The Dilemmas of the National Bourgeoisie

THE national liberation movement in colonial and semi-colonial countries is led by men and movements issuing from one section or another of the ‘national bourgeoisie’.

Where political independence has been achieved this ‘middle’ class, or part of it, becomes effectively the ruling class, whether or not in coalition with ‘feudal’ or tribal notables.

Because these countries are economically backward such a class remains, as it were, a thin sliver off the social trunk.

The European-educated intelligentsia, perhaps the most characteristic human product of ‘combined development’, forms its most articulate component, and usually assumes political leadership.

Its commercial and industrial segments tend to be relatively weak, dependent to some extent upon foreign capital, though often anxious to push ahead with accumulation and capital investment for the internal market.

Such a ‘middle’ class tends to be divided from the workers and peasants by its alien culture patterns, by great disparities in consumption levels, such as the purchase of expensive motor cars and similar conveniences of advanced countries.

Needless to say, in any particular case a host of specific factors will determine its social position and political strength and outlook.

The important thing is that once this class takes political control, as in India, Ghana or Egypt, it faces a complex of PP PP SPSS SPS SS SSSSSSS SSSI ISIS SIS IDI III IIIS This is the first of two articles. By ‘national bourgeoisie’ is meant the native capitalist class in a colonial or semi-colonial country; the ‘urban petty bourgeoisie’ is the middle class of the towns—shopkeepers and professional people; a ‘semi-colonial country’ is one that has formal political independence, but is under the economic and often military domination of an imperialist power.

PPP PPP LIP PPP PIP IPP IS SID ISS IDI DIDI SD III III INI I IIIS GS problems, and the ambiguities of ‘its position stand revealed.

Internally it takes over the heritage of imperialism and economic backwardness. It is brought to power by, and continues to lean upon, the mass of peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie and working class, which provided the sinews of the national movement: and these followers expect to see big changes in material conditions. - Jt is confronted with demands which its means do not enable it to satisfy properly, partly as a consequence of its own class position.

For example, political independence does not automatically bring economic independence.

Not only do property relations, including the rights of the big foreign companies, remain intact—and could be tampered with only at its own peril—but essential tasks, such as land reform, are left undone.

The astute upholders of economic imperialism in the advanced countries recognize that ‘decolonization’, in a political sense, whatever risks it may involve, is the only way in which their profitable investments and markets can be retained. They know the vulnerabilities of the national bourgeoisie.

The international context contributes to the problems and the possibilities of the new rulers, or potential rulers.

For one thing, the existence of the USSR and the Chinese People’s Republic has an important bearing on the weakening of the older imperialisms and the achievement of political independence.

It also provides possibilities for manoeuvre and alternative sources of economic aid; but to make the best of these requires skill and circumspection.

Outside economic aid appears as a major force making for economic development and the satisfaction of political supporters’ expectations.

Though it would be illusory to think that it could be dispensed with, the inevitable failure of the bourgeoisie to fulfil its ‘historic’ tasks makes it loom much larger than it need do in plans of economic development.

At least non-alinement Economic dependence of a new kind raises acute political problems: especially how to secure aid with the least strings attached, whether or not they are visible.

Thus aid from the west means that you must respect the property rights and earnings of foreign companies and assumes, though it cannot ensure, a policy of at least non-alinement with the Soviet Union.

What the national bourgeoisie can do depends upon what cards they hold—and they have not all got a Suez Canal up their sleeve.

The entry of the USSR on to the scene as purveyor of aid, so far on a modest scale, introduces a:new element. It provides scope, notably, for bargaining and manoeuvre which would otherwise be non-existent. But the Kremlin bureaucracy is no more disinterested than the western governments.

It does what it can to weaken the influence of imperialism and strengthen its own diplomatic bloc. So far it has depended to a large extent on inexpensive expressions of sympathy at Bandung, Cairo and Accra.

Promises considerably exceed goods delivered, and emphasis upon joint aid at the United Nations by the Soviet representatives suggests that on the basis of a ‘peaceful coexistence’ package deal the USSR would abandon all pretence at political support for the extension of the colonial revolution.

And Khrushchev knows (for surely Nasser will have taught him) that the national bourgeoisies are equally prepared to make use of Russia, and to go elsewhere when a better bargain is available.

Such poker players as Nkrumah and Bourguiba have also recognized what can be gained by playing on differences between the imperialist countries. They have a whole school of disciples—Sekou-Touré, Ferhat Abbas and so on.

Bigger share of profits The national bourgeoisie manoeuvres to survive in internal politics and on the international scene. Often the best that it can hope for is a bigger share of the profits extracted from its own peasants and workers by the big foreign companies.

In some places it comes into collision with the old landowning class. In others it is torn into factions—with one or more leaning on foreign support.

Its own experience; the spread of corruption; inability to contain popular discontent: these may lead to the intervention of its ‘own’ military wing.

Rule by majors, colonels and generals is becoming increasingly common. It becomes a provisional, ‘Bonapartist’ solution to growing crisis (Iraq, Pakistan, Syria—with Egypt as the prototype).

The army officers, mostly younger members of the bourgeoisie, free from the taint of corruption, able to reawaken the original enthusiasms of the national movement, provide a reserve team able to take over when the crisis reaches a breaking point.

Essentially the army officers defend property relations, social . order, national integrity (‘honour’). They act to save the bourgeoisie from the consequences of its own excesses and divisions, as has so often happened before in history in one form or another.

They find allies in the technical intelligentsia, who are politically realistic. But the same internal and external problems remain on the agenda.