Problems of the Fourth International

AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF REVISIONISM in the United States today is the protracted and relatively low political development of the working class. The post-war inflationary boom strengthened temporarily many illusions in the viability of American capitalism. At the same time the cold-war witch-hunt resulted in the best militants being expelled from their trade unions and sacked from a large number of the most important industries. The Socialist Workers' Party suffered very severely from these setbacks.

The break-up of this situation became discernable in the early 1960s with the emergence of powerful movements amongst student youth around civil rights and later the war in Vietnam. In some respects this development resembled the CND movement in Britain during the late 1950s. They were, and are, predominantly middle-class movements which indirectly reflect the re-emergence of the working class into class politics in the metronolitan capitalist countries.

But for a revolutionary Marxist party to orientate itselt exclusively on such manifestations ot struggle Is a fundamental error in terms of Marxist theory. In practice it means basing the activity of the party around the idea that the middle class can change society, when, in fact, this is the task and the task alone which the working class has to perform under revolutionary leadership.

This does not in any way mean that the working class no longer needs the support of such middle-class layers. It does indeed, but here again the venicle tor consciously guiding such support towards the working class is the Marxist party which on matters of principle bases itselt on the revolutionary role of the working class.

The political degeneration of the SWP internationally was greatly accelerated by its about turn towards the petty-bourgeois radical movement inside the USA.

From here on it was only a stone's throw to sympathising with the late President Kennedy's wife when he (the President) was assassinated and from demanding that Federal troops be sent into Mississippi to aid the Negroes. This also marked the uncritical turn towards Malcolm X and later the slogan of Black Power.

Whilst it is the duty of the revolutionary party to provide critical support for such movements in order to direct them towards the working class, the SWP completely capitulated to them.

And yet, without the intervention of the powerful American working class, all these movements are in a blind alley from which there is no way out unless the revolutionary party mobilises this working class against capitalism.

It is at this point that we can see the real political implications of internationalism for the SWP. The Fourth International-its theory and organisational conceptions-is the only force capable of guiding and rectifying the course of a national section when it starts from impressionism and begins to capitulate to its capitalist environment.

It was precisely when such a need arose that the SWP broke of all its relations with the International Committee of the Fourth International and turned towards the Pabloite revisionists.

Only the International Committee could have at this stage assisted the SWP to overcome its difficulties, but Cannon, Hansen and Dobbs were contemptuous of the Fourth International outside the United States.

They had become arrogant American nationalists who were now hopelessly entangled with the politics of the petty bourgeois in the USA. They wanted the kind of international they could utilise for their own revisionist ends and Pabloism filled the bill.

When the Fourth International was founded in the summer of 1938, it based itself essentially upon the revolutionary potential of the international working class.

Into its theoretical armour Trotsky poured all the lessons and principles derived from the struggles of the modern proletariat against the forces of international capital.

Revolutionary internationalism is inseparable from the Marxist conception that the working class is the only class capable of overthrowing capitalist society and establishing socialism. tional in 1953, maintained that sections of the petty-bourgeois Stalinist bureaucracy would, under pressure, move into a leftward direction and substitute themselves for the revoRobertson The revisionist Pabloite conception, which produced the split in the Fourth Internalutionary party by taking the power.

Here is the essential revisionist bond which binds the SWP to the rump Pabloite outfit of Germain, Pierre Frank and Livio, which masquerades as the 'Unified Secretariat of the Fourth International' operating trom Paris.

From its intancy the group in the USA, which is now led nurtured in the worst environment of petty-bourgeois politics, the Shachtman group which denounced the derence ot the Soviet Union in 1940 and split trom the Fourth International.

The group joined the SWP in the late lyus at a ume when Cannon and Co. were rapıdly moving away irom ine Fourn International. Hence the early anu-internationalst training which Rooerison's group brougnt with it Irom Shacntman now blended with the anti-internationalsm of the SWP.

Back to revisionism This did not at all mean that trom then on relalions between Robertson and the SWP leadership would be plain sailing. The basic core of Robertson's group is first and foremost clique of peltybourgeois frienas whose politics are determined by the need to maintain at all costs their own little group.

If the preservation of this clique sometimes takes on the form of abstractly defending the correct principles of Fourth International, then they will turn enthusiastically towards defending them, vided it does not interfere with their little friendly circle.

At the time when Robertson joined the SWP the party leaders having made up their minds to capitulate to Pabloism, were busily turning their attention towards the liquidation of all opposition to their policies.

They saw in Robertson's group a potential source of such opposition and this immediately raised the future of the clique.

For time Robertson appeared to move politically in the direction of the Socialist Labour League and the International Committee.

Then came the crucial test.

Since the struggle of the SWP was essentially being waged against the International Committee of the Fourth International it became essential that all those who supported Committee should work under its leadership.

This is something which Robertson would not tolerate.

He and his clique wanted the right to say and do as they liked inside the SWP and the USA without any interference from the international movement.

In other words they wanted the political authority of the International Committee without in any way being organisationally responsible to it.

Naturally, bearing in mind the anti-internationalism which was prevalent in and around the SWP, we could never agree to such a position.

Accordingly, the Committee drew up a list of proposals in 1962 which we insisted must be agreed by all the US participants in the political fight The dnois Of the against the revisionist SWP leadership. These were as follows:

1. The tendency expresses its general political agreement with the tendency of the International Committee which has agreement around the 1961 international perspectives presented by the Socialist Labour League. It must therefore begin from the standpoint of its responsibilities towards the political struggle of this tendency in relation to the construction of the revolutionary party in the United States.

The tendency recognises that the building of the SWP as a revolutionary party depends on and derives from its adherence to the revolutionary international perspective a n d approach.

All discussion and disagreement within the tendency is part of the discussion within the international tendency. Patience will have to be exercised so that while time is allowed for such differences to be adequately discussed internationally, the political aims and functioning of the tendency remain unimpaired.

For this purpose, there will be facilities available for all members of the tendency to express their opinions in a special international tendency bulletin to be published by the Socialist Labour League. This bulletin will have a limited circulation amongst leaders of the international sections who will be invited to comment and participate in the discussion inside the tendency. All written discussion must be carried out within this bulletin.

2. The tendency must pay particular attention to the development of a perspective for work in the United States in relation to the trade union and the Negro movement. The main political work of the tendency within the party will be to patiently explain the nature of the Pabloite revisionism and liquidationism as a method, and its relation to the problem of developing a concrete revolutionary perspective for work in the trade union and Negro movements. Such a policy must be carefully presented, not in an artificial factional way, but in a way that will make sense to the activists in the party. The elaboration of the policy is therefore a matter that can only be carried out by most careful preparation.)

The more careful and thoughtful the preparation, the easier it will be to convince people i is ctired othe preparation factional and subjective way, then barriers can be raised between the tendency and the rank and file which will slow down the rate of clarification.

The main political fight of the tendency must be directed against the right-wing elements The sixth of a series of articles by G. HEALY National Secretary Socialist Labour Leaj in the party, the Weiss group Swabeck: tendency.

This does not in any way mean that we make the slightest concession to the centre element in the party who up to now have been trying to have the best of both worlds, but who have gradually shifted this position, for the time being at least, in a leftward direction. Because this shift to the left on pacifism is carried out empirically, it can easily become a shift to the right under different conditions. What does is to open a favourable opportunity for a real struggle against the right-wing elements.

An analysis of the Weiss position adopted by the Pabespecially French Pabloites, on Cuba will show a very clear difference between them and the majority of the SWP.

strategy should be to establish political cohesion of our tendency in a way that can effect united front where possible with the centre elements in the SWP against the right.

3. The tendency must recognise that the SWP is the main instrument for the realisation of socialism in the United States. Inere is no other OIganisation outside that movement which can decisively aid the struggle for socialism at the present time. Our comrades must theretore work as loyal party members; conirlbute to all aspects of the work, literary and practical, taking part in all its electoral activity and sub-drives and accepting the administrative decisions ot the leadership even thougn we might be very much against them.

Members of the tendency must recognise that the Swp is their party, and they must speak as possible for their parare rese difficulties of the party not be exploited in a factional way. This must be seen as the overhead price for lack of policlarification. Since the responsibility for this clarification now rests squarely on the shoulders of the tendency, to make factional capital out of the party's difficulties would be nothing more than shelving that task which is the main purpose for the existence of the tendency.

The tendency must not make premature characterisations of the leadership of the SWP except of those groups such as Weiss and Swabeck who have clearly revealed their Pabloism in theory and practice.

The centre group which is, of course, the majority cannot be described as a finished centrist tendency in the same way as the Pabloites. To be sure there are elements of centrism in its thinking and activity, but these do not predominate. To characterise the SWP majority tendency as a finished centrist tendency is to give up the political battle before it has begun.

We must believe that by common work and political discussion it will be possible to win a majority of the party to adopt a correct line on Pabloism and for the building of the revolutionary party in the United States.

4. The present tendency shall dissolve and shall reestablish itself on the basis of the preceding point.

5. Only those comrades who accept these conditions can be members of the tendency.

Robertson and his clique rejected these proposals out of hand. They were not really concerned with the struggle inside the SWP to clarify the party, they were more concerned about what was to be the future of their own little group, which was now being pressed to make up its mind by two irreconcilable and antagonistic forces-the International Committee and the Pabloite revisionists of the SWP.

Caught by his unprincipled politics in this trap, Robertson beat a hasty retreat into the camp of revisionism.

Right in the middle of the most critical stage of the political struggle between the International Committee and the American Pabloites he preferred to split the weak forces of the Committee within the SWP rather than accept the international recommendations on how the struggle should be conducted.

Thus, Robertson's anti-internationalism played right into the hands of the revisionists and correspondingly strengthened them.

This was a serious warning to the International Committee and the Socialist Labour League as to the treacherous middle-class nature of this group. Still we resolved to proceed in a most patient way to try and educate Robertson and as many of his supporters as possible.

A few days after the split from comrade Wolforth's group we replied to their arguments justifying the break as follows:

London Dear Comrades, We have received a letter dated November 4 in the names of L. Harper, L. Ireland, S. Mage, J. Robertson, S. Stoute written on behalf of a majority of the New York section of the Revolutionary Tendency of the SWP.

There appears to be some misunderstanding amongst you about the proposals which we submitted through comrade Phillips. You appear, for example, to be labouring under a misapprehension that these proposals were draited after we listened to an attack upon you by comrade Phillips.

This, of course, was not the case. If we had any criticisms to make of your goodselves, we would do so in writing. We would certainly not listen to any kind of gossip in relation to your activity. We start from the assumption that you want seriously to construct the revolutionary party in the US and we would like to assure you that we are only too happy to discuss with you about the best possible way to do this.

We ourselves have, as you know, a long experience of working as a minority faction inside the British Trotskyist movement. We began this work in 1943 and it lasted for seven years. We did not assume leadership rights in England until 1950.

The proposals are based upon experiences we had during that time and are certainly not dictated by comrades Wolforth and Phillips. During this period we accepted on a number of occasions advice with which we ourselves disagreed, but which we operated in practice because we accepted the revolutionary integrity and rich experience of those comrades. wno gave it to us. In this way we began to understand the real value ot international collaboration.

Between September 1943 and March 1944, we tought a sharp struggle tor the unitication of all the Troiskyist groups in Britain. At the conterence of our organisation the Workers' Internauonal League in September 1943, 1 was in a minority of one supporting this proposal. Then advice came from comrades in New York which laid down the terms for unification. These terms were presented as final and could not be dedated or discussed. They had to be accepted or rejected as they were by all parties concerned, including our minority. • Since the unprincipled majority of our section wanted to deprive us of an opportunity to continue the struggle against them, they immediately opened up relations with the opportunist elements in the other groups and decided to accept the terms. Their reasoning was that by moving towards acceptance of such terms they could isolate us by an unprincipled combination. They did just that. When the unification congress took place in March 1944, we were deprived of minority rights on the National Committee of the fused organisation, the Revolutionary Communist Party. Prior to this conference we raised the matter with the comrades responsible for the fusion terms but they told us that we could not insist on any rights and that we had also got to accept the terms as they were.

So reluctantly we accepted the terms and went ahead to make the fused organisation work. History has since revealed that the fusion was in side of those who were our favour and not on the manoeuvring and intriguing. If we had not accepted the terms and split from the fused organisation because we were not given any rights, then surely our tendency would have been destroyed.

I might add that we did not receive minority rights on the National Committee of the Revolutionary Communist Party until almost two years later. Everything was done to persecute us as a faction but we refused under any circumstances to split no matter what the differences or to be driven out of the party. Our people were the best workers and nothing could be done to take this right away from them.

Early in the fusion it became clear that the leadership of the Revolutionary Commun ist Party contained a mixture of ultra-Lefts, opportunists and centrists, but we resisted attempts to characterise them premature characterisation i premature characterisation STUR aescribuon DUOM nave acted as a barrier between ouruanaoue seatos ape pue suew sapenmos u! имо tendency lem surongly aboul 947 majority ing tney had 01 their feelings in order Suo1 UIa1 JO YIOM 01 e pe danz den lauch stag.

anz [0 international struggle IsUrede IOTHOISTASA which resulted in the split of MOT SEY 5561 • WIO] •TOd 10 tical clarication mnoqe [ne nature or tis revisionism. une leadership IO tne aMS tendine to succumo to it as al prodields stal ing ou e sueat clear-cut aevelopment. VY e WAI MOY reaaine the docu ments and Duducallons or tae RiJed ina certaln TAne se se ueseH pue opaem aevelopea a rounucu vul tau loite approach. Others - are however, still very unclear Suor signing for SOaNT altnough it cannot, because the Voorhis Act, participate in international activity.

Untortunate v activit ot the Pabloites nas Uaaa some extent successiu in pro voking a lacuonal atmospnere between anasa pue majority. A g00C percenlage ISIA SIE SUT GOSMOCT in will misrepreMans Suns factional •points which Welc then relayed the US in order to sharpen up difterences know only )01 well the шлеч that •op The „1ж oz I0ddo expose SISSeOme Kired 01 ST uo pue ror unIs эм nave to snarden up ine invernai lac JMS au! no mallel whal tie provoca •uon inn эр SDIPMO1 DaUAS LuIS ered une with our past experience We impose them on you. 1I you uke to accepi tnem, inen inere DAATOIT TTTAYT1 inose comrades OUM PROOP OTA se этэм эм Ino To ST 10 San pue 10u IPPORS groupings. The SLL as part o world movement every right to establish tendency re lations when it feels these are aq 07 ITO ON.OS OlIR ing sapasa Sapeo of OUM PIIOM eAeu patnas S! II bute in all the al tens trist nature of the SWP leaderAn pue dg p Asna Ii cuss them with vou ansa of in o n internal struggle the minority that „ ved vd de efforts towards clarifying the struggle. We feel sure that at is pue СТ 11 this под inox 07 seM/ op this we make important gains in the tuture We would like to ask you L Due suiaz tis hea. : a written discussion witł were nossible you may be able to arrange ISIA some time spring or earlier if it could be managed.

Acceptance of the term. SAOD tou mean vou ever an UROA Soso aTod to ao wnal o1 peu "sed that te national experience pue St5n yan ue Io tendency tanas no pana

NEWSLE Octob 1966