Problems and Prospects of British Capitalism II

[p026] PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF BRITISH CAPIPALISM — ID Tom Kemp The stability of capitalism Empuasis was laid in the first part of this article upon four major related determinants of the recent expansive phase of British capitalism. They are as follows: (1) government-sponsored investment, especially in hous-. ing; (2) arms expenditure; (3) the technological spurt; and (4) world market expansion. It may be observed that the alleged structural changes within the system with which Strachey begins his analysis of Contem- porary Capitalism have here been passed over, and the forces and relationships which have been instrumental in Opening up new avenues of investment and demand have been brought into prominence. The validity of Strachey’s concept of ‘last stage capitalism’ needs to be considered at length. But for this article it seemed almost wholly irrelevant. We have seen that a favour- able combination of factors, operating on an_ inter- national scale, and containing the seeds of their own exhaustion, have been sufficiently powerful to elimin- ate unemployment for over twelve years and to bring about a fairly sustained upsurge in the economy of Britain and of other countries. This outcome has, how- ever, little to do with the ‘growing enlightenment’ of 118 the representatives of capitalism or with the influence of Keynes on politicians or, indeed, with the economic consequences of democracy. Furthermore, those who believe that the problem of maintaining full emplov- ment has now been solved, implicitly assume the con- tinuance of these conditions or the ability of a British government to counteract the of course depressive effect of one or more of them petering out. It is impossible to disprove the thesis that British capitalism is capable of a long, sustained, peaceful and prosperous advance. But it is fruitful to appraise it on the basis of probabilities, drawing upon historical ex- perience and upon the results of the analysis and diag- nosis of past and current trends. Very well! We shall not shirk the job. Will there be unemployment in Britain? The period since the war constitutes only a brief period in the history of British capitalism. While it is clear that important new factors have arisen in the last two decades, it is equally plain that the adverse changes in Britain’s world position have been overlaid by a series of special, favourable circumstances. Crystal-

[p027] gazing apart, it is impossible to say which of these favourable factors are likely to remain operative and which of the adverse factors are likely to continue to operate, whether with reduced or heightened effect. It would seem to be particularly foolhardy to draw op- timistic conclusions about the future prospects of Bri- tish capitalism when it is realized that the special fac- tors which have been sustaining it in this post-war period, far from being the sort of built-in factors which are self-perpetuating, may well be simply using them- selves up without prospect of renewal and becoming less and less significant. Nevertheless, many professional economists appear to accept the most favourable view of the future of British capitalism. This view, essentially Keynesian, rests upon a simple proposition to which reference has already been made—namely, that known, proved meas- ures for maintaining full employment exist and that they will be made timely and successful use of by future governments should need arise. If this is accepted there is, of course, no further argument about the possibility of future crises and unemployment arising from a defi- ciency in demand. Government-steered capitalism is, these economists believe, capitalism without crisis, cap- able of further unlimited growth. Even at a superficial level there are certain flaws in the argument. For ex- ample, it is founded on a certain naive faith in the perspicacity of politicians which was not shared, say, by Adam Smith. It also contains implicit assumptions about class harmony in society which some people would say are not very realistic. Moreover, the remedies imply some renunciation of economic sovereignty by individual countries in the interest of maintaining full employment in others. In Britain, regardless of what happens elsewhere, the maintenance of full employment cannot be regarded as a foregone conclusion. It is well known that the very idea of a ‘full employment economy’ has always been regarded with scepticism and hostility in some quarters. Such terminology as ‘brimful’ and ‘over-full’ employ- ment itself betrays a belief that unemployment levels are pathologically low. From time to time the Economist and other journals present persuasive argu- ments recommending increases in the unemployment rate—to squeeze the ‘slack’ out of the economy. A Tory government, when pressed, might well be prepared to sacrifice full employment for other objectives, such as for example, a desire to inflict some crushing industrial or political defeat on the trade unions or Labour Party. Alternatively, a Tory government might be prompted to take drastic action to curb internal uncontrolled in- flation which was seriously threatening Britain’s ex- ternal status. The present large investments in ‘automation’ in some branches of industry are a further possible source of crisis. Until the summer of 1956 the rapid introduc- tion of automated machines and the consequent dis- placement of labour which had taken place in some sectors of industry was concealed by the buoyancy of the market and the expansion of production at a suffi- ciently rapid rate to reabsorb labour displaced by tech- nical improvements. It is not difficult to see that if home and foreign demand do not remain high (in fact this demand must continue to increase at a steady rate) there will be ‘overproduction’. The ensuing technologic- ally-induced unemployment will necessarily be followed 119 by the spread of other kinds of unemployment and perhaps by the ignition of a general crisis. The heavy investment undertaken in some sectors will then prove to be an incubus on profits and as a result large cut- backs in the labour force and the closing of some plants could then be anticipated. Such eventualities have al- ready been foreshadowed by the recent ‘labour redun- dancies’ in the motor industry, but the main effects of this were soon counteracted by other factors which continued to keep the overall demand for labour at a high level. Without our following through these arguments in detail there is a prima facie case for stating that a sharp change in any one or more of these rather special fea- tures of the post-war economy could detonate a crisis of the classic type—that is, there would be shrinking markets, falling investment, declining prices, unemploy- ment and a pessimistic re-assessment of future prospects in business and industrial circles, which would provide the first really serious practical test for the theories of how to apply ‘counter-cyclical’ measures. Moreover, international complicating factors are already on the horizon. The permanent crisis in the British economy If the economy of Britain, and that of the capitalist world at large, has not experienced a crisis of over- production of the classic type since the 1939-45 war, the term ‘crisis’ has been on all our lips so frequently as to depreciate somewhat its meaning. An economy in which ‘crisis’, whether actual or impending, can be diagnozed with such monotonous regularity would, on the face of it, be regarded as inherently unstable. In most years since 1945, strains of varying character have been pre- sent, including, for example, the coal shortage of 1947, a depression in the cotton industry, incipient unemploy- ment in some other sectors of industry, ‘redundancy’ in motors in 1956 and the current consequences of the Suez affair. Inflation appears to have become inherent in the economy and the pound has steadily lost value since 1939; the ever-present risk that this so far ‘suppressed’ inflation should assume a runaway character, which would mean social chaos and breakdown, can hardly be associated with a healthy organism. Underlying all this, a mirror of the adverse change in Britain’s worid position, has been the ever-recurrent ‘balance of pay- ments’ question, which has assumed crisis dimensions at various times between 1945 and 1951 and has been on the agenda once again since 1955. Of course, in the short intervals between these dates, a good deal of optimism was stimulated by each temporary improve- ment in the position. Each time talk has been heard of restoring the convertibility of sterling. Since 1955 a tense struggle has been necessary to avoid even a further de- valuation, and such a possibility should not be ex- cluded for the period ahead. Meanwhile the gold and dollar reserves have become a sensitive index of the condition of British economy and threats to these re- serves always now result in the sudden application of emergency measures, such as the ‘credit squeeze’ in the summer of 1955, only a few months after the Conser- vative election victory. Indeed the problem of the bal- ance of payments is closely related to that of internal inflation, since upon relative prices depend the pros- pects of British goods in export markets. This has

[p028] meant that the more or less normal, though hardiy successful, guerilla struggle against it (by every means from ‘premium’ bonds to raising the price of babies’ milk) has turned into a more open and intensive cam- paign to curtail demand in the home market whenever the external stability of the economy has been threat- ened. Increases in the bank rate, restrictions on hire purchase, removal of food subsidies, cuts in public ex- penditure have, therefore, all been determined primari- ly by the external situation. The whole operation of cutting living standards is closely watched by specula- tors at home and abroad and bears the contingent risk of overshooting the mark and precipitating a downward plunge in some major segments of the economy. The importance of inflation It is not surprising that inflation has become a main focus of attention for economic opinion in recent years. While some measure of inflation seems to be in- separable from full employment under capitalism (and to this extent it has its defenders) it is also responsible for serious distortions, inflexibilities and ‘disincentives- to-effort’. Potentially, inflation is a source of complete economic prostration should confidence in the mone- tary unit ever disappear. The allocation of responsibi- lity for inflation gives rise to serious problems; un- doubtedly a major share today lies with the government and with its control of the monetary and credit system, reinforced by supply and demand conditions in world and national markets. Like all similar phenomena, in- flation feeds on itself and, having gone on so long, tends to be taken for granted. So much is this the case that one of the surprising features of the situation is the willingness of the public to go on saving in terms of a unit which is continuously losing purchasing power. A convenient scapegoat for the continued infla- tionary pressure has been found in the trade unions and their wage demands. This takes the form of pleas for ‘wage restraint’ and the argument, which appears in various guises, that if wage-earners would forego some present consumption (i.e. allow prices to move ahead of wages) this would enable a more rapid rate of invest- ment and provide a solid basis for a rise in real wages in the future. It is most important to grasp that the weakness of this argument lies not in its logic, A socialist govern- ment would be fully justified in asking for such a sacri- fice to be made to enable a more rapid rate of invest- ment in socialist industry to take place. Even so it would need to explain fully the reasons for the call and have the full confidence of the workers in carrying through its policy. But in a capitalist society this argu- ment means, in effect, that workers should abstain from consumption (by foregoing wage increases) in order to increase the rate of capital accumulation while capital is privately owned. Indeed there are not even any gua- rantees that profits would be ‘ploughed back’—for the profits of business might simply increase without any new investment being undertaken. But certainly the capitalists will guarantee no security for the workers’ jobs, and there is no certainty that crises would be avoided in the future. This argument makes, therefore, a wholly unjustifiable assumption about the nature of class relations in capitalist society and about its future prospects. It asks the working class to abandon all its hopes for ending the system in which one man exploits 120 the labour of many. It calmly ignores the whole grava- men of the socialist’s criticism of capitalism. The wide circulation and influence in the Labour movement itself of such exhortations rejects both the bankruptcy of official trade union policy and the ab- sence of all economic theory—except ordinary capital- ist theory—among many trade union officials. Post-war economic policy in Britain has had the appearance of a succession of more or less unrelated expedients to meet unforeseen emergencies. In this re- spect the change in 1951 from a Labour to a Tory government made little fundamental difference. Both governments were favourably assisted by persistent ex- pansionist forces in the world economy which enabled crises in Britain to be limited or localized. Such limited crises have come up for solution one after the other rather than occurring simultaneously, and in the cir- cumstances ‘muddling through’ has not been disastrous. Under the Labour government more reliance was placed upon direct controls inherited from the war period, but its policies showed little coherence. No more than lip- service was given to the much-vaunted planning which was to solve the problems of the post-war world. The Tories have ended a great many of the war-time physi- cal controls on the economy and, taking the credit for the relaxation of some irksome restrictions made pos- sible by improvements in supply conditions, have, to the satisfaction of banking and business circles and many professional economists, depended mainly upon the old style monetary and fiscal measures still mas- querading in Keynesian garb. Certainly, on its record, neither government has offered evidence of being able to cope with a crisis situation of the type which struck the country in the thirties. They take shelter behind the spurious reasoning that the American economy is the main source of crisis, today as it was in 1929, and they are confident that the American government will take the necessary measures. It is clear therefore that to a very large degree the maintenance of full employment in Britain since 1945 owes more to a highly favourable world conjuncture than to changes in capitalism or to deliberate policy. Mean- while the economic situation has been undergoing con- tinuous change. The world of 1957 is by no means the world of 1945; nor is it, economically, much like what would have been expected by anyone surveying the prospects at that time. Certainly some of the more pes- simistic estimates have not been realized. The ability of modern societies to bear wars and recover from them proved greater than then seemed possible to socialists. The post-war boom, followed by the crash, which seemed the obvious deduction to make from the ex- perience of the economic aftermath of former wars, turned into a more or less sustained boom. Industrial production began an upward march almost everywhere with a particularly rapid growth from the early fifties. Under these conditions economists have largely put be- hind them those portions of their analysis dealing with the problem of inadequate demand. But it would be premature for the socialist movement to do likewise. Present trends in Britain’s economy A brief examination of the more recent signs of expansion in British economy indicates possible sources of its own limitation, and the signs of future contrac- tion are perhaps to be seen, if as yet only dimly. The

[p029] impact of the Suez war (which itself shows how un- expectedly new factors can come into the situation) and the petrol shortage which succeeded it have further re- vealed the weaknesses in Britain’s position. ; The Economic Survey for Europe in 1955, pub- lished by the Economic Commission for Europe, an agency of the United Nations, was devoted mainly to the problems of ‘balanced growth’ growing out of the expansion then proceeding. It included, however, a brief but significant analysis of some recent trends in Europe’s trade with the rest of the world. Europe’s prosperity is closely bound up with the ability of the rest of the world to buy its exports, which, in turn, de- pends upon the ability of non-European countries to sell to Europe or to borrow (i.e., to postpone payment until some future date). Now although the European economy as a whole expanded during 1954 and 1955, it took rather fewer commodities from the non-dollar countries, which exported, mainly, agricultural goods to Europe. In other words, their ability to purchase European manufactures from current earnings declined. One reason for this is that on a world scale there has been an improvement in food production and the mar- ket is turning once again to a surplus of supply of food over demand. This is based, of course upon ability to pay, regardless of the world’s under-nourished millions and the possibilities of their securing a fairer share of the food supplies of the world. When agricultural products coming on to world markets were in short supply their value in terms of manufactures rose: the terms of trade of countries like Britain, which export mainly manufactured goods, therefore deteriorated. We heard a lot about this in the years after the war. In the last few years the movement has been in the opposite direction: the terms of trade of the industrialized countries have improved at the ex- pense of the agricultural exporting countries. This fac- tor has been of advantage to the British balance of pay- ments position. But the dependence of Europe as a whole upon outside sources Pot food, while still large, has been diminishing, and is likely to diminish still further. This simple and apparently beneficial change can lead to serious complications. First, if the agricul- tural countries sell no more, and possibly less, of their goods to Europe, then unless they can find other mar- kets or borrow they will have to reduce their purchases of manufactured goods from Europe. Second, the ex- pansion which has been proceeding in Europe has been building up export capacity. Consequently, if one segment of the market contracts, just when capacity has been increasing, there is the possibility, as the re- port states, of ‘increasingly strong competition on ex- port markets and the risk of considerable instability of export prices’. This would seriously disrupt the drive towards more liberal trade relations—strongly backed by the United States. It could also foreshadow a more general crisis, with the expansion of the past few years culminating in overproduction, excess capacity and an intensified struggle for markets in both the manufactur- ing and the agricultural countries. Some other trends underlined in this report are also worth considering. The whole economic upsurge of Europe in the recent period ‘was predominantly a re- flection of the strong demand prevailing in the indus- trialized areas of the world, particularly Europe and the dollar countries’. Characteristically, the boom was feed- 1 1 throughout the system: if on a sufficient scale. ing on itself and spreading its effects to all the partici- pants in the trading system of the capitalist world economy. A break anywhere might prove just as con- tagious and spread. its effects widely and swiftly Each country would then be under strong pressure to try to insulate itself from the impending disaster: reflationist measures would necessarily have to be applied early, vigorously and with a fair degree of international agree- ment. But it is worth bearing in mind that the old nationalist ideas are deeply entrenched in national capi- talist economies, despite the internationalist gloss which they have acquired in recent years. Needless to say, Britain would be among the most vulnerable should the present expansion end in such a way. A substantial part of her exports consists of capi- tal goods and durable consumer goods which can ex- pect to prosper only during an investment boom and a period of rising incomes oversea. These also happen to be the kind of goods whose productive capacity has been greatly increased in other industrial countries as part of the general expansion process. As long as mar- kets have been growing, order books full, and the home market so buoyant as to draw goods away from the export market, foreign competition could be discussed without alarm. But what if the markets do not hold? New competitors Then of course there will develop once again that sort of intense trade rivalry under the old, old slogan of ‘export or die’, characteristic of the inter-war years. Competition will be cut-throat, and there can be no doubt that this renewed competition is already growing in significance. If the reappearance of Japan and Ger- many has not so far caused alarm in all industries it is because there has been room for them within the uni- versally expanding market. A glance at the record of Western Germany gives an idea of what may be in store for Britain. Germany has now reassumed her position as the leading capitalist power on the European continent—and this even without East Germany. Some four million new jobs have been opened up in the past few years in a country which only a decade ago had an immense refugee problem and seemed doomed to a low standard of living and economic stagnation for a generation. As it was, in 1955 German industrial pro- duction rose a further fifteen per cent and in 1956 it was up again (taking an average on the basis: of the first six months) by ten per cent. Exports have taken an increasing share of industrial production and they have grown faster than imports. This has strengthened Ger- many’s international financial position by enabling her to build up a large currency reserve. Germany’s speciali- ties—machinery, electrical goods and chemical products —are highly competitive with British exports. There is no doubt that should the market shrink (as we have suggested it will) German industry will try to increase its share of the contracting market at Britain’s expense and will be well placed for doing so. From this, an intense ‘imperialist’ rivalry will de- velop between the two countries for spheres of influence and fields of investment, reminiscent of the period be- fore 1914. Before the Suez war, for example, Egypt had become Germany’s most important market in the Mid- dle East and one to which considerable attention was being paid; no doubt her salesmen will do their best to

[p030] take advantage of the fallen esteem of Britain and France in the whole Middle East. Likewise in South America, India, Indonesia and other vital areas com- Petitive prices, long term credits, keen enterprise and high quality have enabled German industry and finance to re-establish a strong position. In any future trade war British capitalism will find itself hard-pressed. The instability of British capitalism A worsening of the trade situation can take place quite rapidly. Indeed previous crises in the ‘balance of payments’ have been marginal affairs and some future adverse change which goes a little further than the others may cause irrevocable damage. Some time ago it was stated in Barclays Bank Review that a ‘compara- tively small reduction in imports and expansion in ex- ports, visible and invisible’ was ‘all that was needed to shift the balance from “red” to “black”’.’”? In the same article the point was made that the severity of the foreign trade crises of the post-war years was ‘due to the inadequate reserve of gold, dollars and international credit with which oscillations in the balance of, pay- ments could be cushioned’. This reserve has become a sensitive barometer of the international standing of British capitalism, regarded with concern both in the City and in Westminster. It can be influenced by transactions outside the normal run of current trade, for example, by the sale of the Trinidad Oil Co., and by the dollars recently obtained from the International Monetary Fund to make good the losses consequent upon the Suez affair. Speculation and future expectations -of the. exchange rate, into which all kinds of political and economic factors enter, also influence the: level of the reserves. Experience shows that while it may take months, or even years, to increase the size of the reserve appreciably, a sharp unfavourable turn in the situation can allow the whole gain to drain away again before counter-measures can be applied. Safeguarding the reserve (which now forms a much smaller proportion of annual imports than be- fore the war) has at all times to be a major preoccupa- tion of economic policy, and the current low level of the reserve is an indication of the diminished field for manoeuvre in the near future. The future prospects of British capitalism are, therefore, geared to a multitude of factors operating on an international scale, political as well as economic. In general these prospects have been made more dubious by the events of last autumn. As the Economist wrote at the beginning of the year: ‘The new year starts under UNIVERSITIES AND LEFT REVIEW GABRIEL KOLKO GORDON HENDERSON LELIO BASSO HENRY COLLINS Socialism and the Intellectuals the shadow of the crisis of confidence in sterling that has resulted from the Suez adventure’.+ That crisis has by no means been overcome at the time of writing and has been complicated by the trial of strength now pro- ceeding in shipbuilding and engineering, unprecedented since the war. The optimistic forecast which the Economist made at the same time of a long term ‘mas- sive increase in production’, following a future ‘re- expansion’ to begin later in the year, seems unlikely to be fulfilled. Summing up Our assessment of forces and trends in the British economy suggests that when we dig below the tinsel of superficial appearances and examine the fundamental features of British economic development, very little evidence remains for a belief in the smooth and un- interrupted progress of British capitalism. Our analysis suggests that those theories now cur- rent in the Labour movement which are founded on this assumption of smooth and uninterrupted progress should be treated with a good deal of suspicion. Finally, it is abundantly clear that a more pene- trating analysis of contemporary capitalism needs to be made, to form the basis of a fruitful socialist economic policy. 1The consequences of a bureaucratic forcing through of such a policy in a nationalized economy have been strikingly re- vealed by events in Poland and Hungary last autumn. This whole problem needs to be carefully thought out by social- ists, with special attention to the need to win and maintain working-class support for high investment policies (where they are really necessary) and to avoid the rapid creation of a crust of bureaucrats out of touch with popular feeling. 2A recent example comes to hand in Gaitskell’s speech at Wellington, reported in The Observer, March 24, 1957. While putting the main blame on Government policy, he talks abstractly as follows: ‘What we [Who?—T.K.] need at the moment is a recovery in production without too big a rise in consumption. We want the increased output to take the form of more exports—since without them we cannot pay for the increased imports of raw materials—and of higher investment, because this is the basis for future pros- perity. What stands in the way? It is unfair to British man- agement to say they are not sufficiently bold and adventurous. [My emphasis.—-T.K.] That has not been, and is not now, our main trouble. The real problem is to combine rising produc- with enough savings ...of the extra output.’ This is the essence of the ‘restraint and responsibility’ approach. With nothing more than this to guide it, a Labour Government will merely be shoring up capitalism and damp- ening down the militancy of the working class. 3Barclays Bank Review, November 1954. 4Economist, January 5, 1957. Issue No. 2 The American “Income Revolution” Can Capitalism Survive? The Italian Left—I What is happening to Capitalism? RODNEY HILTON MERVYN JONES HAROLD SILVER CHARLES TAYLOR E. P. THOMPSON Order From: The Business Manager, R. J. Prince, Magdalen College, Oxford. NEW FORMAT: 8 PAGE PHOTOGRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT 9/- Three Issues

[p031] Book Reviews Strong on Stalin The Stalin Era by Anna Louise Strong (New York: Masses and Mainstream, 8s. 6d.) ‘... they first turn mad’ ‘IT IS too soon to sum up the era, and yet one must try to’-—so writes Miss Strong in her foreword, and why ‘one must try to’ is indeed obvious. The paean writers of yester- day are now faced with the problem of Khrushchev’s secret speech, of Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary, etc. How does Miss Strong face the problem? This book has been taken up by the leadership of the Communist Party in this country. Indeed it needs to be, be- cause a decision which formerly faced a few individuals in- side the Communist Party is now facing almost all the mem- bers—namely, what political conclusions do you reach and what political action do you take when you become aware of the mass terror that existed inside the Soviet Union? Deceit, silence and slander will no longer hide the problem. It has to be faced, and Miss Strong has come forward to prevent workers reaching the ‘wrong’, that is, the anti-Stalinist con- clusions. It would be gratifying to report that ‘The Stalin Era’ contained an examination or analysis more serious than, that of a Mr. Gollan who says that the revelations of the Twen- tieth Congress came as a great shock to the Executive Com- mittee of the Communist Party, or indeed of a Mr. Khrush- chev who naively wonders what text of what speech is being referred to in a recent interview. But unfortunately there is no attempt at serious analysis. ‘The Stalin Era’ lies in the lightweight class. ; For example, the Georgian oppression is dealt with, but only to be misrepresented. Lenin’s criticism of Stalin’s great- nation chauvinism becomes merely his criticism of Stalin’s ‘ruthlessness’, or his ‘brutalities’, and oh, the philosophical vacuity of the word ‘excesses’ in Georgia! But Lenin’s cri- ticism was not of arbitrary actions against individuals but of an impermissible relationship between the Soviet power and the Georgian people. Lenin was a Marxist and not a pro- fessor of moral philosophy, and understood that the ruth- lessness was the result not of the policeman’s ulcer but of a wrong relationship between police and people, between the Soviet State and the Georgian nation. Miss Strong’s explanation for the embalming of Lenin’s body for public show condemns both her and her idol, Stalin. It was done by Stalin ‘over the protests of Lenin’s widow and some other Bolshevik intellectuals’. (This is one of sev- eral disparaging references to intellectuals contained in the book.) Why not just ‘some other Bolsheviks’? ‘Stalin under- stood better than any of the Europeanized Bolsheviks how the Russian people, still largely peasant, could be moved by a shrine and a saint with “incorruptible” flesh.’ The Bolshe- viks did understand it and all their lives had been fighting such backwardness, not catering for it. Miss Strong should bring the career of the mortician Bolsheviks up to date. Do they think, thirty years later, after building socialism under the ‘wise leader Stalin’ that the Rus- sian people need yet another shrine and saint with ‘incorrup- tible’ flesh? ‘The Great Madness’, the chapter on the terror, finds Miss Strong writing twenty years too late, and developing her gloss on events with ingenious subtlety. It is one of these she-knows-that-we-know-that-she-knows situations. She knows that we know that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Bukharin and many others were, like Rajk, innocent. But she knows that we know that Khrushchev has not yet said so and won’t. (Can the most able man Stalinism has produced afford an ex- amination of the question of the Moscow Trials?) Therefore 123 she knows she may safely get away with her explanation that Stalin became ‘sickly suspicious’ when he found former com- rades trying to assassinate him. So the ‘treachery’ of his comrades is to explain Stalin’s actions! There is also the story of her closest friend who after arrest by the GPU had those ‘interesting discussions’ with her jailer. A proper Marxist discussion group it was, a sort of fore-runner to the Socialist Forums! Her explanation of the terror seems to have influenced Miss Strong. We, however, are advised against hasty explanations until we have some de- finite statement from the CPSU. Miss Strong, rather illogic- ally, does advance a theory that may be summed up in her statement: “They will find the key most probably in actual ex- tensive penetration of the GPU by a Nazi fifth column. . ”’ Only one fifth column! What about the second fifth column that purged the first one and so on? What fifth columns were variously responsible for the deaths of successive heads of police? (The reviewer in Dutt’s Labour Monthly quotes this same phrase with evident support. The ‘sun-spots’ are now clearly seen to have been swastikas.) ‘Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty and justice, not only under capitalism, but even more so under socialism.’ Thus writes our chastened authoress, but Marxists will not identify with this unqualified ‘socialism’ the bitter experience of the masses of the people under Stalin. ‘Eternal vigilance’ is no substitute for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as Engels recognized it in the Paris Commune, and when it comes to over three million people estimated by Mosa Pijade to have been killed by Stalinism in the USSR in 1936-38, ‘eternal vigilance’ is criminal phrasemongering, not honest humane analysis or leadership. The Labour movement is in a mood to go deeper in its analysis of the Stalin Era (or is it perhaps the Lenin Era?) than this addle-pated apologia. It contains no serious thought. It is journalistic, evasive, slick. As an aid to an understanding of the Stalin Era it is valueless and can only act as a weak prop for what it claims to study. The problem for the revolutionary trend in the Labour movement is that the Great Madness left some in high places permanently mad. H. and R. HUNTER Soviet Verse