ALGERIA

ALL the efforts of the French Army over almost six years of war have failed to bring about a military solution to the Algerian question. De Gaulle has been no more successful than his predecessors in his search for a so-called political solution. If the Algerian liberation army cannot be beaten in battle the _material stake of French capital must be safeguarded by other means, similar to those which have been applied to the newly ‘independent’ territories of colonial Africa. For this, however, it is necessary to find © collaborators with standing among the Algerian population and, in effect, means turning to the Algerian Provisional Government in Tunis.

It is to be noted that while the struggle continues in ary. However, if it were possible to win concessions on Algeria it threatens to become a source of infection these points it seems likely that the FLN would be preto the other areas of Africa where the new political pared to reach an arrangement with de Gaulle. arrangements’ have left. unresolved the social and. If de Gaulle really wants such an atrangement—which economic problems. That is because the struggle in is not certain—and can get his supporters in the adminisAlgeria, whatever the leaders of the FLN may want, tration and in Algeria especially to go through with it— is part of a social revolutionary struggle for land and life which is also questionable, then it is clear that the FLN on the part of an oppressed and pauperized popula- government would have to sell out the social revolution tion. In the measure that it succeeds it will sharpen in Algeria. It would become, despite the paraphernalia the social conflict in other territories. of political independence, the stooge of French capital, Moreover, the failure of the Summit talks have both powerless to carry out agrarian reform or to take the strengthened de Gaulle’s illusions of grandeur and evoked steps ‘necessary to promote economic independence in pathological fear of the Chinese, with whom the Algerian the interests of the people. And this is the inevitable leaders have recently been carrying on negotiations with concomitant of any negotiated peace with de Gaulle. a view to obtaining arms and assistance. A settlement in Algeria has become increasingly desirable, perhaps. im- The French working class perative. At the same time, the failure of the settler Notably absent in this latest turn in the Algerian crisis movement of last January has weakened its possibility has been any intervention by the French working class. of standing out against the will of the French GovernUndoubtedly, like the majority of the French population; ment as long as the Army remains loyal to de Gaulle.

it is anxious to see the war brought to an end, but it has For the moment the possibility of rebellion by the been numbed into passivity by its experiences since 1945. settlers and the Army is not immediate. The former are No sudden change can be looked for. A crisis in leadertoo weak: some of their leaders are in prison, allies ship so profound as that which exists in the French among the extreme Right in France are prevented from working-class movement cannot be overcome in a day. going to Algeria. The Army waits, perhaps sceptical of The bitter truth is that every turn in the Algerian crisis the possibility of de Gaulle meeting the Algerian Proreveals it more starkly and bitterly. visional Government half way and not wishing to show Into the vacuum rush the self-styled:‘men of the ‘Left’, its hand, or convinced that de Gaulle’s ‘liberalism’ is pushing the cry of a negotiated peace (but de Gaulle not genuine.

would also be prepared for a negotiated peace) and forThe Provisional Government getting the revolutionary character of the Algerian moveAs we said at the time of de Gaulle’s original ‘self- ment and the great historic responsibility of the French determination’ offer last December, there are elements left for the present situation. These conscience-salvers in the Provisional Government which are attracted by the are, in fact, urging de Gaulle to be good-hearted and not prospect of a compromise peace which would enable to listen to the wicked men who surround him. French them to take office in Algeria itself. Ferhat Abbas, its interests, they say, lie in recognising Algerian ‘independPrime Minister, is the centre of this tendency, with sup- ence’ on the same terms as Mali and Madagascar. It port from Morocco and Tunisia. But even he cannot is not surprising that the ‘Left’ has not been able to rouse make peace on the terms proposed by the French so far much enthusiasm for its campaigns along these lines— and still retain the support of his followers. The real so much like the other half-hearted efforts of the last stumbling blocks encountered in the recent negotiations decade. The line of pressurising de Gaulle is not one seem to concern the position of the Liberation Army, the likely to appeal to workers in present circumstances or conduct of. elections and the status to be accorded to the one which can lead them out of their apathy and beProvisional Government, i.e., they are political and milit- wilderment.

DOCK STRIKE—(Continued from front page)

In their attempts to turn London men against the north, Transport and General Workers’ Union officials told fate of the northern men.

London shop stewards that there were two thousand nonBecause of their piece-work earnings, the London unionists in Liverpool and Birkenhead. dockers feel that an increase won’t mean so much for them. But the main point to bring home is that lower It should only take a moment’s thought for the wages and conditions in the north represent a sharp stewards to realize that these men were out solid in the threat to the standards of dockers in London. When the strike and that they support the purpose for which unions Merseyside docker fights for higher wages he is fighting were formed—to carry forward working-class struggle. to prevent his port becoming a scab alley, undermining Most of these non-unionists are outside because they conditions in London. are disgusted with the TGWU. They see no future in

the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers, the ‘blue’ union, which has suffered nothing but kicks and blows during the past few years.

When TGWU officials talk about non-unionists in the north, they also mean ‘blue’ union members whom they have done their best to drive off the dock.

A joint official campaign by ‘blue’ and ‘white’, some-. thing suggested by the local NASD but vehemently opposed by TGWU officials, or a campaign by rank-and-file committees would very quickly find these men taking out union cards again.

But the first task is to organize the wages fight. The Liverpool committee should immediately arrange a series of meetings in other ports. The aim should be to have a national leadership and a national rank and file completely aware of the issues before July 12.

The committee should be strengthened and ‘widened in Liverpool. There are dozens, even hundreds, of militants in Liverpool and Birkenhead who could be contributing to the committee and making it a much closer reflection of the feelings of the dockers.

These militants should come forward and take their place on the committee, otherwise there is no point in. them complaining about the weakness of the present leadership.