LABOUR REVIEW

am convinced that what does us harm at elections is not concrete, specific and carefully designed proposals for particular acts of nationalization, but the vague threat to all private property, which we should eliminate’. (Our emphasis.)

The tone and content of Gaitskell’s speech leave no doubt as to his real intentions. Together with the professional, parliamentary and trade union cabal who support him he is determined to silence his critics and New Format — Reduced price . .. Is. 6d. Contents include :— Behind the Rail ‘Settlement’

Statement by the Editors Politics of Prosperity and Depression Tom Kemp Freedom and Revolution Alasdair MacIntyre Lessons of the Dining Car Strike Brian Arundel , Building the Bolshevik Party Brian Pearce

i The surrender of the Algiers insurgents who for eight days manned the barricades in defiance of the government of the Fifth Republic brings to an end its sharpest crisis to date. The tension had mounted until it almost matched the near panic of May, 1958, both in France and in Algiers.

The significant delay before De Gaulle’s television broadcast calling the insurgents to order, indicated that behind the scenes his ministers were divided and hesitant. The ominous threat that the army would throw in its lot with the ultras and precipitate civil war loomed on the horizon. The fissures in French society seemed to gape wide—they have been bridged temporarily by De Gaulle’s still immense personal prestige and appeal.

Everyone can now see, however, that the stability of the regime hangs on the life of one tired and ageing man —an uncrowned monarch carried to power by the forces from which he now tries to dissociate himself, and with no legitimate heir. The entire capitalist press contemplates with awe the political vacuum which the events of the past week have disclosed.

While the balance sheet of this episode in the still short history of the Fifth Republic is being struck, it is worth casting an eye at the policy of the French liberals and radicals during the crisis.

In short, a general rallying occurred of the official trade union organizations, including the Communist-inspired CGT, to the support of the Republic—the Republic which had issued from a similar rebellion in May, 1958—which, in the absence of political differentiation, meant support for De Gaulle.

When the Fourth Republic was on the eve of its demise these same forces rallied their biggest effort. A vast concourse from the Radicals to the CP thronged the streets; their slogans—defence of democracy, defence of the Fourth Republic. The funeral procession of the Fourth, some have unkindly dubbed it.

At this time no policy was presented which could rally the working class into action and swing behind it vacillating sections of the middle class. The great cry amounted to support for the government, defence of a system which had long exhausted its credit. “ This was a move in the bad tradition of Popular Frontism —in which defence of parliamentary institutions was hoisted to the masthead with the tricolour, while the red flag and the struggle for socialism were cast into limbo. A further step along this road was taken in the latest crisis; the bankruptcy of this policy has not yet been widely understood.

The French radical sector has, under its sway, adopted piecemeal the policy of the lesser evil in every critical turn. It appears in a crass form in the policy of Guy Mollet. It infects the leadership of the Communist Party and trade unions. It works its ravages among the so-called ‘new lefts’.

Bourdet’s letter An especially subtle, not to say brilliant—if equivocal— exponent of this line is Claude Bourdet, editor of the influential left paper, France Observateur. In its issue of January 28, he published a long open letter to De Gaulle. In places he did not mince matters. He spoke of shedding the blood of the torturers, and perhaps that of his own friends, as perhaps necessary to restore the honour of France’s name before the world and before history.

He showed an intellectual’s scorn for the General’s ambiguity and obtuseness. But despite lese majesty and an emotional tone there was shrewd reasoning in Bourdet’s He argued that the revolt would strengthen the army and _ that the deteriorating situation in Algeria arose from the FEBRUARY? 20, 1960 General’s own inability or unwillingness: to come to terms with the Provisional government of the Algerian Republic set up by the National Liberation Front (FLN). But, since the army no longer had a De Gaulle in reserve, as it had in May, 1958, it would, given firmness, be obliged to abandon any idea of insubordination—indication of which had been plain in the days following January 24.

At the time of writing, at the height of the crisis, Bourdet clearly feared that the General would temporize with the insurgents. It was in desperation, rather than with hope of being heard, that he put forward the proposition of immediate negotiation with the FLN government and asked De Gaulle to be ‘once more, as the defeatism of a whole class, and not your own wish, made you in 1940, the representative of the people of France against the social forces to which you are attached’.

Bourdet mingles not a little admiration with his mistrust of De Gaulle; he shows readiness to rally behind De Gaulle as ‘representative of the people’, though without much confidence that the ‘offer’ would be accepted.

In fact, the reply came as soon as the paper was off the press: it was seized by the police and reappeared later minus Bourdet’s article!

But that does not give Bourdet a clean bill of health. When the regime stands on the brink of disaster, instead of a message to the working people, this ‘new left’ sends a personal message to the autocrat—and what a message!

In the same issue Giles Martinet is more precise. There is, he argues, no possibility of putting an alternative democratic government in place of the De Gaulle regime. ‘This amounts to saying’, he adds, with emphasis, ‘that all our efforts must tend to oppose a counterweight to the action of the army and the ultras, and to exercise the maximum pressure on the policy of the government.’ — There must, he says, be no concessions to the ultras and the principle of ‘self-determination’ must be really applied; i.e., by De Gaulle’s government, since no other government is in prospect!

Martinet called for a campaign of petitions, telegrams, meetings and partial stoppages leading up to a national day of protest, which was not unlike that actually carried out by the official workers’ organizations. Thus the policy of the lesser evil was translated into practice... .

Took the advice On the back page of the same journal another contributor wrote ‘I have no doubt that General De Gaulle is big enough to accept his responsibilities.’

Yes, in a sense he took Bourdet’s advice: while the French ‘left’? was hanging in the air putting on the pressure. In true Bonapartist style De Gaulle balances between the seething social forces in France and Algeria to conserve French capitalism and maintain its essential positions in the colonies. Last week he moved to ward off a challenge from the extreme right.

He has not thereby become one whit more ‘democratic’; and the republic he has saved—with the support of the ‘left’, whatever its reservations or criticisms—remains the regime of big capital. De Gaulle not merely retains the initiative, Obtains special powers and moves to apply his own policy in Algeria—but he is able to use the so-clever ‘left? as a footstool in his manoeuvres.

The left and the working class have gained nothing from the timid ‘lesser evil’ policy adopted consciously or shamefacedly by their leaders.

The lesson of the Algiers revolt is that the French working-class moyement remains terribly misled, confused and demoralized; another opportunity to educate it for the trials ahead has been scattered to the winds, with the ‘new left’ aiding in its own way.

FEBRUARY: 20, 1960 was not allowed to chair the final meeting of strikers and Jack. Frazer, well-known Stalinist on the executive council, was imposed in his place. A resolution from the floor calling for the extension of the dispute and opposition to all payment