What lies behind the latest Soviet crisis

Castro: had illusions

more determined measures against American interests and their stooges in the Cuban ruling class. The American response to this forced him into economic dependence upon the Soviet Union.

Cuba became a chip in the long, drawn-out and still continuing poker game of 'peaceful co-existence' carried on between Washington and Moscow.

For a long time-perhaps still - Castro had illusions about the possibility of restoring friendly relations with the USA. This was apparent for instance, when Kennedy took over the presidency in January 1961 (despite his anti-Cuban speeches during the election campaign).

PLANS LAID

By early 1961, 'however, plans had already been laid by the Central Intelligence Agency to put paid to Castro's game.

Such hopes were defeated at the Bay of Pigs. Castro stayed, but he now faced a permanent military threat from American imperialism.

Like republican Spain, Castro's Cuba became dependent upon Soviet backing for survival. This was a great opportunity for the Khrushchev bureaucracy.

If they had been concerned with defence of the Cuban revolution and its extension into Latin America, the planting of missiles on Cuban soil in the autumn of 1962 would have been 'reckless responsibility'.

As it was, Khrushchev thought only of what concessions he could win from the Americans. He won very little. AS the Soviet Union completes its 11th year without Stalin, a stocktaking of economic performance shows how little Khrushchev has been able to depart from the track laid out by his predecessor.

The roots of his problems go back to the 1920s when Stalin raised the cry of "socialism in one country' and proceeded to silence and crush all those who disagreed with him.

Stalin represented the conservative forces in the party and state which formed a new, privileged layer and assumed political control. Resting as it did on the healthy social and economic basis established by the Revolution of 1917 it was bound, for its own survival, to develop the economy in its own way.

Concession

While fighting his Opposition critics in the 1920s, Stalin made concessions to the peasants and ridiculed those who wished to step up the tempo of industrial development.

At this time Russia was still overwhelmingly agrarian and backward. The industrial sector was small and only climbing with difficulty back to the pre1914 level of output.

After losing valuable time in the twenties, Stalin seized violently on items in the programme of his opponents and proceeded to press them through in a brutal and distorted form.

Driven

Peasants were driven into collective farms. Many did not understand the reason for the collectivisation drive. They slaughtered their cattle by the thousand and were met with force, or driven by the trainload to Siberia, where thousands perished. Agriculture suffered a blow from which it has still not recovered.

Khrushchev had to admit, in 1953, that the numbers of Russian livestock were still below the 1928 level. The way in which collectivisation was carried out left an enormous weight of resentment in the villages.

Collosal

Industry was built up in same heavy-handed way amid colossal mistakes avoidable human suffering.

At the same time the Revolution had freed Russia from the dead hand of landlords and capitalists. Despite their hardships the Russia workers, reenforced by huge new contingents from the countryside, believed they were working for their own future.

The nationalized base of the economy permitted large-scale planning and a tremendous rate of growth, despite the distortions and mistakes which resulted from bureaucratic blundering and the lack of effective control from below.

Severed

At the same time, the Russian economy was artificially severed from the world market. It was dependent mainly on its own resources.

Lenin had believed that the working class of advanced Europe would make their own revolutions and come to the aid of backward Russia.

Instead, the policies of the world communist movement were attuned, not to the needs of the international working class, but to the protection of the interests of the ruling caste in Russia.

'Socialism in country* the and and thus had its own logic. It meant no revolution outside Russia.

Inside Russia it meant the cowing of all opposition and the maintenance of a huge apparatus of police, purges and prisons. The inordinate powers of the secret police terrified even the members of the bureaucracy.

None of them could feel safe. In his report to the 20th Congress, Khrushchev depicted the atmosphere of terror in which they all lived.

Expanding

But, in the meantime, despite the colossal distortions and mistakes of the Stalin period, Russia had become a great and rapidly expanding industrial country.

The costs of Stalinism had been extremely high. The country was still isolated in 1939 and nearly crushed by the Nazi war machine. It suffered tremendous war losses. These can be put at the door of 'socialism in one country'.

The Stalinist betrayals in Germany, China, France and Spain directly weakened the Soviet Union and almost brought it to disaster. They also added up to major defeats for the working class, the effects of which are still being felt.

Co-operate

The Chinese, by posing revolutionary Stalin against the 'modern revisionist' Khrushchev, fail completely to read or understand the lessons of history. Khrushchev is Stalin's heir, if not his disciple.

During and after the war Stalin hoped to co-operate with the victorious imperialist coun tries. Anybody who wants a classic expression of 'peac ful co-existence' can find it in the Yalta and Potsdam agreem nts. Even Khrushchev has not yet been able to better them.

Threat

The capitalist countries had other thoughts. They saw the strength of the USSR as a threat to their own system. They measured its economic weight (together with that of still backward Eastern Europe, and then LENIN believed the European workers would make their own revolution China) against their own combined force, which remained greatly superior.

The ruling classes in these countries had never accepted the existence of the USSR as permanent. The Cc old War, begun in the late 1940: s, showed that opinions had not changed.

Problems

When Stalin died in 1953 the bureaucracy was faced with major problems. • The weight of secret police terror had become intolerable and they wished to relax it in their own interest and rule through more refined means.

The working class grown immensely in and social weight, as as education: there now a threat that it v demand the political F had size well was ould ›wer which had been filched away from by the bureaucracy.

The growing demand for more goods of better quality and in greater variety could no longer be resisted Resources The weaknesses in agriculture could no longer be concealed and major changes in policy were called for in that quarter. Industrial strength was no longer measured solely in tons of steel or coal; more resources had to be directed into industries based on the new technologies, in some of which the Soviet Union lagged badly behind. The heavy pressure from the hostile capitalist world still imposed an immense burden of armaments. In the same way, 'socialism in one country' cut the country off from the capitalist world and had even distorted relationships with the East European countries.

To counter imperialism, economic aid had to be extended to newly developing countries.

The planning system, backed under Stalin by secret police and forced labour, was no longer adequate to the needs for a more advanced economy. wiewed in this issue Colonialism Today f th r Pa Publications Ltd., 186A Clapham Higl SW4 Large parts of the economy still lagged seriously behind the advanced capitalist countries; Russia had not overcome all the problems of belated economic development.

Pressure

These were the main problems facing Khrushchev when he took over power in 1955. Faced with a tremendous pressure on resources and an explosive international situation and challenged from within by the working class—which reached a STALIN represented the conservative forces in the party and the state climax in the Hungarian Kevolution of 1956-the bureaucracy sought desperately to find new measures which could enable it to retain its privileged position.

Hence the remedies with which Khrushchev's name is particularly associated and the new approach to imperialism, representing the continuance of 'socialism in one country, which goes under the name of "peaceful co-existence' This is the first of a series of articles on the economic crisis in the Soviet Union. pamphlet are available, price 2s. Ad.

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