The Great Decision, by M. Amrine

[p027] The Great Decision. Amrine. Heinemann. No one will deny that the events leading up to the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan are of very great significance; but a writer does not emphasize their significance by being more sensational than is necessary. He should be able to describe great events faithfully and convincingly without resorting to forced journalistic dramatism, but it seems Mr. Amrine cannot do this. At times his book resembles a tele- vision commentary, at times a snappy popular magazine article, but never. a careful and conscientious history. Whether he has deliberately chosen to write in this style as an alternative to a prosaic and scholarly tone, it is impossible to say; but the overall result is lumpy and unsatisfying. Otherwise, this is an important study and an informative one. Par- ticular attention is paid to the ques- tion of whether a warning demon- stration should have been given to Japan before the bomb was used in earnest. According to Mr. Amrine, the Inter:m Committee, formed by the Secretary of War to discuss America’s nuclear policy, had al- ready decided by June 1, 1945, in favour of a strprise attack with the atom bomb. This was before the first test had been made, and before the technical possibilities of a demonstrative explosion were known to the Committee. A number of reasons were given for not attempt- ing a military demonstration of the bomb, but none of them seem ade- quate in the light of such a momen- tous decision. For instance, it was claimed there was no way of en- suring that the bomb would go off, and that even if it did, the Japan- ese leaders might not be induced to surrender. Byrnes objected that if 61 the Japanese were told when and where to expect an explosion, they might bring all the prisoners of war to the area. Finally the subject was closed when the Scientific Advisory Panel reported to the Committee that it could not propose any effective demonstration of the weapon. But many nuclear scientists thought otherwise, and it was from them rather than any of the war leaders that the main arguments against a policy of surprise attack came. The Franck Report, delivered by a group of prominent scientists to the Secre- tary of War, urgently stressed the danger of precipitating an atomic armaments race by an unannounced nuclear attack on Japan. It advo- cated using the bomb against Japan only after a warning demonstration, and then only with the sanction of the United Nations and American public opinion. The military and political leaders, however, had their own ideas on the subject, and were not inclined to be interested in the Franck Report. Nevertheless, the general impres- sion is that the American leaders could have arranged a demonstration had they really wanted to; the scientific advisers’ report that no efrective demonstration could be pro- posed was made before the first test in New Mexico, and in that time a great number of the technical prob- lems involved had been overcome. What effect it might have had on the Cold War that was to follow is diffi- cult to imagine. At that time the American government was already looking on Russia as a_ potential enemy, and that may be one of the reasons why it preferred to keep the bomb a secret until its terrifying lethal power had been fully demon- strated. Perhaps understandably, the book makes little mention of the part played by Britain in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki episodes. The arrange- ment seems to have been that Churchill would give his consent, and leave the rest to the Americans. For his part, Churchill would have been only too glad to give his con- sent; he was positively overjoyed at the news of a successful test, and generally treated the whole subject with far less concern than either Truman or Stimson. But he dis- appeared from the scene after the election, and on Attlee’s part in the

[p028] 62 decision there is scarcely a word. We are only left to infer that by that time the atom bomb policy was so far advanced that his voice made very little difference. STEPHEN WILLIAMS