The Communist Party and Democratic Centralism

[p017] The Communist Party and Democratic Centralism John Daniels ONE DIRECT result of the current crisis within the Communist Party is that many members are beginning to question the manner in which the system of demo- cratic centralism has been applied during the period of ascendant Stalinism. Some—a great many we fear—even question the validity of democratic centralism as a basis for party organization. Democratic centralism, they maintain, contains within itself the germ of its own degeneration. As such, it not only fostered the growth of Stalinism but made its advent inevitable. The mood of criticism and uneasiness reached such dimensions that the Communist Party leadership was forced to take notice. A Commission on Inner Party Democracy was set up by the Executive Committee. The Committee has now issued its Report which will come up for discussion at the Easter Conference of the C.P. A significant minority on the Commission has issued a Minority Report which differs in some funda- mental matters from the majority. Of significance is the fact that for the first time in many years something like a genuine discussion, with real differences of opinion, is developing within the Communist Party. The leadership will undoubtedly try to limit this development but the dykes have been opened and there will be no holding back the flood waters. The very composition of the Commission, which was overweighted with full-time party officials 46 with a vested interest in defending the privileges of the ruling bureaucracy, is evidence of this stultifying effort on the part of the Executive Committee. It says much for the honesty of purpose and tenacity of the minority that they did not allow themselves to be overcome by this wealth of bureaucrats but persisted in their con- structive criticisms. Before subjecting both the majority and minority reports to detailed analysis, it is necessary to say some- thing about democratic centralism itself, to define what it is and to trace its historic origins. THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY Democratic centralism was the organizational prin- ciple advocated by Lenin and applied in building the Bolshevik Party. The Bolshevik Party was a revolution- ary Marxist party, based on a definite programme, whose aim was the organization of the working class in the struggle for power and the transformation of the existing social order. All the activities of the party, its methods and its internal regime were subordinated to this aim and designed to serve it. It needed a self-active and critical-minded mem- bership to forge and consolidate such a party and to solve its problems by collective thought, discussion and experience. From this followed the need of assuring the widest party democracy in the ranks of the organization.

[p018] But to accomplish its historic task, the party needed not only democracy but the firmest discipline in carry- ing out decisions once they were made. This was es- pecially true in the conditions prevailing under Czarism, when the party was illegal. Under those conditions, cen- tralized leadership and direction were indispensable prerequisites for any sustained and disciplined action. To sum up, therefore, the Leninist conception of democratic centralism meant that party policy was ar- rived at after full and free discussion and it was put into operation under the direction of a centralized and responsible leadership, democratically elected. It was the right and duty of every party member to participate in arriving at a decision and it was equally their privilege and duty to carry out the direction of their chosen leadership in executing that policy. The acceptance of the organizational principle of democratic centralism became one of the 21 conditions for affiliation to the Third Communist International. But formal acceptance of the principle is not, in itself, a guarantee against degeneration. Under Lenin democracy within the Communist Party was effective and real. Although Lenin was the undisputed leader of the Party, other prominent Bolsheviks did not hesitate to disagree with him violently from time to time. On the issue of the attitude of the Bolsheviks toward the Feb- ruary Revolution, there were profound differences be- tween Lenin on the one side and Stalin and Kamenev on the other. It took patient persuasion on Lenin’s part to win over a majority to his position at the fam- ous April Conference of the Party. Similarly, there were wide divergences within the Bolshevik ranks on such issues as Brest-Litovsk, the Polish campaign and later, the New Economic Policy. These differences within the Bolshevik Party fre- quently led to the formation of “platforms” or fac- tions, ‘who fought bitterly for their positions. These factions were not static—that would have constituted a party within a party—but changed their personnel from issue to issue. Only at the Tenth Congress of the Party was a decision taken, on Lenin’s initiative, to prohibit organized factions in the party. This decision was taken for definite historical reasons and there is an abundance of evidence that it was intended only as a temporary measure to tide the party and the Soviet régime over a desperate crisis, a crisis which threatened the very existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. What was the position confronting the party at the 10th Congress? The party had just passed through an acrimonious and exhausting discussion of the trade union question. The country was smouldering with dis- content. In Kronstadt the sailors had risen in open re- volt on the very eve of the Congress and there were also outbreaks in Tambov and other places. The growth of bureaucracy in revolutionary Russia had, as its inevitable counterpart, the develop- ment of factions within the party. At the 10th Congress, several “platforms” were represented. There was the “Workers’ Opposition”, led by Shlyapnikov and Kol- lontai and the “Democratic Centralists” under Assin- sky, Maximovsky, Sapronov and other old Party mili- tants. There was the platform of Bukharin, Larin, Sokol- nikov and Yakoleva, and a fourth consisting of Trotsky, Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Rakovsky and others. Then 47 there was a faction supported by Lenin, Zinoviev, Tomsky, Rudzutak, Kalinin, Lozomovsky, Petrovsky and Stalin. These factions or platforms were in the best traditions of Bolshevism, whose history is replete with the appearance of groups standing on specific platforms within the broad framework of the fundamental party platform. Although the Congress approved Lenin’s resolu- tion to ban factional platforms, it never intended this to mean a banning of discussion. Far from it! Point 4 of Lenin’s resolution read:- “It is necessary that every party organization take vigor- ous care that the absolutely necessary criticism of the short- comings of the party, all analysis of the general party direction, all appraisa's of its practical experience, every examination of the execution of the party decisions and of the means of correcting mistakes, etc., shall not be discussed in separate groups standing upon any ‘platform’, but rather in the meetings of all the party members. Toward this end, the Congress decides to publish a periodical DISCUSSION BULLETIN and special periodicas. Everyone who comes forward with a criticism must take into consideration the position of the party in the midst of its encircling enemies, and he must also strive in his direct activity in Soviet and party organs, to correct practically the mistakes of the party.” Lenin soon made it quite clear that this was in- tended as an extraordinary and temporary measure, a departure from the norm. When Riazanov, the famous Marxist historian who later fell victim to one of Stalin’s purges, proposed an amendment to the effect that “The Congress condemns factionalism with the utmost en- ergy and pronounces itself at the same time, with the same energy, against elections to the Congress on the basis of platforms,” Lenin vigorously opposed it. “TY think that the desire of Comrade Riazanov is unfortunately not realizable. If fundamental disagree- ments exist on the question, we cannot deprive members of the Central Committee of the right to address them- selves to the party. I cannot imagine how we can do this. The present Congress can in no way and in no form engage the elections to the next Congress. And if, for example, questions like the Brest-Litovsk peace arise? Can we guarantee that it will not arise? It can- not be guaranteed. It’s possible that it will then be necessary to elect by platform. That is quite clear.” (Minutes of the 10th Congress of the C.P.S.U., p. 292). About the same period, Lenin wrote: “But if deep, fundamental disagreements of principle ex- ist, we may be told: “Do they not justify the sharpest fac- tional action?’ Naturally they justify it, if the disagreements are really very deep, and if the rectification of the wrong policy of the party or of the working class cannot be otherwise obtained.” (Collected Works, Vol. XVIII, Pt. I, p.47, Russian Edition). Despite these unmistakable indications of Lenin’s real attitude, the bureaucracy seized on the decisions of the 10th Congress to fasten its grip still more firmly on the party, the Communist International and the Soviet State. From Russia, the bureaucratic fester spread and infected all the other Communist Parties. There is a direct line from the decisions of the 10th Congress of the C.P.S.U. to the present discussions within the C.P.G.B. With the hindsight vouchsafed us by history, we can smugly assert today that, even given the cir- cumstances which compelled Lenin to introduce the ban on factions, this was one of the few major organi- zational blunders of his career. Even before he died he

[p019] foresaw the tragedy which lay ahead for the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Union and himself formed a fac- tion, with Leon Trotsky, to combat Stalin and the growing bureaucratization of the party and the state. Lenin’s views on democratic centralism were flexi- ble. Under certain conditions it may be necessary to curb public discussion and concentrate emergency powers in the hands of the leadership. But on the whole his emphasis was on the need for democracy, the necessity for democracy, if the party was to function effectively. Never once during Lenin’s lifetime was a major policy decision taken without first summoning a Congress of the party. Even at the height of the civil war, both the C.P.S.U. and the Communist International met regularly in annual Congress. Compare this with the record under Stalin! As far back as February 1905, Lenin wrote: “Really, I often think that nine-tenths of the Bolsheviks are really formalists....One must recruit among the youth more magnanimously...and still more boldly, without fearing them. Forget all the old cumbersome ways, the respect for titles, etc....Give every subordi- nate committee the right, without many conditions, to write leaflets and distribute them (it is no great mis- fortune if they make mistakes; we will correct them ‘gently’ in VPEROD)...The events themselves will teach in our spirit ... Else you will perish with the hon- ours of KOMITETHIKI (Committeeman), with the official seal imprinted upon you...” At the Congress of the Bolsheviks, which met in London from April 25 to May 10, 1905, Lenin again took up the theme of inner party democracy: “The Party does not exist for the Party Council, but the Party Council for the Party...In all consti- tutional lands the citizens have the right to express lack of confidence in this or that official or official body. This right cannot be taken from them... Who is the judge in the handling of a dispute between the Party Council and the Local Committees? ... Under free political con- ditions our Party can and will build completely on the principle of election... Even under absolutism the ap- plication of the electoral system in much greater meas- ure than at present would have been possible...” DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM IN BRITAIN Having made at some length a historic survey of the origins of democratic centralism and_ the views of its main advocate, Lenin, we must now return to the two documents under discussion, the majority and minority reports on Inner Party Democracy in the British Communist Party. The minority report is absolutely right in its con- tention that the Commission has failed to discharge the task given to it: “to examine and report upon problems of inner-Party democracy, including Congress proced- ure, and to make recommendations as a basis for discussion.” No report on this subject could be com- plete or satisfactory without a thorough investigation of the way in which inner party democracy has actually functioned until now. How was a situation ever reached which made the appointment of this Commission neces- sary? Who was responsible? No attempt was made to investigate these questions. Why? One can only con- clude that the answers would have put the finger on the 48 guilty men—the present leadership of the Communist Party, who docilely copied the methods of the Kremlin. The majority report is an attempt to whitewash the old party leaders and to safeguard their positions in the future. The Majority Report defines Democratic Central- ism as follows: (i) The right of all members to take part in the discussion and formation of policy and the duty of all members to fight for that policy when it has been decided. (ii) The right of all members to elect and to be elected to the collective leaderships of the Party at all levels, and to be represented at the National Congress, the highest author- ity of the Party. The duty of all members to fight for the decisions made by those leaderships, and the duty of the lower organizations to accept and fight for the decisions of the higher organizations. (iii) The right of all members to contribute to the democratic life of the Party and the duty of all members to safeguard the unity of the Party. While carrying out the policy and decisions of the Party, members who disagree with a decision have the right to reserve their opinions and to express their views through the proper channels open to them as laid down in the Party Rules. At first sight there would seem to be little to quar- rel with within this definition, but the bite comes in paragraph (iii) “...to reserve their opinions and to express their views through the proper channels open to them as laid down in the Party Rules.” It is these rules which have to be carefully examined. We can do no better, at this stage, than to quote from the Minority Report:- “Rule 12, in defining democratic centralism, provides that minorities shall accept the decisions of majorities, and lower Party organizations shall accept the decisions of higher Party organizations. These provisions are then rigidly inter- preted by rule 13, which states: , ‘During the time the matter is being discussed it is the duty of all members of the Party organization to carry out to the full the policy of the Party until the final decision is reached. If the individual member does not receive support from his Party organization, it is his duty to accept the majority decision and carry out to the full the policy of the Party’.” This means, as the Minority Report points out, that every member of the party is in duty bound to fight for the decisions, not only of Congress (taken after prolonged discussion), but also of every decision taken by the executive or district committees, even when the member is deeply and sincerely opposed to the deci- sion on principle. “Moreover, the rule that minorities must accept majority decisions is interpreted on page 31 of the majority report to mean that a minority on the Executive Committee, or a _ district committee is obliged to fight for the majority opinion in the lower organizations of the Party, for the majority report only recognises the right to express differences to higher bodies.” Compare this rigid rule with Lenin’s rejoinder to Riazanov as quoted above: “...If fundamental dis- agreements exist... we cannot deprive members of the Central Committee of the right to address themselves to the party. I cannot imagine how we can do this.” Even Lenin’s imagination could not conjure up a vision of the iron grip with which Stalinism would strangle democracy within the Communist Parties. Congress, the rules lay down, is the highest auth- ority of the Party and the branches, says the majority report, have the obligation to send “their best political

[p020] people” as delegates to Congress. But suppose a branch is sharply, though mathematically unevenly, divided on important issues which are to come before Congress? Are there any provisions in the rules for the propor- tional representation of minority opinions? Careful examination of the rules does not reveal any such pro- vision. Yet without it, Congress cannot honestly reflect Opinion within the Party. The provision of proportional representation of minority opinions need not negate the very sound principle that delegates to Congress are not mandated to vote in some predetermined way. A very important section of the Majority Report and one which goes to the root of the matter, is that which deals with discussions in between Congresses. Between Congresses, says the majority report, the Executive Committee is the responsible leadership of the Party. It will develop policy in accordance with Congress decisions but—and here is the bureaucratic rub, “events may make it necessary to take decisions without prior consultation with the membership.” It is this thoroughly undemocratic procedure which has resulted in Communist Party policy being turned up- side-down from one day to the next and which has so often made rank-and-file communists the laughing stock of their work-mates. While it may not be possible, in an emergency, to summon a National Congress, in periods when the Party is wholly legal and above ground, there should be no obstacles in the way of hastily summoning divisional representatives for consultation. But clearly this method, too, will only be truly democratic if min- orities are adequately represented at every level of the Party organization. If the change under consideration involves a fundamental departure from previously agreed policy, then an emergency Congress must be summoned at the earliest possible moment. This question of minority representation on all the leading committees of the Party is one of fundamental importance. Discussion in the internal bulletins and party publications can only be a genuine reflection of the various viewpoints within the party if all shades of opinion are guaranteed an adequate share of the avail- able space. Past experience has made it clear that no reliance can be placed on the good faith of the Party functionaries. Only the proportional representation of the minorities can provide the necessary safeguards. THE PANEL SYSTEM What enabled Stalinism to fasten its stranglehold on the Party? There can be little doubt that the way in which the panel system of electing the Executive Committee was misused from 1925-1943 helped in the transformation of the British Communist Party from a revolutionary party into a mere appendage of the ruling bureaucracy in the Soviet Union. This should not be interpreted as a criticism of the panel system as such. Properly operated, with adequate democratic safe- guards, the panel system is ideal for the dual task of ensuring a continuity of experienced leadership and of introducing new blood into the leadership. But for the panel system to function democratic- ally, two things are necessary; firstly, the panel must adequately represent minority as well as majority ten- dencies within the party; secondly, Congress delegates must have the right to vote separately for the elimina- tion of any individual nominee on the panel and to substitute other names. As the majority report itself comments, in a masterpiece of understatement, the method as hitherto applied in the Communist Party “had the drawback that opposition to any individual name, or support for an alternative name, could in the last resort only be expressed by voting against the panel as a whole or by abstention.” From 1925 onwards the Stalinist octopus spread its tentacles from the Kremlin to sieze hold of all the parties affiliated to the Communist International.. Bureaucratic manipulation of the panel system was part of the process of the “Stalinization” of the British Communist Party. In this way, the present self-per- petuating leadership came into existence and estab- lished its authority over the party. The fact that after 1944 other methods of electing the executive National Committee (though not the District Committees) were adopted and that substantially the same people were elected is used by the Majority Report to assert “the falsity of the argument that comrades who have been repeatedly elected to the Executive since the early years owe their re-election to one particular method, since they have in fact retained their positions in spite of the changes in method. If such comrades have been repeat- edly re-elected it is not due to a particular method but to the desire of Congress to have them on the Execu- tive.” The fact is, of course, that during the period when the panel system was in operation, the Stalinist leader- ship consolidated its hold on the party. It eliminated all Opposition within the party and crushed all free discus- sion. After that it felt secure enough to experiment with other methods of elections but returned to the “panel” (or rigging) system in 1954. The old panel system is still in use to isolate and crush all independent leadership at the District level. FACTIONS IN THE PARTY On factional activity, the majority report really waxes indignant:- “Some comrades argue that the right to reserve one’s views and to express them to the higher bodies are not sufficient. Some claim that comrades on higher committees should have the right to express disagree- ment downwards—that is, to the branches. But if that were done it would not be simply for information, it would become the first step in a campaign against the decision with which they disagree. Some comrades spe- cifically claim the right to campaign in the Party and the press to get the decision changed and the right to form groups of like-minded comrades for this purpose. Some claim that such groupings should have the right to draw up their own political platform and to cam- paign for it and that either the Party should be obliged to publish their platform or they should have the independent right to publish it.” All these claims put forward by “some” comrades, and which the majority rejects out of hand, was the normal practice of the Bolsheviks under Lenin until the 10th Congress—even in the period of revolution and civil war. These methods of work did not weaken the Party but strengthened it and prepared it for its tasks. Only after the advent of Stalinism and after the suppression of free discussion and criticism within the

[p021] party, did it degenerate to the stage where all policy emanated from a single “individual” and even the Central Committee and the Political Bureau became merely rubber stamps to endorse his policies. In a healthy party, whenever a group of members have a point of view on a given issue, they will tend to co-ordinate their efforts to get that viewpoint ac- cepted by the party. Once the issue is decided, the group will dissolve and on other issues may find them- selves aligned against each other. That is the way fac- tions functioned in the heroic period of Russian Bol- shevism. Only when Stalinism came along with its methods of brutal suppression did factions harden into permanent alignments. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE The minority report goes to the heart of bureau- cratic control of the party when it refers to the powers of the Political Committee. Although the powers of the Political Committee are nowhere defined (this com- mittee is not even mentioned in the Party rules), every Communist Party member knows full well that this is the body which exercises the real power within the party. To quote the minority report: “It appears to exercise real control over the Party press, plays a major role in the selection of the recommended list for the new Executive Committee, controls the Party appara- tus, and issues important political statements. It. ap- pears to be a policy-making body in between the two- monthly meetings of the Executive Committee.” Internal democracy under these conditions be- comes a farce. As the minority report demands: “The functions and the powers of the Political Committee should be defined by rule, for the value of democratic- ally electing the Executive Committee would be seri- ously reduced if, in fact, effective power was wielded by an inner committee of full-time political workers not directly responsible to Congress.” Despite its shortcomings, the proposals of the minority report, if adopted, would go a long way to curb the power of the bureaucrats and to restore de- mocracy within the party. But to transform the Com- munist Party from the soulless bureaucratic machine which it has become into a genuine revolutionary workers’ party, much more is needed than a few changes in the rules of the party. What is necessary is. an understanding of the reasons why the Stalinist de- generation took place. POLITICS AND ORGANIZATION While it is right to struggle for real democratic discussion in the Communist Party, it is also necessary to demand that the leadership makes available the full facts of the history of the Communist International, the C.P.S.U. and the C.P.G.B. from 1923 onwards. It will then become clear to all that political degeneration preceded organizational degeneration. When the bureaucrats usurped power in the U.S.S.R. and abandoned the policy of international socialism for the narrow, nationalistic doctrine of “socialism in one country”, they no longer required a Communist International acting as the General Staff of the world revolution. The Communist parties had to be transformed from vanguard revolutionary par- ties into frontier guards of the Soviet Union. It was in this process that the British Communist Party along with the other Communist Parties in Europe, Asia and America lost its political soul and abandoned inner party democracy. This process took place in a period when the world revolution was in retreat, when the Russian workers, weary and tired of waiting for help from the West, turned in on themselves and turned away from international socialism. Only small groups of oppositionists kept alive the fire of revolutionary Marxism. Today, the tide has turned. In China, a great peo- ple have taken the first steps towards socialism though the Chinese Communist Party has not yet thrown off its Stalinism. The colonial peoples are marching deter- minedly toward freedom. These changed conditions are having their impact also on the Stalinist Communist Party. Even the most hardened bureaucracy cannot ignore the objective conditions under which it exists. Under these circumstances, the discussion in the British Communist Party on the working of inner party de- mocracy may well be the harbinger of that fuller dis- cussion on fundamental communist policy which our times demand. UNIVERSITIES AND LEFT REVIEW ie Contents of First Issue (now published) include: Isaac Deutscher K. H. Jelenski G. D. H. Cole Eric Hobsbawm Claude Bourdet David Marquand Stuart Hall E. P. Thompson Russia in Transition Destalinisation and European Security What is Happening to British Capitalism The Future of Marxism in the Social Sciences The French Left - Recent Trends The Politics of Lucky Jim The-New Conservatism and the Old Socialism and the Intellectuals The First Issue can be obtained by sending an annual subscription (three issues) of seven shillings to: The Business Manager, R. J. Prince, Magdalen College, Oxford. * 50