the conquest of power. For Lenin the end always determined the means. The “mistakes” of Stalin are of an entirely differ- ent character. He personified, not the revolutionary working class, but a smug self-satisfied caste whose interests were alien to Socialism. He came to power, not because of any intrinsic qualities of leadership, but because the cultural backwardness, the physical ex- haustion, and the decimation of the Russian workers together with the apathy induced among them as a re- sult of the successive defeats (such as those in Ger- many, China, Bulgaria and Hungary) suffered by the world revolution after the first World War, favoured the growth of bureaucracy. Lenin came to power on the crest of a revolutionary wave, Stalin came to power when the revolution’s tide was ebbing. The dialectics of degeneration quickly turned the bureaucracy and Stalin from an effect of defeat and demoralization into its op- posite—the cause of further defeat and demoralization. The bureaucracy usurped the political power of the working class by driving workers’ representatives from the Soviets, from the Trade Unions, from the youth organizations and from the Party. In order to consoli- date his power and perpetuate the bureaucratic system, Stalin was forced to wage a bloody and unrelenting civil war not only against the remnants of the capitalist and landlord classes but also, and mainly, against the working class and peasantry. Elementary Marxism teaches that his “mistakes” which were the logical re- sult of his reactionary policies, would never have been permitted if they had not suited the interests of the bureaucracy. It is only now that the bureaucracy, faced with the wrath of a resurgent working class, attempts to lay sole responsibility for its crimes and excesses at the feet of Stalin. THE “PROGRESSIVE” CHARACTER OF STALINISM The Chinese leaders, in order to bestow a pro- gressive, historical mission to Stalin’s regime, point to the fact that the regime defended the property rela- tions established by the revolution and developed the productive forces of the USSR. The rapid growth of Soviet industry and technology certainly shows the superiority of centralized planning and nationalization over capitalist anarchy and crises. The bureaucracy defends nationalized property relations and develops the forces of production and defends its state from ex- ternal attack, with its own methods of course, only be- cause in this way under the prevailing conditions (thanks to its control of state power) it is guaranteed a disproportionate share of the national income. “The bureaucracy,” as Trotsky remarked, “...is concerned not so much with its function as with the tribute that- this function brings in.” Contrary to the Chinese statement, the character and policies of the bureaucracy remain reactionary, as Hungary testifies, and can never be reconciled with a regime of socialist democracy. The political system instituted by the bureaucracy did not, at its inception, and does not now correspond with the development of Soviet economy. On the contrary, it is in flagrant con- tradiction to it. “Socialism,” said Trotsky, “is impos- sible without the independent activity of the masses and the flourishing of the human personality. Stalin tram- ples on both. An open revolutionary conflict between the people and the new despotism is inevitable. Stalin’s regime is doomed.” These words were uttered twenty years before Hungary, in the middle of the Moscow Trials, at the height of Stalin’s power. Despite the lapse of time, or rather, because of it, they have not lost their validity. Indeed, Stalin’s regime is doomed! What is also true is that all the world is coming to see that. Only a regime of workers’ democracy can put an end to bureaucratic rule, bring the bourgeois methods of dis- tribution into line with the new property relations, and so ensure a dynamic expansion of Soviet economy. BASE AND SUPERSTRUCTURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY In a transitional society such as Russia, state ownership and control of the means of production provides unlimited scope for the conscious regulation and development of productive forces. In this society, the policy of the state-party leadership is of paramount importance. If the state leadership does not respond to changes in the base of society (by making correspond- ing adjustments in the political superstructure) and, conversely, if it does not take necessary measures for preserving the worker-peasant alliance (by maintaining properly proportioned development of the economy), in short, if it does not show sufficient sensitivity in per- ceiving problems, as they arise, flexibility in tackling them, imagination and foresight in planning and firm-

[p032] ness in executing its plans, then explosions are inevitable. The Hungarian revolution is a reminder to those who deny that there is a contradiction between the base of Soviet society and its bureaucratic apex. This contradiction has become an antagonism and is very real and tense. The resolution of this contradiction demands basically a political overturn, the restoration of democracy to the Soviets and trade unions, a purg- ing of the state apparatus, the abolition of all privi- leges and resolute measures to “limit inequality in the payment of labour to the life necessities of the economy and the state apparatus” (Trotsky). Such a revolution, it must be stressed, will leave the property relations in- tact but will make a clean sweep of the Stalinist political system. STALINISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION Presumption and conceit are not lacking in the Chinese statement. The fact that they have not yet ren- dered to their own membership an account for their failure to support Tito against Stalin does not prevent the Chinese Stalinists from criticizing Tito and Kardelj in an unjustified manner. While calling upon all communists to treat ex- perience critically and test it independently they con- tinue, in the same breath, to give uncritical support and wholehearted approval to the Kadar regime and the Soviet intervention! Disregarding the sort of evidence provided by the Indian government, and conveniently ignoring the precedent of Poznan, they unashamedly declare that the Hungarian uprising was a “counter- revolution”. Yet in this thirty-page document they have not been able to adduce one single fact to justify this lie. Assertion takes the place of evidence. Marxism is a science, and science relies upon ac- curate data. Facts are the only verification of a scientific analysis of political events and social phenomena. All the assembled facts prove, conclusively, that social progress and historical justice are on the side of the Hungarian people and that the discredited Kadar re- gime has neither prestige, public support or any other validity. It has neither a past nor a future. Take away the Russian tanks and bayonets, remove the secret police, and the Kadar regime would collapse like the walls of Jericho. It is interesting to recall that Stalin too made simi- lar baseless allegations against the Georgian Commun- ists and it would not be out of place to quote Kruschev’s testimony given at the secret session of the Twentieth Congress: “On the basis of falsified documents, it was proved that there existed in Georgia a supposedly nationalist organization whose objective was the liqui- dation of the Soviet power in that republic with the help of imperialist powers...The question arises: Could it be possible that . . . nationalist tendencies grew so much that there was a danger of Georgia leaving the Soviet Union and joining Turkey? “This is of course nonsense. Everyone knows how Georgia has developed economically and culturally under Soviet rule.../t is clear that as the economy and culture develop, and as the socialist consciousness of the working masses grows, the source from which bourgeois nationalism draws its strength evaporates. 61 (My emphasis.—M.B.). As has since transpired there was no nationalist organization in Georgia. Thousands of innocent people fell victim to wilfulness and lawless- ness.” LENINISM AND CHAUVINISM The Chinese leaders devote most of their statement to a vague and abstract analysis of the national question in order to defend Russian intervention in Hungary. All this of course is done in the name of Leninist orthodoxy. But Lenin’s attitude on the national question and the right of nations to self-determination is fundamentally different and irreconcilably opposed to the national chauvinism of the Soviet bureaucracy, whose attitude to the national question in Eastern Europe (and also within Russia itself) could be paraphrased from Orwell: “All nations are equal: but some nations are more 994 equal than others”! Bureaucratic rule and national oppression are in- separable in the USSR. Lenin, more than anyone else, was fully aware of these twin dangers to the Soviet state. In letters written in December 1922, before the Thirteenth Party Congress, Lenin severely castigated Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Ordzonikidze for their Great- Russian nationalism and made the following prophetic warning: “It would be unforgivable opportunism if we, on the eve of this emergence of the East, and in the dawn of its awakening, would undermine in its eyes our authority even through the smallest tactlessness towards and injustice against our own members of other races. The necessity of solidarity against the im- perialism of the West, which is defending the capitalist world, is a different matter. Here there is no doubt and I need not say that I praise these measures without any qualification. It is another thing, however, when we see that we ourselves generate an imperialistic out- look on relations with the oppressed nationalities, even if it concerns only insignificant points; this undermines completely our whole principled sincerity and our whole principled defence of the fight against imperialism. (My italics —M.B.). And the day of tomorrow in the history of the world will be precisely that day when the people oppressed by imperialism will awaken and when the decisive long and hard fight for their liberation will begin.” (Lenin, Concerning the National Question or “‘Autonomisation’’, 31/12/22). Alas! the warning has turned into a prediction. What Lenin feared and fought to prevent has become reality. On the very week that the oppressed masses of the Middle East began their “long and hard fight for liberation” from imperialism—in that very same week the banner of Socialism was sullied by the massive, brutal intervention in Hungary. Between the policy of Lenin and the policy of Kruschev there lie today more than 20,000 Hungarian corpses. They are, and will re- main forever, a mute and damning indictment of bureaucratic oppression. China, in her hundred-year struggle against foreign domination, has made a historic contribution to the struggles of oppressed nations for the right of self- determination. It is, therefore, all the more reprehen- sible, to see the Chinese Communist leaders dissipating the painfully acquired*prestige and moral authority of the New Chinese State by refusing to support the pro-

[p033] gressive and legitimate struggles of the Hungarian people for an independent Socialist Hungary. By attacking Tito, by supporting the Kadar regime and by equating Stalinism with Communism the Chin- ese Communist leaders have proved that they cannot teach the European working class movement anything. Uhis statement constitutes a remarkable monument to the theoretical backwardness and political illiteracy of Chinese Stalinism. Fabian Essays