Algeria: Struggle Continues
By Tom Kemp
1962The NewsletterTom Kemp Read the scan at ETOL (PDF) →Title, extent and credit checked against the scan (17 October 2026, from the scan: page 2, headline across columns 1-4, 'By Tom Kemp' set over columns 2-3; the split had filed column 1 and the close (top of column 4) under the headline uncredited, and columns 2-3 under the by-line). The text is machine-read and not corrected: for anything you quote, read the scan.
- T is difficult to determine who is actually ruling Algeria at present. Where the concentration of French troops is still thick enough, and as long as their loyalty can be counted upon, the government of de Gaulle rules.
The French administration had been crumbling for some time under the pressure of the Secret Army; in any case it is now formally standing in for the provisional executive of the new 'independent' Algeria.
Headed by a late rallier to the nationalist cause, this executive does not really rule either. In some areas and in the Muslim quarters of the cities the FLN, which backs the executive, rules. But it cannot rule the country as long as the OAS remains unsubdued and the Europeans non-co-operative.
The latter, however long they may continue to stand out for 'Algerie Francaise' ', have little hope of immediate support from the army or from the metropolis.
Against the background of this three-way pull, it is clear that the FLN and the Gaullist regime stand together. Likewise, in France, the 'left' parties, including the Communist Party, will give support in the coming referendum for
de Gaulle's policy of determination.
All 'good Frenchmen' and Algerians, too, will back this imperialist deal.
It is argued by the friends of the FLN that, although the settlement is admittedly a compromise, it is a victory over imperialism. The failure of the French working class movement to provide effective support for the Algerian people was another great historical betrayal on the part of its leaders.
But the truth is that the FLN and its leaders, being the kind of movement it is, has been seeking such an arrangement all along. The fact that it used guns and bombs and bodies of armed men is not the determining one: they were necessary to win political independence from the French.
If there had really been a movement of solidarity between the French workers and the Algerian people fighting for their human rights and national independence, not only would that have meant pushing Thorez and Mollet from the scene, but Ferhat Abbas and Ben Khedda would have had to go as well.
The latter can settle with de Gaulle, just as the former can vote approval for his policy in the referendum.
It is all very well to argue that although the settlement prevents real agrarian reform or social change in Algeria in the long run these will come about. The question is that the agreement has not facilitated the achievement of a socialist Algeria.
The social and political balance inside the Muslim community itself has, for the present, swung towards ' moderation', which means acting in co-operation with French capital. the Blockade of Cuba The new regime, after independence, is likely to swing towards the type of Bonapartist politics which we are familiar with in Tunisia, Guinea, Ghana and so on.
There is no 'socialism' here.
While no viable national capitalism' can be built either, the historical impossibility of such a development in a backward country should not be taken as a sign of an 'irreversible movement' towards socialism.
Unless & new leadership can develop in Algeria, as well as in France, at least some temporary stabilization is possible for a period that will block the social revolution.
Of course there must be solidarity with the Algerian people. There must be backing for the new Algerian government insofar as it seeks to wage a real struggle with imperialism.
This is quite a different thing, however, from pressurising de Gaulle to honour his own agreements, made to favour French imperialism, in the style of the Communist Party, or making heroes of the FLN leaders.
There should be no illusions about the latter. Their policy in the past has been far from flawless and bears some responsibility for the shameful
sell-out they have now forced to make.
We do not acclaim these leaders, but we do support the Algerian Revolution, which in its course will sweep them aside.
The French army must be withdrawn from Algeria; even now the OAS could not survive without it. The French and international labour movement must demonstrate its solidarity with the Algerian people in its continuing struggle for full independence, which begins with carrying out an effective policy against imperialism in its strongholds.